Debordering and Rebordering

This book addresses practices of bordering, debordering and rebordering on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after state borders had been remapped on the negotiation tables of the Paris Peace Treaties following the First World War.

As life in borderlands did not correspond to the peaceful Europe articulated in the Paris Treaties, a multitude of (un)foreseen complications followed the drawing of borders and states. The chapters in this book include new case studies on the creation, centralization or peripheralization of border regions, such as Subcarpathian Rus, Vojvodina, Banat and the Carpathian Mountains; on border zones such as the Czechoslovakian harbour in Germany; and on cross-border activities. This book shows how disputes over national identities and ethnic minorities, as well as other factors such as the economic consequences of the new state borders, appeared on the interwar political agenda and coloured the lives of borderland inhabitants. The contributions demonstrate the practices of borderland inhabitants in the establishment, functioning, disorganization or ultimate breakdown of some of the newly created interwar nation-states.

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**Introduction**

*The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: border making and its consequences*

Machteld Venken


**Chapter 1**

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Gábor Egry


**Chapter 2**

*New state borders and (dis)loyalties to Czechoslovakia in Subcarpathian Rus, 1919–25*

Stanislav Holubec


**Chapter 3**

*The new borders as local economic possibility? The case of post-1920 Hungary*

Péter Bencsik


**Chapter 4**

*The role of history and geography teaching in the building of national identity in interwar Vojvodina*

Dragica Koljanin, Biljana Šimunović-Bešlin and Paulina Čović


**Chapter 5**

*Bohemia by the sea: establishing a Czechoslovak port in Hamburg in the interwar period*

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Chapter 6
The traitorous national periphery: the legacy of identity politics of imperial Hungary in a new eastern metropolis of Czechoslovakia – Košice/Kassa
Ondrej Ficeri

Chapter 7
Reinforcing the border, reconfiguring identities: Polish initiatives in the Carpathians in the interwar period
Patrice M. Dabrowski

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The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: border making and its consequences

Machteld Venken

ABSTRACT
This special issue addresses practices of border-making and their consequences on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As the reality did not correspond to the peaceful Europe articulated in the Paris Treaties, a multitude of (un)foreseen complications followed the drawing of borders and states. Articles include new case studies on the creation, centralization or peripheralization of border regions, such as Subcarpathian Rus, Vojvodina, Banat and the Carpathian Mountains, on border zones such as the Czechoslovakian harbour in Germany, and on cross-border activities. The special issue shows how disputes over national identities and ethnic minorities, as well as other factors such as the economic consequences of the new state borders, appeared on the interwar political agenda and coloured the lives of borderland inhabitants. Adopting a bottom-up approach, the contributions demonstrate the agency of borderlands and their people in the establishment, functioning, disorganization or ultimate breakdown of some of the newly created interwar nation-states.

Major border changes (triggered by the demise of the Cold War set-up following the collapse of communism, the Yugoslav wars and the enlargement project of the European Union), as well as the recent strengthening of state borders as a response to asylum seekers and the COVID-19 pandemic, have inspired contemporary historians to readress or shift their lens of analysis to the physical demarcation lines between states. Space, which was functioning in the background of most historical analyses, has begun to come to the foreground. It is no longer assumed to be independent of humans, with historical events manifesting themselves within the closed box of the nation-state, but is perceived as 'a product of human agency and perception, as both the medium and presupposition for sociability and historicity'. An understanding of space as a social, political and cultural product invites us to approach nation-states as flexible and historically changing phenomena. What then becomes visible is that space is transient, in the sense that it is 'created through economic, social, cultural or political movements and interactions', and is 'meaningful for historical actors only in relation to a specific set of perceptions, interests and strategies, and in a given temporal context'.
The Association for Borderlands Studies, the world’s largest organization for scholars analysing the historical and contemporary dynamics of border creation, border management and border shifting, as well as the consequences of these practices for the societies concerned, held its Second World Conference in Vienna and Budapest in July 2018. The participants sought to gain a deeper insight into the similarities and differences in the ways in which borders were and are made around the world, as well as the forms and functions borders fulfil over time. The conference had a strong focus on history, as the post-imperial experience of Europe raises numerous questions that relate to borders, identities and citizenship and, ultimately, migration. A special series of 11 conference sessions focused specifically on the consequences of the dissolution of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire in the aftermath of the First World War, one of the single most comprehensive changes in the European state system, for old and/or newly created borderlands. This special issue contains a selection of the papers presented at the conference, all of which deal with different and often unknown aspects of border-making and its consequences in the space formerly composed of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

With the demise of three multinational empires at the end of the First World War (Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman), as well as the containment of the German Empire, nationalist forces all over Europe claimed the right to a territory for what they considered to be their own people. The decision-makers in Paris were guided by their visions of a just Europe and adhered to the vague and contentious principle of self-determination while determining the layout of a European continent with changed state borders. Self-determination arose as a theoretical concept in the texts of Lenin and became the motor for political action in the steppe rebellion of 1916. Soon after the February Revolution, the Soviet started to speak of self-determination and peace. Peace was to bring an end to the oppression of people hitherto considered at the margins of society by granting them their own sovereignty. Imperial paternalism needed to be exchanged for national self-determination. The Western Allies despised the German expansionism presented in the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty in March 1918 and responded by making the dissolution of imperial regimes and the self-determination of people in Central and Eastern Europe their war aims.

However, the idea of national self-determination could not be translated into homogeneous entities; uncontested nation-states as identities were multifold and not graspable within clear territorial lines of demarcation. The peace treaties resulting from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 caused a major redrawing of the map of Europe. Two treaties recognized the independent status of newly emerged nation-states on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye divided the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy between the interwar Austrian state, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Treaty of Trianon divided the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy between the interwar Hungarian state, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Austria and the Free State of Fiume (today Rijeka), which emerged in 1921, operated under the auspices of the League of Nations and was annexed to Italy in 1924.

The seven articles included in this special issue focus on the policies adopted by national and local authorities with regard to borderlands, as well as the way in which state
policies were approved, reinforced or refuted by borderland inhabitants. They address practices of border-making and their consequences in the interwar nation-states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Poland and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. They include case studies on the creation, centralization or peripheralization of border regions, such as Subcarpathian Rus, Vojvodina, Banat and the Carpathian Mountains, on border zones such as the Czechoslovakian harbour in Germany, and on cross-border activities. The articles contribute to historical scholarship by offering new insights in three areas: border-making in interwar Europe; phantom borders; and belonging.

Several factors, such as geopolitical concerns, economic reasons, the development of supranational protection of minority rights and the internationalization of rivers, shaped the contours of Europe’s interwar state borders. Historians have convincingly shown how geopolitical concerns about safety and order on the continent were behind the drawing of state borders in borderlands such as Upper Silesia, Eupen-Malmedy and Schleswig. The way in which interwar state border lines could be drawn for economic reasons is equally well covered in historical literature, an example being the Polish Corridor giving the newly independent Polish state access to the Baltic Sea. Three articles in this special issue break new ground by showing the economic consequences of new state borders. Both Stanislav Holubec and Gábor Egry demonstrate that the establishment of the Romanian-Czechoslovak state border line mainly along the Tisza River and mostly respecting the ethnic differences as declared in the last Habsburg census of 1910 caused local trade networks to be cut and increased local dependency on resources flowing in from Prague and Bucharest. The Hungarian-Czechoslovak state border line in Subcarpathian Rus decided upon by the Entente Powers in 1919, on the other hand, had to facilitate transportation from and to interwar Czechoslovakia and did not take into account the allegiances of the local population, leaving approximately 100,000 Hungarian speakers in Subcarpathian Rus. Stanislav Holubec compares the consequences of border-making for local inhabitants in Subcarpathian Rus, pointing in particular to the growth of a local Hungarian, but not Romanian, national party refuting Czechoslovak state sovereignty. With his article on trade across Hungary’s state border lines, Peter Bencsik, on the other hand, places himself in a new current of research focusing on economic possibilities in interwar Hungary. Following on from research showing how the use of modern technologies and the opening of the economy to larger international markets outweighed the fact that Hungarians were left without most of the raw resources they had had access to in Dualist Hungary, the author analyses how those who owned land on two sides of the newly established state borders benefitted from legal and illegal cross-border trade. Based on historical newspaper research, he unravels how poverty and food shortages in the early 1920s triggered the emergence of a new social practice, namely cross-border contraband activities.

The development and functioning of a supranational framework for the protection of rights of national minorities in the newly established nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe is one of the most well researched topics in contemporary historiography, and there are numerous studies on schools in borderlands. At a time of growing state involvement in the lives of individuals inhabiting the European continent, with nation-state representatives unambiguously defining their incentives in their measures for future citizens, borderland schools often became essential sites of interwar political struggle.
where nationalists clashed over the meaning of childhood. The article by Dragica Koljanin, Biljana Šimunović-Bešlin and Paulina Čović focuses on multi-ethnic Vojvodina, a border region within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (after 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Initially, a pluralistic understanding of Yugoslav nationhood legitimizing the commonalities among its inhabitants through the inclusion of political, regional or religious particularities was pursued. Because the state ideology of Yugoslavism was developed at a moment in time when identities such as being Serbian, Slovenian or Croatian were still contingent and dynamic, it could eventually have generated a hybrid but vernacular Yugoslav identity. In the process, however, the endeavour failed because of the centralization and politicization of Yugoslav nationhood undertaken by Belgrade authorities during the authoritarian rule that characterized the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.14 State authorities increasingly doubted whether their citizens were willing enough to place their regional identities within the larger idea of Yugoslav ideology. The dictatorship in Yugoslavia preferred to execute its power as prohibition, domination and repression.15 The authors use school textbooks to explore how national education was practised before and during the dictatorship, and conclude that borderland children were exposed to increasingly non-negotiable Yugoslavian (mostly interpreted as Serbian) content in history, geography and language classes. The findings need to be read in tandem with the latest insights on minority education for German-speaking Donauschwaben. The latter learned that by framing themselves as a national minority, and not merely a cultural one, their cultural and linguistic needs could be met. As a national minority, they were able to attract the attention of a powerful transnational actor, Germany, and have their concerns addressed by the League of Nations in Geneva. This led to a change in the enrolment policy for German-speaking minority schools, where name analysis (i.e. state officials deciding which child was entitled to education in a minority school based on the names of his/her ancestors) was exchanged for a procedure based on what a parent declared their child’s mother tongue to be.16

The creation of a patchwork of small nation-states went hand in hand with an internationalization of rivers.17 Sarah Lemmen presents the fascinating case of the Czechoslovak right of access to the sea, an illustrative new example of the problem of combining the ideology of self-determination with the need for functional economic structures in newly established states. While describing the 10 years of negotiations over the inclusion of a clause concerning a Czechoslovak rental property at a German port in the Treaty of Versailles and the operation of the Czechoslovak Free Zone in Hamburg, Lemmen meticulously unravels different understandings of a sovereign territory at the time. Whereas the Czechoslovak authorities started out claiming that their sovereignty rights needed to entail a transfer of territory, their German counterparts asserted that a lease of a port zone did not mean that Germany had to give up its sovereign rights over the zone. Common ground was found in the late 1920s, when good bilateral economic relations were given priority, replacing the previous bombastic nationalist rhetoric. Czechoslovakian authorities could lease zones in the harbour of Hamburg and offer customs controls for their ships in Prague instead of in Hamburg. This partial transfer of sovereign rights was a solution that preserved the interwar political order of nation-states executing control over their territory.

A second research field to which articles included in this special issue contribute is phantom borders. Borderlands have already been referred to as palimpsests: manuscripts
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'on which two or more successive texts have been written, each one being erased to make room for the next'.18 Whereas erasure suggests a picture of the past as a definitive break, a group of mainly German historians has preferred to understand the history of borderlands as an activity of layering well captured by the concept of phantom borders. Phantom borders are 'earlier, most commonly political borders or territorial structures that, after they were dissolved, continued to structure the space'.19 The concept of phantom borders allows us to look at how, after a switch of state sovereignty, certain structures, discourses or practices from the past can reappear or be reassembled or lost through human activities. The search for what remains in new and changing situational contexts concentrates on the way in which historical players gave meaning to a new geographic-political order. Borders are thus approached as complex historically contingent processes, and borderlands as places where different ideas about belonging are negotiated and renegotiated whilst making use of, adapting or ignoring past structures, discourses and practices depending on the situational context.20 Scholars have already demonstrated, for example, that the Habsburg administration supported the strengthening of various nationalisms by installing a mandatory system of classification into strictly defined national groups along linguistic and/or ethnic lines.21 Most of the scholarship, however, has focused on the Western part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with little attention being paid to the different ethnic policy agenda of the Eastern part. Three articles included in this special issue deepen our understanding of the influence of the past within the interwar lands formerly belonging to Dualist Hungary.

Gábor Egry compares the interwar regions of Maramureș and the Banat. Both regions were situated at the edge of the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy and saw state border lines being drawn across their lands in the aftermath of the First World War, with parts of both being included in Romania. The author argues that the peripheralization and political regionalism which developed in both borderlands during the interwar years, but according to different patterns, had much to do with legacies of the past. The practice of differentiated rule cast a lasting shadow on re(b)ordering practices in Romanian Maramureș. Differentiated rule meant that representatives of Dualist Hungary chose to cooperate closely with regional elites, thereby guaranteeing that power within the borderlands would remain largely executed in ways local inhabitants were used to, while at the same time offering elite members from the borderlands access to power in Budapest. In this way, the traditional elite managed to preserve its position of power within the borderlands. In the interwar Romanian part of the Banat, on the other hand, the political battle against Hungarians in the early twentieth century inspired borderland political activists to reject an alliance with a political party in Bucharest and to contest Romanian nationalism instead.

Ondrej Ficeri zooms in on the city known as Kassa when it belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Košice when it joined Czechoslovakia at the state border with Hungary in the aftermath of the First World War. Through an analysis of the position of the city in interwar discourses and practices, Ondrej Ficeri assesses the influence of the city's switch in state sovereignty on the imagined spatial universe of its inhabitants. He concludes that while Czechoslovak authorities attempted to determine the sentiment of local inhabitants, they failed to clarify matters as they underestimated the symbolic legacy of the city for Hungarians, as well as the persistence of cultural and economic ties local inhabitants had developed during imperial times. Peter Bencsik further explains how the
The drawing of interwar state borders in Central and Eastern Europe gave rise to new practices that equipped inhabitants with a suitable response to the controlled economies installed during the Second World War. On the other hand, the newly established practice of cross-border smuggling in interwar Hungary created a phantom border within occupied Hungary and the Hungarian People's Republic.

As well as offering new insights into historical knowledge about border-making in interwar Europe and phantom borders, this special issue contributes to scholarship on borderland inhabitants’ feelings of belonging. Influenced by the cultural shift, historians have come to understand national appropriation as a construction—that is as an experience of the social world as differentiated between ‘us’ and ‘them’—resulting in a departure from primordialist interpretations that claim identifications as innate characteristics. Although it is the ambition of nation-states to hold a strong position in policy-making in borderlands, historical players made their own use of such policies. The authors included in this special issue were inspired by four different approaches in their analyses of borderlanders’ feelings of belonging: Alltagsgeschichte (or everyday life history); national indifference; multiple loyalties; and regionalism.

The method of everyday life history serves to unravel how political ideas interact in the lives of non-hegemonic inhabitants. Aiming to shed light on the way in which local people appropriated, changed or refuted such ideas in their daily life practices, this literature avoids using a top-down approach and instead explores microstudies from a bottom-up perspective. Practices, i.e. repetitions in everyday routines, articulate the relationship between individuals and their environment and provide experiences with one or more means of appropriation. In his article about contraband activities, Peter Bencsik sketches the profile of an ordinary peasant whose land ended up on two sides of the new state border and who was unable to understand why all of a sudden he needed papers to cross. He describes how legislation was developed that named and penalized the phenomenon, as well as how local sheriffs implemented these laws differently depending on their background and personalities. Notwithstanding legislation, contraband activities became a permanent phenomenon, which, in better economic times, shifted to the smuggling of luxury goods.

While investigating how inhabitants with different national and local allegiances lived in the vicinity of and cooperated with one another, historians have discovered inhabitants who at times happened to have distanced themselves from nationalization. In an attempt to conduct historical research on those who would have been deaf to the appeals of nationalism, Tara Zahra proposes the concept of national indifference, pointing to ‘how and why people allied themselves politically, culturally and socially from the ground up.’

In his article, Ondrej Ficeri places the multifold and changing allegiances of city dwellers in Košice/Kassa centre stage. Although the concept of national indifference has been frequently applied to borderlands with a history in the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy, the author argues, not enough attention has been paid to the different characteristics of the Hungarian part, where the idea of a Hungarian political nation resulted in Magyarization policies. In Košice/Kassa, city dwellers who did not identify themselves in national terms before the idea of a Hungarian political nation was promoted among them were invited to embrace the idea by joining in as an independent ethnic group called Slovjaks, a term distinguishing them from Slovak nationalists who
increasingly considered themselves opposed to Hungarian nationalism. Despite that mobilization, the author found that city dwellers formed alliances outside imagined national communities. Moreover, their alliances continued to be nationally indifferent throughout the interwar years. Ficeri finds proof in the fact that while 60% of the population identified as Czechoslovaks in national censuses, a majority of inhabitants voted for a political party striving for autonomy and later, ideally, incorporation within Hungary.

Patrice M. Dabrowski provides an investigation into the way in which Polish authorities aimed to secure the interwar Polish long southern border composed of the Carpathian Mountains, which, prior to the First World War, had been an internal porous Habsburg frontier separating the province of Galicia from Dualist Hungary. Not all highlanders had identified themselves in national terms prior to Poland’s independence in 1918. While the state had its hands full fighting over and securing state borders early on, the policy agenda of the 1930s opened up to initiatives reaching out to the highlanders. Dabrowski meticulously unravels how state officials attempted to reinforce the state border by influencing the feelings of belonging of the nationally indifferent local inhabitants.

Compared to the concept of national indifference, the concept of multiple loyalties offers more flexibility for analysing how people moved back and forth (possibly multiple times) in relation to their notions about their rights and duties towards their nation-state. Loyalties are by definition ‘partial, mediated and contingent’. Loyalties are also relational; only when orders articulated by rulers are followed by the ruled do they have consequences, and only when these orders are interpreted correctly will they generate the intended effect. When looking at the matter in a more complex way, the motives of rulers and ruled to engage are of relevance as well. Stanislav Holubec centralizes this aspect in his contribution on the rulers and ruled in Subcarpathian Rus after the region’s incorporation into the interwar Czechoslovak state. Using the concept of multiple loyalties allows the author to question the still widely prevalent notion in historiography that interwar Czechoslovakia was a rare treasure of democracy. Obsessed with territorial expansion, Czechoslovak authorities were eager to include a region where they expected a majority of the multi-ethnic population to be and remain disloyal. Presenting themselves as saviours liberating locals from centuries-long oriental oppression, Czechoslovakian authorities left no stone unturned in implementing semi-colonial practices of domination and steadily reducing the decision-making power of local inhabitants. Analysing data from interwar censuses and elections, Holubec deciphered how local inhabitants reacted to state policies. He discovered that inhabitants displayed both loyal and disloyal attitudes towards Czechoslovak authorities. In the mid-1920s, Czechoslovak political parties attracted one third of voters, mostly Rusyns and to a lesser extent Hungarian and Jewish locals. More Hungarian borderland inhabitants, however, articulated their support for Hungarian nationalist parties, and more Rusyns were keen to put their hopes on communism, thereby idealizing incorporation into Bolshevik Russia, an independent future for a Ukrainian state, or more autonomy within interwar Czechoslovakia. Surprisingly, communists gained more than 30% of the votes in the free elections, an achievement unparalleled elsewhere in interwar Europe.

An increased use of the bottom-up approach has also enhanced research on the relationship between nationalism and regionalism. As both are inherently modern,
contrary to popular belief, they are not competing or mutually exclusive concepts. In the interwar period, for example, authorities throughout Europe saw regionalism as a force capable of buttressing their national policies. This was especially true in borderlands where national sovereignty had changed. In such cases, officials were well aware that regionalism, because it elicited a cognitive affinity of belonging in inhabitants, garnered more support than nations, which were imagined as larger communities.

In this special issue, Patrice M. Dabrowski investigates how Polish state officials tried to establish regionalism among different Carpathian groups. These officials developed activities to strengthen local folklore traditions as well as create a brotherhood between inhabitants of the Carpathian Mountains, so as to prevent East Carpathian highlanders from developing a Ukrainian national consciousness, in the hopes that all highlanders would identify with and take up arms for the Polish state. One group of Carpathian highlanders, the West Carpathian Górale, made painfully clear how the endeavour to achieve Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s ideal of a civic statehood (without ethnolinguistic nationalism) through regionalism was more dictated from Warsaw and did not have a lasting influence on locals’ feelings of belonging. During the Second World War, some of those who had enthusiastically participated in the interwar folklore festivals initiated by Warsaw state officials proved equally eager to receive preferential treatment by representatives of the Nazi regime. Gábor Egry’s article, on the other hand, compares how Romanian state representatives’ strategy of delegating tasks to local elites in two interwar Romanian border regions yielded different results. Whereas locals in Maramureș agreed to continue their cooperation with central authorities along the imperial practice of differentiated rule, elite members in the Banat were more likely to interpret regionalism as incompatible with Romanian nationalism.

Taken together, the articles show how the borderlands upon which the Paris Treaties thrust their imagined idea of a peaceful Europe, but which they failed to support by means of an international relief plan, became the places where Europe’s interwar order was especially challenged. At the moment at which they were signed, it was already known that the Paris Treaties were incapable of establishing a stable peace order on the European continent. Even Woodrow Wilson, when he left Paris, told his wife: ‘Well, it is finished, and as no one is satisfied, it makes me hope we have made a just peace.’ As reality did not correspond to the ideals of nationalist movements, a multitude of (un)foreseen complications followed the drawing of borders and states. The articles in this special issue show how disputes over national identities and ethnic minorities, as well as other factors such as the economic consequences of the new state borders, appeared on the political agenda and coloured the lives of borderland inhabitants. By adopting a bottom-up approach, moreover, the articles demonstrate the agency of borderlands and their people in the establishment, functioning, disorganization or ultimate breakdown of some of the newly created interwar nation-states.

Notes

3. See the Association for Borderlands Studies’ Second World Conference website.
8. The contemporary Zakarpatie province in Ukraine has previously been referred to as Subcarpathia, Carpathian Ruthenia and Carpathian Rus’ (Magocsi, *With their Backs to the Mountains*).
12. Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others*.
24. Kamusella, “Upper Silesia in Modern Central Europe.”
30. Ther, “Zwischenräume,” XVI.
34. Novikov, *Shades of a Nation*; Matzer, “Be(com)ing ‘German’."

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Bibliography


Unruly borderlands: border-making, peripheralization and layered regionalism in post-First World War Maramureș and the Banat

Gábor Egry

ABSTRACT
The Maramureș (Măramăroș) and Banat (Bânsăg) regions of dualist Hungary were classic borderlands with markedly different characteristics. While both zones were multiethnic, the former was a mountainous, backward and agricultural area. The latter was one of the richest and most industrialized in the country, with thriving cities and a developed economy. While social life in Maramureș was dominated by interethnic and trans-religious noble kins, who ruled over Ruthenian- and Romanian-speaking peasants and Orthodox Jews, the Banat had a diverse yet stratified society defined by a landowning aristocracy, urban bourgeoisie, families of military descent, immigrant worker groups and a multiethnic peasantry. These regions had very different roles and positions within Austria-Hungary and were ruled in a differentiated way. The new boundaries that were drawn after the First World War resituated these areas: new centres emerged; new elites came to dominate in the successor states; and the new state borders cut previously existing economic and social ties. Both Maramureș and the (Romanian) Banat were relocated in terms of space, economy and society. The once economically central and self-supporting Banat became dependent on a central government that aimed at its political subordination, which generated strong regionalist political currents. Maramureș became the most peripheral area of the new state, and the local elites had to rely on resources provided by the centre. Divided among themselves, Maramureș regionalists, Transylvanian regionalists and centralizers competed for favour in Bucharest, creating unexpected alignments within the framework of a layered type of regionalism, and offering diverging visions of the regions' futures.

From the perspective of statehood, the most defining characteristic of the end of the First World War in East-Central Europe was disintegration. While the new borders drawn at the Paris Peace Conferences sanctioned the territorial extents of successor states that faced the challenges of (re)integrating people, institutions and often disparate lands, for those living in these areas the primary experience was one of the loss of almost all integrating features of an imperial form of statehood. The most prominent manifestation
of this unexpected ‘release’ from the ‘chains’ of empire was the sudden appearance of all kind of small republics in areas where people had not been considered mature enough for political participation by the previous imperial elites. Subsequent state-building efforts were therefore not just attempts at reform within a gradual process of transformation based on the principle of nation-statehood. They represented rather significant – one may even say radical – breaks from a past marked by centuries-old institutional traditions.

Part of this break was besides the importance of the new guiding principle of nation-statehood – the effect that the new borders had on local and regional societies. With all their divisive consequences, with the generation of new borderland spaces on both sides of the new border, and with all the new forms of trans-border connections that emerged, they resulted in a relocation of these areas in a reconfigured space defined by the institutions of the new states. But however significant this break with the imperial past seemed, the practical outcomes of such depended on the legacies of the past. Regional societies were not washed clean of their pasts, no matter the pretensions of the new ruling national elites. Additionally, both what these societies lost and what they preserved influenced their future positions in economic, social, cultural, political and symbolic terms. The impact of imperial legacies was often not direct or easily discernible. The goal of this article is to reveal at least one of its aspects: the consequences of peripheralization processes before and after the new boundaries were set, with special attention given to how the border changes affected political regionalism(s).

The argument starts with the imperial characteristics of dualist Hungary. The Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy is often seen simply as a nationalizing state that differed significantly from the truly imperial Cisleithania. Contrary to this assumption, Hungary was ruled via a system that resembled imperial rule and was reflected in the variety of relations between the centre and its multiple peripheries. Thus, it was not primarily the economy, culture or the gradually unified institutional setting of the country that defined the peripheries within it, but rather local and national politics, which were still influenced by the pre-1848 and pre-1867 regimes. From this perspective, the thriving Banat was just as much a periphery as backward Maramureș (Máramaros) or Subcarpathian Rus.

Seen from a similarly broad angle, not much changed after 1918. Greater Romania, although nominally a unitary nation-state, struggled to bring together its disparate provinces. The energetic centralizing measures preferred by the National Liberal governments met with opposition from (at least some) regional elites with markedly different socializations. Regionalism at the level of the new provinces (Transylvania taken together with the Banat, Maramureș, Crișana, Bessarabia and Bucovina) became the order of the day and fuelled strong political currents. However, the conflicts that such regionalisms generated were more conditioned by the relationship between Bucharest and the acquired territories as a whole and less by local circumstances.

Nevertheless, the actual political, social and cultural circumstances contained within a smaller area were not insignificant, especially in terms of how these smaller regions fared after 1918. The social fabrics and the resulting social hierarchies, habits and customs were part of the very legacies that conditioned reactions to the new state-building developments, a new turn in peripheralization. While the Romanian Maramureș remained a backward periphery, the Banat, prior to 1918 an economically and culturally developed area, lost its relatively favourable status – a change that had broad consequences. Thus, when looking at
the politics and the symbolic roles and positions of these areas, the impact of the new borders on their societies and economies (including the fate of ethnic minorities) is considered as a significant factor together with the legacies of dualist Hungary.

The comparison of two zones disparate in economic and social terms is essential for my analysis. I argue that, despite both of these regions being political peripheries, the trajectories of the Banat and Maramureș differed greatly. In and after 1918 they were relocated in an abstract sense and exposed to further peripheralization. Furthermore, dualist and imperial legacies had a significant impact on both this process and the reaction of local elites. As both regions had been and remained peripheries in political terms, ruled or managed in a similar manner from Budapest, the differences and similarities of their trajectories in Greater Romania offer clues to understanding the role of the new boundaries (including how they shaped new state architectures) and their legacies.

Two (sub-)imperial peripheries?

Dualist Hungary was a ‘problematic’ part of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867 only aggravated the situation. While the Austrian half of the empire remained a conglomerate of institutionally separated provinces with provincial legislations, Hungary, with the exception of Croatia, became a unified state after 1872, with the elimination of the territorial separation of the border regiments, the militarized territorial units along the Ottoman border under direct control of the Viennese authorities. Meanwhile, the Hungarian parliament passed a series of laws aiming at the unification of the judiciary and the public administration, effectively creating the framework of a uniform nation-state. Thus, it is customary to see Austria-Hungary as a composite empire of two different states, one properly imperial and the other a nation-state (or would-be nation-state).

But despite the palpable processes of unification and nationalizing, a closer look reveals that even at the beginning of the twentieth century Hungary retained characteristics that are familiar from the imperial set-up. What are these characteristics of imperial polities that are crucial for the argument of this article? First, empires are composite states, the result of acquiring territories with diverse legal and political traditions that are not transformed into a uniform state. Furthermore, empires typically employ differentiated rule, a method of exerting the power of the metropolitan centre over the peripheries according to the local circumstances. Differentiated rule often entails the co-optation of local and regional elites, who are ready to align with the central power in exchange for retaining their influence at the local level (and sometimes also gaining power at the centre). And empires often use imperial figures, whose loyalty and knowledge makes them suitable for connecting the empire’s distant spaces and adjusting the means of the central power to the local context.

Although in 1914 Hungary had only two separate composite parts with some form of administrative separation—Croatia and the corpus separatum Fiume—that are rarely taken for being indicative of the state’s composite nature, it was a country whose parts were sewn together relatively recently. The Banat was annexed to Hungary in 1778 after serving for six decades as a model of enlightened development policies, including colonization. However, the southern areas of the region between the Maros, Tisza and Danube rivers remained under direct Viennese military control until 1872. Meanwhile,
Transylvania was merged with Hungary in 1867—though some of its legal peculiarities were not eliminated until the Communist period—and the privileged territories of feudal Hungary (like the Szepes/Spiš, Jász-Kun district and the Saxon Königsboden) were only gradually eliminated by a series of administrative laws issued through 1876. Some of these bodies were transformed into legally incorporated public communities that administered the resources drawn from vast properties. For instance, the former Romanian border regiments in the Banat, with their seat in the town of Karansebes/Caransebeș, had possessions worth around 40 million Crowns. All these legacies still had an impact on the country four decades after the nominal unification.

The case of Maramureș was more straightforward, the county (and the adjacent ones in the Subcarpathian Rus) having been fully incorporated into the traditional Hungarian county system since the seventeenth century. But it was situated at the very edge of the country, along a road leading to Bukovina and Galicia, just like the Banat was on the border of the Ottoman Empire and its Balkan successor states. Due to its smaller size and more homogeneous natural environment of mountains and river valleys, its economy and society was more uniform than the Banat. But it was a peculiar place, with an unusually high percentage of people with noble origins, among whom the largest number were adherents of the Greek Catholic religion (who spoke Ruthenian and Romanian), and most of its inhabitants, the Jewish population included, were active in agriculture.6

By contrast, the Banat was a mini-empire in itself, a kind of ‘Belgium’ of the monarchy, with diverse natural zones, divided into fertile plains in the west and north and mountains in the east and southeast. Because of its composite character, it was defined as a region more by history and politics than by its economic or social features. The fertile plains of Torontál/Torontal and Temes/Timiş counties, dominated by latifundia, were complemented by the mining and industrial areas in the south, around Resica/Resița and Oravica/Oravița, an industrial hub that was born out of the imperial past, owing to the efforts and investments of Viennese companies (such as the Erste Donau-Dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft and the Österreichisch-Ungarische Staatseisenbahngesellschaft [StEG]), which were in need of coal and steel.7

The professional distribution of labour reflected the differences in these areas. In the Subcarpathian Rus agriculture dominated, with around 80% of all economically active people in this sector in 1910.8 However, Maramureș differed markedly from Bereg and Ung counties, with a lower overall share of industrial labour (10% versus 14%) but a higher proportion of miners (over 1%). Still, Maramureș’s share of the agrarian population was the highest among the three counties. Within the small industrial sector, clothing manufacturing, dominated by home industry, was the largest everywhere. Forestry was second largest in Ung and Maramureș, but only third in Bereg behind food.9 Large works operated in the forestry and food processing sectors.

Outside its cities the Banat was very similar. Around or over 80% of the economically active lived from agriculture, while various industries—mining excluded—employed 13% to 15% of the workforce, and in the only county where mining was important, Caraș-Severin/Krassó-Szörsény, mining employees made up about 2.5% of the economically active population.10 But aggregate numbers obscured a different economic structure, in which all sectors of industry were dominated by large and mid-size outfits, with several large factories among them. Torontal County had an important base in its stone, ceramics and glass industries, with 12 companies
employing more than 1400 workers. The iron- and steelworks in Caraș-Severin belonged to the largest in Hungary, and the 14 works that employed more than 20 people had together around 5300 employees.

Temesvár/Timisoara/Temeschwar was the industrial capital of the region, with 15,000 employees (almost 70% of a workforce of around 22,000) busy in its factories. Large companies thrived here at the intersection of all regional supply chains, mainly providing food, clothing and machinery. The five largest clothing factories employed more than 1300 workers; the 10 largest food factories, more than 2300; and the 5 largest machinery producers, nearly 900.

With the thriving city of Timisoara – with its electric street lighting and streetcars, an operable port, a modern theatre and a goods exchange – at its centre (and the similarly dynamic Arad on its natural border, the river Maros), the Banat had exceptionally strong urban features, a result of the accumulation of capital at an accelerating pace. It was an economic centre in its own right, but well integrated into the commercial and production chains of the monarchy. Its banks operated in partnership with Budapest and Viennese banks, and its industrial companies were aligned with Budapest banks and industrial groups on equal terms. Part of the iron- and steelworks in the south were owned by companies of European significance, such as the Paris- and Vienna-based Österreichisch-Ungarische Staatsseisenbahngesellschaft AG (StEG). Thus, even a certain internal periphery was created within the Banat, with the north and west dominating the mountainous east and partly exploiting the resources of the industrial south.

In Maramureș (and in the whole Subcarpathian Rus) cities of secondary importance, most notably Sighetul Marmatiei/Maramarossziget, were not capable of acting as drivers of rural modernization. The cities in the river valleys and on the edge of the Great Plains were natural centres of the mountain areas as marketplaces and administrative and educational hubs, but the persisting traditional forms of agriculture and the state-owned mines (for salt and precious metals) were not conducive to the greater accumulation of capital.

Regional societies

As a result of these markedly distinct economies and their different histories, the social fabrics in the regions were also dissimilar, and not just in terms of the above-mentioned professional distribution of the workforce. With agriculture still the most important economic sector, the distribution of land was key to social stratification and relations in all geographic areas. All land had once been noble or royal property, but since 1848 noblemen (including latifundia-owning aristocrats) retained only a part of their estates and the weight of the large landed properties gradually declined. Still, around the turn of the twentieth century it remained the dominant form of ownership. According to the official statistics from 1900, the share of large landed property (over 1000 cadastral acres) from the land used for agriculture varied from 20% (Caraș-Severin) to 48% (Bereg). The share of the other sizable category, property between 5 and 100 cadastral acres, varied from 61% (Timiș, Torontal) to 17% (Caraș-Severin). Most people living from agriculture had to contend with a minuscule plot.

But the overall numbers concealed important differences. In the mountain areas of both regions, forests were owned by latifundia, and in these zones plough land and
meadows were mainly divided among mid-sized farms hardly large enough to make a decent living from – especially not in Maramureș, where the soil was mediocre at best. The significance of forests, on the other hand, lay not just in the profit potential they offered. For the traditional rural economy, they were a source of heating and building material, and the rights for pasture and grazing on these lands allowed people to practise husbandry. With the elimination of feudal rights, the latter became contested and a source of conflict and permanent grievance in the mountain regions. In the southern Banat, the domain of the former border regiments made these resources more accessible for all inhabitants through a governing public body composed of the elected delegates of all former border communities, reducing social tensions in this regard. Some form of community property was customary in Maramureș too, but it was never organized into such huge holdings, leaving individual communities to deal with their own issues, including the conflicts that arose with the larger landowners.

The plains of the Banat were entirely different. Not only were large parcels of plough land profitably managed by their owners or renters, but owing to the legacy of the organized colonization, mid-sized farms were more numerous, larger and more profitable here. In Torontál their average size was over 18 cadastral acres (including 17 cadastral acres of tillage), in Temes, over 16 cadastral acres (13 cadastral acres tillage). Such conditions produced a well-to-do peasantry that, together with the broadening urban society of Timișoara and the larger cities, including educated people who could work for the commercial or industrial companies, was the basis of a new type of middle class. In opposition to this was Subcarpathian Rus, dominated by the nobility, where financial services, for example, predominantly meant loans from Jewish moneylenders. Once-privileged groups remained, however, important within society in both regions. In the northeast the local nobility retained its dominance over politics and the administration. In Maramureș the number of people with some form of title or privilege before 1848 was extremely high – around 20% – and their ranks were not limited to Hungarians. Around 80% of the Romanians who lived south of the Tisza were ennobled individually or collectively. North of the Tisza, Ruthenians, mostly former serfs, were the majority. During the era of neoabsolutism and the transitional early 1860s, a group of educated Ruthenians held administrative offices, and their misrule facilitated an alliance of the Romanian and Hungarian nobility that lasted until the end of the First World War. But Ruthenian noblemen were not excluded from family relations, and the local noble kin were intricately connected with each other. These local nobles monopolized the county administration, where Greek Catholics of Romanian and Ruthenian mother tongue easily found employment. Even their education was firmly in local hands, as the Calvinist law college operating from the county seat, Sighetul Marmăției, could issue the necessary degrees, and it was attended by a significant number of Greek Catholic students. With no modern middle class challenging them, these noble families held on firmly to their dominant position.

The situation in Caraș-Severin was somewhat similar. In the south, the military organization of the border regiments exempted inhabitants from feudal rule, and compulsory education fostered the emergence of a small but not insignificant group of Romanian officers and educated intellectuals. With the backing of the forest domains they could retain important positions within the county administration too, while the presence of an Orthodox (Carașbeș) and a Greek Catholic (Lugoj/Lugos/Lugosch)
bishopric, accompanied by the usual ecclesiastical institutions, further improved their material and intellectual position. Finally, some of the landowning aristocrats, such as the Mocioni/Mocsonyi family, were also of Romanian origins, while the growing number of non-Romanian workers without suffrage rights did not pose an immediate threat.

In the other counties of the Banat, the developing modern middle and working classes made deeper changes to the social structure more realistic. Nevertheless, upward mobility into the middle classes was conditioned on loyalty to Hungary and often entailed acculturation. The emerging political figures of the cities adhered to the Hungarian national idea, even though economic growth offered resources for rival groups too. But until the early twentieth century these rival currents, including Romanian and Serbian nationalism, did not pose a credible threat to the supremacy of the Banat elite, and even prominent Romanians and Serbians were aligned with the parties that dominated Hungarian politics.

**Regional politics**

This attraction to new political currents for a growing number of people who were not existentially dependent on the state represented perhaps the key difference in how the centre–periphery relationships of Maramureş and the Banat evolved in political terms on the eve of the First World War. The Liberal governing party dominated politics and parliamentary elections in both regions until 1905. In the Banat it was the aristocratic landowners and the local nobility who dominated county congregations, acted on behalf of the government, and were most often elected to parliament, especially in Caraş-Severin. In Maramureş the local nobility concluded an agreement with the government. The Romanian Mihali family retained one seat in the parliament, ultimately held by Petru (Péter) Mihali Jr., while the other five were reserved for candidates of national prominence, ministers and state secretaries. In exchange, the government designated the lords lieutenant (government representatives and increasingly the acting heads of the county administration) from Maramureş noble families.

The situation was upended by new political developments around the turn of the century. First, a new Romanian nationalist political activism challenged pro-Hungarian Romanian politicians. Second, the Liberals suffered their first and only electoral defeat in 1905 at the hands of the pro-independence opposition. In Maramureş the threat of Romanian nationalism and the loss of orientation led to the merger of all Hungarian parties with the justification that, unless all Hungarian parties offered a united front and showed tolerance of the other nationalities, the Romanian majority of voters would elect non-Hungarian members of parliaments (MPs).

In the Banat the situation was more complicated and varied from county to county. In the 1905 elections, 21 of the elected MPs had local origins, and two MPs were born outside the Banat but had developed careers within the region. In Torontal most of the elected MPs held large domains, while in Timiş the group was divided between educated intellectuals and landowners, and in Caraş-Severin all of them were educated intellectuals, although two of them were also large landowners. The number of MPs of local origins fell to 14 in the next year, and six MPs came from outside the region but had a career at the local or county level in the Banat. The group of landowners shrank to four from eight. Four of the MPs of local origins were candidates of the Romanian National
Party (RNP). Four years later, when the re-established Liberal Party returned to power in 1910, 17 MPs with local roots were elected and only one of foreign provenance with a local career: Bela Tallian, who won his seat in 1905 and 1906 too.

It is thus plausible to say that the fall of the Liberals was partly facilitated by the success of political personalities who came to the region and built successful careers. The RNP successfully captured Romanian voters in Caraș-Severin in 1906, but failed in Temes. In 1910 the Liberal candidates were locally dominant figures from the landed elite (the number of landowner MPs rose to 13) and new Romanian figures with strong institutional positions and standing within the Romanian community. They were so strongly embedded in the local Romanian community that prominent RNP figures from the county refused to run, being convinced that such competition would be futile. Finally, the RNP had to select Aurel Vlad, a national hero from Huniad/Hunyad County, for Caransebeș, who duly lost against the local pro-government Constantin Burdia, the chair of the Border Community funds. It is telling of Burdia's position within the local Romanian society that he even attempted to find a counter-candidate for another pro-government Romanian candidate, Géza Duka. Nicolae Ionescu, Burdia's prospective candidate of choice, would have run representing the RNP. Thus, the Liberals reclaimed political dominance with the help of the traditional elite and the aspiring new Romanian political figures against the educated and nationally minded middle classes that started to make waves in politics, minority and Hungarian alike. In Caraș-Severin this alliance with Budapest pointed to a self-colonizing relationship much like in Maramureș. Pro-government Romanians who promised the resolution of practical issues always emphasized that it could only happen with the government’s support.

The government sent different types of lords lieutenant to manage these counties. In Caraș-Severin, which had a sizable and politically influential Romanian population, the government usually installed lords lieutenant who did not have many local contacts or roots, whereas the representatives sent to Timiș mostly held strong local ties. The ones selected for Torontal, the county where electoral politics was dominated by large landowners, were almost always strongly connected with the county and often held domains there.

These patterns point to the most prominent imperial feature of dualist Hungary: differentiated rule. Governments of all colours needed to co-opt some of the local elites for handling the diverse country, but just whom to engage with and how depended on the actual local context. Torontal County was defined by modern and efficient agriculture that made local large landholders dominant, but the county lacked a modern urban centre like Timiș, where Timișoara's urban society and wealth offered the most favourable conditions for the emergence of a new middle class produced through modern education.

Finally, in Caraș-Severin the local nobility, armed with law degrees, pursued typical careers in the administration, while the considerable Romanian population was (until 1905, but again in 1910) mobilized with the help of Romanian figures of authority. Facing the threat of Romanian nationalist dominance in the region in 1910, István Tisza attempted to foster a compromise along the lines of the one made with the Maramureș Romanians, but it was rejected, compelling him to return to the proven method, namely to help the pro-government Romanian candidates with administrative support and deny representation for the Romanian nationalists. However, his success failed to bring reconciliation with either of his political challengers.
By contrast, the Maramureș elites accepted a self-colonizing relationship, providing political support and safe seats to whichever government was in power. In exchange, they received material support and a free hand in the local administration. However, they lacked the incentive to pursue a more general developmental effort and the government had to intervene directly. The so-called 'Mountain Action' ('Hegyvidéki Akció') had dual goals: to modernize Ruthenian communities that were without plough land and under pressure from the rapidly industrializing forestry industry and Jewish middlemen; and to turn the nationally indifferent into loyal Hungarian subjects. (Another obvious political undertone of the effort was antisemitism, as it mainly targeted the Jewish shopkeepers and moneylenders, and the head of the Action, Ede Egan, explicitly connected it with the 'Jewish question'.) To achieve these ends, a permanent delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture started education programmes, initiated projects aimed at land amelioration, introduced new methods of husbandry to replace the traditional rural economy based on the mountain forests, and more. Thus, the government turned to a more explicit understanding of its role in a civilizational mission, one that was akin to that found in colonial contexts.

**Peripheries in a quasi-empire?**

During the First World War the loyalty of the majority of the non-Hungarian population generally held until the end of hostilities. Despite instances of revolution and violence, as well as attempts to establish small republics, the fate of both regions was decided at the peace conferences, not least because they were contested by Allied contenders. The Supreme Council had to figure out how to demarcate territory between the claims of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Romania in the Banat, and between Czechoslovakia and Romania in Maramureș. However, while the struggle for the Banat was used to marshal public sentiment and conferred symbolic importance on the area, the 'Maramureș question' remained mainly a local concern.

Neither region remained politically whole, although the consequences of their division were different. In Maramureș a line drawn basically along the Tisza River left a few tens of thousands of Romanian speakers under Czechoslovak sovereignty, but the economic consequences of such border-drawing were more muted and rather indirect: traditional lines of communication and commerce were cut, which affected the small businesses often based on short-distance trade and services. But the region’s dependence on the centre’s resources was not changed. By contrast, the peace treaty dividing the Banat detached the larger part of the fertile agricultural lands from the Romanian Banat, while leaving the centre of the region, Timișoara, with Romania. Given that before 1918 the Banat’s broader economic and social integration was facilitated by multiple links with Budapest, Vienna and further European markets, the reoriented centre-periphery relationship with the new capital of Bucharest was not the only significant realignment. Just as important were how many of these pre-1918 connections were severed.

With regard to politics in a nationalizing state, Maramureș became ethnically more homogeneous with the removal of the mainly Ruthenian northern parts, even though a sizable rural orthodox Jewish and a small, but not insignificant, German and Hungarian minority remained. The Banat retained its multiethnic character, except that the number of sizable minorities was reduced from three (Serb, German and Romanian) to two
(Hungarian and German). In political terms, such changes did not make much difference. The German-speaking population and its elite were before 1918 either relatively passive or had aligned themselves with the pro-settlement parties, while with the ‘dawn of national councils’ Banat Swabian politicians had also organized their own political movement, which participated henceforth in politics in its own right. For Hungarian politicians in both regions, inclusion in the new Romanian state meant the loss of their influence. Some of the non-traditional parties, such as the Social Democrats and peasant parties, had successes in the Banat during the early years of transition, but with the consolidation and institutionalization of Romania’s system of two large parties and many minor ones (the National Liberal and the National Peasant parties being the two largest) around 1926/27, these were sidelined.

As a result, the place of both regions changed significantly in the framework of the new state. Maramureș remained a periphery, but it had lost most of its connected hinterland and was even harder to access from the new capitals. Its economy stalled and the county (just like the Czechoslovak Subcarpathian Rus) remained tethered to mountain agriculture and mineral and timber extraction industries. The development programmes initiated under the Hungarian government did not continue, as agrarian reform was supposed to remedy existing problems. The Czechoslovak government later started an energetic development programme that was defined more along the lines of colonization: a civilizing mission in a barbarian world prone to fall to communism. Backwardness in general was not rolled back, but islands of modernization emerged within the region. Without similar measures, Romanian Maramureș remained one of the most underdeveloped areas of the country.

The loss of certain agricultural areas of the Banat was hardly catastrophic for a regional economy based on the export of its manufactured products. More harmful, rather, were the new obstacles for trade with traditional partners in the former Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, the war and the subsequent currency exchange drained available capital and the new centre was not able to provide a replacement comparable to what had been easy to draw on at the pre-First World War Viennese or Budapest markets. The alleviation of these problems was not helped when the new state and its politicians revealed their intention to take most of the economy into Romanian hands. In contrast to Maramureș, however, the Banat seemed to be a favourable place for new business, as shown by the difference in the number and stock capital of banks established in both areas between 1919 and 1924 (only one in Maramureș with 566,000 lei; 14 in the Romanian Banat with 25.55 million lei). Despite these positive signs, a negative tendency was still clear: the Banat turned from an economic centre that enjoyed the benefits of multiple connections within an empire into a periphery of a rather poor new state. The new borders brought a new position too, and a region that was among the most developed of dualist Hungary became backward in comparison to other Central European regions by 1930.

But these broad developments indicating decline or standstill again hid a wide range of practical processes in these regions. The agrarian reform that was supposed to deliver justice to millions of land-hungry peasants soon turned out to be the source of serious political and social conflict. The average lot accorded to peasants was small and most of the new owners lacked the necessary resources to work their fields profitably. But this hard reality came to bear only gradually, and in the meantime successful attempts by the
previous owners to salvage their confiscated property\textsuperscript{53} – often with the complicity of the state – generated scandals and uproar. As for the forests and mountain pastures, crucial in areas like Maramureş, the state was generally reluctant to rescind long-term lease contracts with private companies. It also refused to relinquish state management over forests taken by the Hungarian state from local communities, even in the face of protests by Romanians.\textsuperscript{54}

With a large part of Banat forests managed by the border community and fostering a sense of ownership despite the lower quality management than the neighbouring Resiţa domains, it was less of a political problem than in Maramureş,\textsuperscript{55} where the old enmity between Romanian activists and pro-Hungarian nobility reappeared in debates and mutual accusations over the mismanagement and improper distribution of forests and mountain pastures.\textsuperscript{56} Nevertheless, the presence of large industrial works in the Banat was at least as important for reducing social tensions, as people were able to find employment in menial jobs.\textsuperscript{57} Banat society was also affected by the expropriation of latifundia and the subsequent loss of social status of the landed nobility and aristocracy, the social group that was crucial to the rule of Hungarian Liberals. The Maramureş nobility, which had much smaller holdings, more or less evaded this fate.

The nationalization of ‘foreign’ businesses, a straightforward and neatly executable process in politicians’ imaginations, turned out to be almost impossible in practical terms. Romania was poor in capital even before 1916 (it is telling that within the financial sector it was Transylvanian capital that flowed to Bucharest and not the other way, despite all the alarmist speeches of Hungarian politicians claiming that Romanians were buying up Transylvania\textsuperscript{58} and the war and heavy-handed occupation made things much worse. Romania needed foreign currency reserves to support its leu and banks so badly that the National Bank applied a forced fixed exchange rate on all humanitarian transfers facilitated by the American Relief Administration. In practice this meant the expropriation of around one-tenth of every dollar sent by worried émigrés to their relatives.\textsuperscript{59} The Romanian government also refused to hand over a US$50 billion government bond that it had received as security for war loans after the United States entered the war.

Thus, even though the peace treaties enabled the expropriation of enemy individuals, what actually occurred was more restrained and reflected the hard realities of the times: the Bucharest business elite could exert pressure on and gain influence over Transylvanian and Banat companies, but was in no position to overtake and manage them. On the contrary, some of these companies, which grew substantially during the war as strategic companies of war industries, profited from quasi-monopolizing certain production sectors.\textsuperscript{60} The result was more of a gradual co-optation of influential politicians and Bucharest capitalists onto the boards of these companies, followed later by co-operation between the original owners and some Romanian business groups.\textsuperscript{61} The most peculiar form of such arrangements was the nominal nationalization of strategic companies, such as coal mine operators in the Jiu Valley and in the Banat, which in reality meant secret arrangements to pay out to the original owners from the real profit of the companies hidden in the falsified accounts after more than a decade – until which point they could, of course, retain the management.\textsuperscript{62} Such arrangements prevailed with the important Banat industrial companies without affecting factory management or the labour force. It is hardly surprising that local Romanian nationalists complained that the state was not stopping the influence of ‘foreign’ capital, but instead strengthening its position through the investment of Romanian firms.\textsuperscript{63}
Moreover, the failure to deliver on this important nationalizing promise happened against the backdrop of a rapid decline in the quality of state administration. County autonomy was gradually eliminated and subordinated to the central government, but the central institutions were often oblivious to the existing laws, regulations, customs and practices in the new territories. Although the continuity of the administrative personnel was significant, the state lacked the necessary resources to staff the new administrative organs and replace Hungarian repatriates. The result was the employment of hastily recruited and trained officials, often without the necessary education and qualifications. Furthermore, the state saw these administrative jobs as an appropriate reward for military officers who left service.64

Owing to the role Romanian noble families played in the county administration before 1918, Maramureș was less affected by these circumstances. Continuity with the pre-1918 administrative personnel was more than apparent, as key figures of the Hungarian administration were often appointed to the most important roles in the county. Sub-prefects and prefects like Gheorghe Dan, Victor Hodor or Gavrila Mihali held important positions, such as secretary of the lord lieutenant (a kind of chief of cabinet) and district chiefs (the much-dreaded 'főszolgabíró' of Romanian history), respectively, before 1918. But the rapidly expanding Romanian language primary and secondary educational institutions permanently struggled with the shortage of qualified teachers and their peripheral situation. Practically no one wanted to be assigned to a school in the region, and those who were transferred there through emergency measures often left overnight, not least because what they found there was astonishing: a region that appeared more Hungarian than Romanian. Even Maramureș Romanians with proper nationalist credentials behaved like Hungarians!65 They attended Hungarian balls and charity events, used the Hungarian language in a wide variety of situations, enjoyed Hungarian theatre and music, and taught their children Hungarian.

The Banat was somewhat different, although at its internal periphery, in Caraș-Severin, the situation often resembled that in Maramureș, Hungarian, German and Romanian officials from the dualist administration were carried over at the local level.66 Hungarian and German cultural traditions dominated in the Banat's cities too,67 which led Romanian politicians and intellectuals to try to establish a cultural foothold via new cultural associations and institutions.68

However, probably because of its economic significance to the new state and its elites, and the symbolic value of the region after popular passions were whipped up during the diplomatic struggle over the border in 1919, the Banat was more affected by the arrival of new personnel. For the locals, accustomed to the bureaucratic but relatively efficient Hungarian administration, such a shift was akin to a natural catastrophe. In one instance, local notables claimed that the state administration had collapsed in the region because Bucharest's presence and influence led to incredible corruption and negligence. The former – now prevalent among local dignitaries too – was simply justified by reference to the general corruption that reigned within Romania.69

Models of regionalist politics on the peripheries of Greater Romania

As demonstrated, Maramureș thus remained a periphery, whereas the Banat experienced peripheralization within Greater Romania. For the former, this meant not only the
permanent lack of access to resources and the severing of ties with the nearby regions that formed the basis of the local service economy. Being located on the periphery and considered an alien ‘wilderness’ by many Transylvanian and Old Kingdom Romanians meant that not even the necessary human resources were easy for the state to come by. For the Banat, the new position meant being caught between the former imperial centres and the new capital, Bucharest, a fact exemplified by the composition of the boards of the largest industrial companies. Important politicians of all colours from the Romanian parties were co-opted, while the arrangements for nationalization effectively meant cooperation between Budapest and Bucharest industrialists and bankers. Some companies could have profited from the new markets, but for the large steel works that previously operated as suppliers for the railway and machinery producers of the monarchy, keeping ties with as many of the successor states as possible was vital for survival. Thus, the Banat could only preserve some of its vitality by avoiding the nationalization of its economy, pursued by most of the Romanian politicians.

It is therefore hardly surprising that apart from the loss of dominance of the Hungarians, whose party henceforth focused on achieving concessions regarding minority rights, the divisions that appeared within the Romanian elite and the emergence of Romanian regionalist tendencies were the most important consequences of the new boundaries. But at the regional and local levels the picture was blurrier, and the different characteristics of peripheral positions together with pre-1918 legacies shaped the specific forms of regionalism present in these zones.

Interwar Romanian regionalism was generally a political idea based on the difference between the Old Kingdom and the new provinces. It fuelled, in its various forms, political demands for a distinct treatment of these regions, to be maintained either until social coherence was established across the Carpathians, or on a more permanent basis, in the form of separate provincial administrations or even autonomy. Thus, regionalism contested the central role of Bucharest and the primacy of the central government, not to speak of the Old Kingdom elites, which were somewhat offhand identified with the National Liberal Party. Proponents of regionalism usually argued that the new provinces had different traditions, were more democratic, and were home to a more authentic Romanianness, and that these political traditions and local circumstances were neglected by Bucharest governments that simply wanted to colonize these lands. From the perspective of Bucharest, such claims were not necessarily false, but these very regional and local specificities were taken not as something worth preserving, but rather as signs of the dubious national character of the area. Therefore, centralization and rapid Romanianization by Old Kingdom Romanians were justified.

Before 1918 both Maramureș and the Banat were distinct regions where social and political accommodation of Hungarian and minority elites, including the local Romanians, helped to stabilize the country. A significant part of the Romanian population of all social strata in these geographic peripheries was co-opted through local and regional institutions into national politics by the governing Liberal parties. In the new, staunchly anti-Hungarian Romania, the memory of such commonplace local and regional political arrangements was either decried or suppressed, and all Romanian parties championed some form of ethnic Romanian dominance. Even so, it was not easy to wipe out these traditions overnight. Together with the changing positions of
these two regions, these legacies brought about different forms of Romanian regionalism.

After a short interlude between 1919 and 1921, the dominance of the traditional Romanian, Greek Catholic noble families was re-established in Maramureș, palpably demonstrated by the return of the Mihalis to (local) power. Gavrila and Petru Mihali were prefects of the county and MPs in the parliament throughout the 1920s and 1930s, while at the same time they admittedly sought to defend regional interests within the county. Astonishingly, they were able to do so as representatives of the centralizing National Liberal Party (PNL) in opposition to the regionalist Romanian National Party (after 1926, the National Peasant Party).

One example concerning primary schools and schoolboards offers a clue as to how they could conclude this paradoxical alliance. In Maramureș County the Greek Catholic Church had a large number of primary schools before 1918 and further church-owned facilities were rented by the state. When Greek Catholic (and Orthodox) schools were nationalized, the church was reluctant to hand them over, and in Maramureș the local elite also intervened in trying to salvage the church’s influence. The county schoolboard, which was presided over by the prefect Gavrila Mihali, had a covert account to finance the upkeep of Greek Catholic property, and they also tried to maintain the existing practice of renting church property for state purposes.

But in a region where the Romanian elite was suspected to have been magyarized, and which was treated as culturally foreign, such aspirations were suspicious to many, among them county school inspector Teodor Stoia. Stoia was a Transylvanian regionalist who derided Bucharest as a colonizer, but he also openly promoted the idea that Maramureș should be renationalized through education. The pushback to his plans was immediate and effective. After the county schoolboard resigned citing Stoia’s conduct, and a smear campaign in the sole Romanian newspaper accused him of incompetence and violence against his subordinates, he was soon transferred. His successor, Petru Didicescu, saw Stoia’s views on the suspect national character of Maramureș confirmed in his first visit to Gavrila Mihali. The prefect allegedly told him with condescension that he could try to do things as he wished, but that locals had their own, Maramureș ways. Didicescu, who shared Stoia’s ideas about renationalization through education, quickly ran into trouble as well. He was accused of attempting to rape a schoolteacher and also promptly transferred.

The alliance with the Liberals secured the rule of the traditional elite in Maramureș for most of the interwar era. Their political opponents regularly accused the Mihalis and their relatives of nurturing Hungarian cultural customs—even of occasionally singing the Hungarian national anthem—and they truly seemed to continue certain cultural practices of pre-1918 society. Thus, in this region a more local, Maramureș regionalism was pitted against the Transylvanian Romanian regionalism, through which the representatives of the traditional elite made use of their pre-1918 experience to foster an agreement with the centralizing government. In exchange for political support at the national level, they were allowed to maintain not just their dominance, but also their otherwise dubious practices at the local level.

Such an arrangement was fruitful for both sides. The PNL enjoyed otherwise impossible electoral successes. The Mihalis had an extremely effective political machine, exemplified by the results in 1927. In this year the Liberals won the elections with 61%
of the votes. In Transylvania, however, the party gained more than 50% in only three counties: it won more than 70% in Trei Scaune/Háromszék and Odorheiu/Udvarhely in the Hungarian populated Székelyland (obviously achieved via violence and repression), and 59% in Maramureș. Its main opponent, the National Peasant Party, achieved this majority in six Transylvanian counties, despite drawing only 22% of the vote at the national level. The county was also used to offer safe seats for important Liberal politicians, much as was done before 1918, one of these being Valer Pop in 1937. Therefore, in this region, segregated from the centre and affected by subsequent, one can even say cumulative forms of peripheralization, regionalism had at least two, different layers: a more traditional micro-regional variant and a more modern Transylvanian one.

Banat Romanians had more diverse traditions of centre-periphery relations and politics. The advanced development of the region made it easier for a broader Romanian elite varying in social background and status to establish themselves within the regional society. While one group behaved like the Maramureș elite, there were no close-knit kin networks like in Maramureș to dominate the Romanian society, and another group had established firm positions as anti-Hungarian nationalists. In 1905/6 the latter successfully drove out the pro-Hungarian group from its parliamentary positions and became dominant in Caraș-Severin County. Thus, for a significant part of the Romanian elite in the region, traditional politics meant the successful struggle against Hungarians and not an alignment with their parties, and the change of sovereignty only further discredited pro-government politicians.

Post-1919 politics not only reflected this duality, but it also fostered further fragmentation. On the one hand, Romanian politicians were divided with regard to the future of their newly won provinces, and to whether to preserve some form of autonomy or to prefer gradual integration and unification. Surprisingly, it was in the Banat where the second option emerged in an organized form, as Avram Imbroane established his National Unity Party around the issue and won four seats in the region in the election of 1919. On the other hand, when the Liberals came to power in 1922, their attempt to rapidly establish a new, centralized state ran counter to pre-1918 traditions and local actors regularly voiced their discontent. Instead of supporting new, unfamiliar institutions they wished to retain traditional administrative units (which included, for example, re-establishing the Severin County, which was abolished in 1880) or preserve the municipal autonomy of the Hungarian counties, an arrangement quickly superseded by the centralizing measures of subsequent governments. Even though they always employed national arguments (Severin was actually the predominantly Romanian southern part of Caraș-Severin, the north being the ethnically more mixed zone), there was a palpable resentment against the Bucharest government here as well.

But politics was also more open here. In contrast with Maramureș, most of the parliamentary representatives of the Banat after 1919 were new to politics, and the majority of them now came from the region (78% between 1919 and 1922 as opposed to the 50% before 1919). This was a new group of Romanian activists, teachers, priests, lawyers and peasants. On the surface it was also more oppositional, at least until 1922, with only 56% of MPs supporting the subsequent governments as opposed to 91% before 1918. Party competition among Romanians offered the possibility for everyone to enter the political arena. While in the early years some traditional forms
of political dissent persisted (in 1919 Caraș-Severin was the only county where counter-candidates of RNP politicians who ran as alternate RNP candidates defeated their official opponents in single member constituencies), the diversity of parties made such practices obsolete. But the pre-1918 practice of offering safe seats to important politicians from the centre faded away. Even the important Old Kingdom parties (NLP and People’s Party [PP]) fielded candidates with local backgrounds in the Banat counties – albeit these were often high-profile candidates, such as Vasile Goldiş, who seceded from the RNP to the PP in 1926. That same year the RNP list in Timiș was led by Sever Bocu, a local grandee of the party; the PNL list by Aurel Cosma, the first Romanian prefect of the county appointed in 1919; and the PP lead candidate in Severin was Petru Nemoianu, who was of local origin and had been a volunteer in the Romanian Army after 1916, becoming the prefect of Caraș-Severin County in 1920/21.88 While all of them claimed to represent regional, Banat interests – that was one rationale for their candidacy – they were also all national heroes. Their most important differences had to do less with how the Banat needed to be rearranged and more with their opinions about how the centre was failing the regions with its imperfect measures that ultimately hindered rather than helped the process of nationalizing these areas.89

One reason for this regionalism, which aimed at the deficits of nationalism rather than at its homogenizing effects, was the local social and economic reality, which was still dominated by ‘strangers’. At least one of the rival Romanian elite groups found it continually favourable to attack the minorities and portray their rivals as weakling Romanians who courted the enemy.90 Another important factor also contributed to making such nationalizing regionalism relatively effective and hindered the emergence of arrangements like the one established in Maramureș: the region’s symbolic resonance in nationalist politics, which made the region more suitable for national integration than for the Maramureș-type tacit accommodation.

The Banat was the most contested of all areas claimed by Greater Romania, and nationalistic politicians attempted to mobilize the whole country to put pressure on the peace conference that was to decide its future. Thus, the Banat became a national cause and a symbol of the grievances that Romania suffered at this conference.91 Not that such appeals could compel local politicians to renounce their claims to some form of regional separation, often justified with these experiences too. But it mitigated the effect of legacies similar to those present in Maramureș on politics. Furthermore, with the Banat’s relative peripheralization, local elites felt more dependent on the centre and its resources, and viewed their goal to be ensuring the dominance of the Romanians over the minorities. Political competition therefore revolved around who was more capable of delivering on this promise, and regionalism was more focused on why it was impossible for the Old Kingdom elite to achieve anything in this regard. In this way the Banat was gradually transformed into a symbolic region that was primarily defined not by the differences that arose from its more developed status, which made it particular even compared with Transylvania, but rather as part of the generalized new province(s) that were distinct from the Old Kingdom because of their more authentic Romanianness. Together with the idea of the Banat’s advanced status as the most developed Romanian province, it was used to justify regionalist claims.
Still, pre-1918 practices, customs and habits survived here, sometimes for just as long as in Maramureş, and they were very often used to channel and express resentment against Old Kingdom Romanians. For example, such as when regional prefects revolted and stood up against the general staff of the army that wanted to dissolve the local voluntary firefighter associations, a precious common tradition of the Banat middle class. Or when a schoolteacher stormed into the office of the chief of state security in Lugoj in November 1928 and told him to go home to his Old Kingdom polenta. Or, finally, when newly transferred gendarmes discovered that it was customary for local Hungarians not to work on the Hungarian national day, 15 March.92 But these incidents remained manifestations of a dividing line between Romanians, proof of the civilizational superiority of the new provinces, and otherwise they no longer shaped politics as they had before.

Notes

2. It was differentiated rule, based on the co-optation of various local and regional elites. See Hirschhausen, “A New Imperial History?,” 741–2; Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, 8–10.
3. Livezeanu, Cultural Politics; Kührer-Wielach, Siebenbürger ohne Siebenbürgen?; Hirschhausen et al., Phantomgrenzen; Cusco, A Contested Borderland; Suveica, Basarabia in primul deceniu interbelic.
5. Hirschhausen, “A New Imperial History?”; Hirschhausen and Leonhard, Empires and Nationalstaaten; Rolf, “Einführung, Imperiale Biographien.”
7. Demeter and Szulovszky, Területi egyenlőtlenségek, 15–84.
16. For data on husbandry, see ibid. On the problems of traditional agricultural methods, see Orosz, “A magyar kormány.”
28. Iudean, “From Budapest to Bucharest.”
31. Dr. Gergely, A hőmezővásárhelyen működői, 9. The initiator of the united party, László Nyegre (Vasile Neagru) later became lord lieutenant.
32. I took the data from the series Országgyűlési Almanach. See also Iudean, “From Budapest to Bucharest.”
37. See Pálffy, “The Dislocated Transylvanian.”
39. For example for the Calvinist lyceum and law school. A máramarosszigeti ref. lyceum, jogakadémia, főgimnázium.
40. Balaton, “The Role of the Hungarian.”
42. See Leuștean, România, Ungaria și Tratatul de la Trianon, 51–9, 187–9; Moscovici, La France et la Banat.
43. Novacescu, “Chestiunea Banatului.”
44. Roth, Politische Strukturen.
45. On Romanian politics, see Ciuperca, Opoziția și putere; Maner, Parlamentarismus im Rumänien.
47. Demeter and Szulovszky, Területi egyenlőtlenségek, 219–54.
52. Hausleitner, Die Rumänisierung.
54. Miu, “Viața politică.”
58. Egry, Egy önlegitimáló narrativa
59. In this scheme the ARA facilitated the collection of donations and money for food packages that were delivered to their addressees in Romania. The money was transferred to the Romanian National Bank in US dollars and disbursed in Romanian lei to the respective individuals or the food warehouses supplying the packages. The fixed exchange rate was lower than the actual market rate and the difference meant net profit – and accumulation of foreign currency reserves. See Archives of the Hoover Institution, American Relief Organization European Operations, box 374, folder 11: contract between the ARA and Romania from February 28, 1919; folder 19: Haskell to Peden May 12, 1919, and May 13, 1919, Haskell to Minister Ferichide May 2, 1919, and Haskell to Paris May 23, 1919, box 289; folder 2: Memorandum to Mr Hyslop, October 1, 1919; box 375, folder 7: Memorandum to Herbert Hoover, Paris, April 23, 1919; folder 8: Woodruffe to Sir William Goode, May 4, 1919.
60. See the case of the Renner tannery in Cluj. Rigó, “The Long First World War.”
62. Bátori, “Dezvoltarea exploatărilor carbonifere.” In reality some of these companies were never nationalized, only taken into Romanian ownership by the post-Second World War Commission for Administration of Enemy Property (CASBI) and subsequent nationalization.


64. Egy, “Unholy Alliances?”; Sora, “Être fonctionnaire ‘minoritaire’.”

65. Arhivele Naționale Secția Județeană (ANSJ) Maramureș (MM) Liceul de Fete Domnita Ileana 2/1921. f. 100; Gazeta Maramureșană, November 2, 1923, p. 4; Gazeta Maramureșană, October 19, 1923, p.3; Gazeta Maramureșană, no. 18, 1924, p. 3; ANSJ MM dosar 2/1921 f. 32; Însemnari cu prilejul serbării “Revelionului” in Sighetul Marmației, Gazeta Maramureșană, January 18, 1924, p. 3. For the use of Hungarian within the postal service in the first years of Romanian rule, see also the bilingual address from the Regional Directorate of the Post Office in Oradea to the Administrative Committee of Maramureș county from October 25, 1921. ANSJ MM Prefectura Județului Maramureș, inventar 1005. 24/VII/39/1923. f. 2. Barbulescu Constantin: Atenționare. Gazeta Maramureșană, December 28, 1923, p. 2; Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale Direcția Generală a Poliției, Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale București (ANIC) Direcția Generală a Poliției (DGP) 3/1919-1920. f. 113.

66. Egy, “Navigating the Straits.”

67. The Gazeta Lugojului published the statistics of borrowed books in Timișoara from November 1922. Only 594 of the 2107 books borrowed were Romanian, 430 German and 896 Hungarian. See January 28, 1923, p. 3.

68. Gazeta Lugojului, January 28, 1923, p. 3; February 25, 1923, p. 3.

69. Egy, “Crowding Out.”

70. Livezeanu, Cultural Politics; Kührer-Wielach, Siebenbürgen ohne Siebenbürger; Hirschhausen et al., Phantogmogrenzen.


73. Filipascu, Istoria Maramureșului.


75. For the establishment and role of schoolboards, see Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, 37–8; ANSJ MM Prefectura Județului Maramureș Pachetul I/13, 1/1923, f. 50–1; T. Stoia: Reflexii la articol de sus: Gazeta Maramureșană. October 12, 1923, p. 2.


77. ANIC Ministerul Instrucțiunii, 24/1925. f. 1–2; Din activitate Dlui revizor scolar al Maramuras T. Stoia I-III. Gazeta Maramureșană, January 19, 1923; February 2, 1923; February 9, 1923; V. Filipciuc, Prietenul Teodor Stoia and T. Stoia, Reflexii la articol de sus. Gazeta Maramureșană, October 12, 1923, p. 2.

78. ANIC Ministerul Instrucțiunii, 24/1925. f. 3–15.

79. See Kelen György, “A nevezetes”; Lazăr, Amintiri.

80. Egy, Etnictas, identitás, politika.

81. It was probably the reason why the returning Hungarian administration in 1940 installed a Romanian prefect, Flavius Iurca, who was a district chief before 1918, county prefect in 1931–32, and an alleged follower of the Mihalis. Ablonczy, A visszatért Erdély.

82. Fritz, “Az 1927. évi választások.”


85. Iudean, “From Budapest to Bucharest”; Răzvan-Mihai, “A Socio-Professional Analysis.”
86. Iudean, “From Budapest to Bucharest,” 380–3. After 1926 the electoral law awarded all the seats in a county to the list that achieved more than 50% of the votes in the respective constituency, and the party that gained more than 40% of the votes at the national level was entitled to half of the seats and a proportional part of the other half, skewing the results.


88. Iudean, “The Banat Political Elite.”


91. Novacescu, “Chestiunea Banatului.”


Note on geographic names

For the sake of simplicity, at the first occasion I give all relevant varieties of the names of administrative units and localities, and subsequently use the Romanian form.

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A máramaroszigieti ref. lyceum jogakadémia, főgimnázium és internátus értesítője az 1916-17-es tanévről. Máramaroszigtet, 1917.


New state borders and (dis)loyalties to Czechoslovakia in Subcarpathian Rus, 1919–25

Stanislav Holubec

ABSTRACT
This article aims to discuss how useful the data from the censuses and election results of the early 1920s are in reconstructing the loyalties and disloyalties of the Subcarpathian population towards the Czechoslovak state. It argues that the priority for the new state was territorial expansion, which would allow it to function in economic and military terms, even though it was clear that such a course of action would mean the inclusion of a disloyal Hungarian minority within the new state. Although the Jewish minority was also viewed with suspicion by the largely Czech administrators, it was soon realized that its recognition in a census would diminish the strength of the Hungarian minority. Even though the Hungarian rural population voted in large numbers for pro-government parties in the elections of 1924 and 1925, despite the lack of Hungarian candidates on the ballots, there was no serious effort on the part of the Czechoslovak state to turn them into loyal citizens. In the case of the Rusyn population, the Czech authorities expected their loyalty almost automatically in gratitude for their liberation from 'the Hungarian yoke'. However, it soon became clear that the political ambitions of the Rusyn elite were not a priority for the Czechoslovak state, and most of the Rusyn population also started to adopt disloyal attitudes, either in the form of communism or nationalism. The results of the 1921 census served the government as justification for its decision to grant the Rusyn political elites less territory than they demanded and to weaken the Ukrainian movement within the Rusyn public. The reason for the spectacular communist victory among Rusyns in the 1924 and 1925 elections was a combination of the generally precarious social situation and some Rusyns' refusal to endorse the existing form of the Czechoslovak state. Although almost a similar number of Rusyns were loyal to the Czechoslovak state, this was not enough for the Czech administrators to grant autonomy to Subcarpathia or to include within it the eastern strip of Slovakia, which the Rusyn leaders had demanded.

Introduction
The process of the disintegration of the great empires and the formation of the postwar central European nation states resulted in many territorial changes in Europe. An important territorial change in central Europe was the annexation of multi-ethnic
Subcarpathian Rus\(^1\) by the Czechoslovak state in the years 1919–20. The process was connected with the political upheavals taking place at the time and the fact that between 1918 and 1920 the region was occupied by different armies and beset with small-scale struggles. It was a combination of the successful politics of the Czechoslovak exile movement in the years 1917–18, the results of armed conflicts in 1919, and the will of Entente powers that brought about Subcarpathia’s inclusion within Czechoslovakia. Although the new state restored order and introduced democratic rights, the burden of the past and several errors made by the new administration gave rise to a situation in which, by the early 1920s, the majority of its inhabitants began to demonstrate their disloyalty to the Czechoslovak state, most significantly in the election results of 1924 and 1925. While most ethnic Hungarians, and perhaps a majority of Jews, wanted to remain part of Hungary (either monarchical, democratic or soviet), others, mainly locals speaking the dialect of Ukrainian – whom I shall refer to in this article, with some simplification, as Rusyns\(^2\) – turned to communism and hoped for unification with Bolshevik Russia or dreamt of being unified with the independent future Ukrainian state. At the very least, they wished to achieve autonomy within the Czechoslovak republic.

This article aims to establish how useful the data from censuses and election results from the early 1920s are in reconstructing the loyalties and disloyalties of the Subcarpathian population towards the Czechoslovak state. The term loyalty is understood as devotion and faithfulness, which is expressed by discursive practices and actions. It is related to the term disloyalty, which also appears in writings on loyalty, although not so frequently.\(^3\) As Martin Schultze Wessel explains, the term loyalty is inspired by the concepts of identity, the sociology of power and institutional economy.\(^4\) The term loyalty is increasingly popular in social sciences and is favoured over the more traditional term identity because loyalty seems to be a more useful methodological tool: it can be characterized as partial, mediated, contingent and existing only between subjects.\(^5\) Not surprisingly, there is a strong link between ethnicity, state and loyalty.\(^6\) There can also be loyalty towards religion, social groups, regions and other social settings. In the early post-imperial period, however, it is loyalty to the state and nation that proves most significant. In the words of Egry, it ‘was fused with ethnicity in the eyes of many’\(^7\).

I will also address the connection between the term (dis)loyalty and the concept of national indifference, elaborated most eloquently by Tara Zahra\(^8\) and widely discussed in current historical writing. I will aim to show that, besides groups with constituted identities (ethnic Hungarians, members of the Rusyn elite belonging to either the Ukrainian or Russian language movements), there are three cases of uncertain ethnic identity in the region. First, Subcarpathian Jews, who, from the late nineteenth century onwards, began to identify more strongly with their Jewish ethnicity than their Hungarian one (although some doubts on this issue remain). The second case was the population of Eastern Slovakia who spoke a dialect of Ukrainian and whose ethnic identity – situated somewhere between Rusyn and Slovak – was not yet fully developed. The third case was the majority of the rural Rusyn population who ignored the question of ethnicity, identified with the smaller regions (Boyko, Hutsul, Hornyane, Dolnyane) or associated their ethnicity with the Uniate religion (which was perceived as the ‘Russian’ religion). I will argue that national indifference, nevertheless, did not become a significant issue in the eyes of the authorities as there was a consensus among the elite that a human had a duty to have an ethnicity; those unable to declare their ethnicity were
viewed with suspicion or as being in some way underdeveloped. It was rather the question of specific ethnic belonging (whether that be Czechoslovak or Russian, Russian or Ukrainian, Hungarian or Jew) that became a disputed issue.

I will argue that the Czechoslovak state did not expect strong loyalty from the Subcarpathian Hungarian minority after 1918, but was satisfied with at best mere passivity. The priority for the new state was to gain substantial territory, which would enable it to function in terms of its economy and military defence, even though it was clear not much loyalty could be expected from the newly acquired Hungarian minority. Moreover, in the eyes of the frequently antisemitic Czech administrators, the Subcarpathian Jews were by definition suspicious, but they soon realized that, by recognizing Jewish ethnicity in the census, they could weaken the position of the supposedly more dangerous Hungarian minority. I will argue that, even when some portions of the Jewish and Hungarian minorities demonstrated their loyalty in the elections, the policy of the state towards them did not substantially change. This makes the case of Czechoslovak Subcarpathia similar to post-1918 Romanian Transylvania, where Egry argues that the ‘dominant public discourse’ clearly connected loyalty with ethnicity and other discourse remained only at the local level.9

The story of local Rusyn loyalties was a different one: in this case, the Czech authorities expected their loyalty almost automatically as a result of their ‘liberation’. It soon became clear, however, that the political ambitions of the Rusyn elite would not be backed by the government if the loyalty of the Slovak elite, the loyalty of the state apparatus in Subcarpathia or good relations with Romania were at stake. I will argue that the results of the 1921 census served to justify the borders of Subcarpathia created between 1919 and 1921, which gave the region less territory than the Rusyn leaders demanded. The second aim of the census was to weaken the Ukrainian movement within the Rusyn public sphere by giving respondents only one option in the question concerning nationality: ‘Ruska’. The alleged lack of Rusyn loyalty, which had been a concern of the Czech apparatus since the resignation of governor Zhatkovich in 1921, led to the postponing of the election, which took place only three years after the Czechoslovak authorities established their rule. The ‘disloyal’ election results in Subcarpathia in 1924 and 1925 were partly expected and partly a shock for Czech authorities, but they were swiftly deployed to further legitimize the unfulfilled promises of autonomy.

Finally, I will discuss why disloyalty to the Czechoslovak state took the form of increasing support for communism among the Rusyn population and nationalism among the Hungarian minority. I will argue that it was a combination of social issues, demands for autonomy and external pressures that led the bulk of the Rusyn population to support the communist movement. Nevertheless, while the Rusyn population was almost as loyal to the Czechoslovak state as it was to communism, this was not sufficient for the Czech administrators to grant autonomy to Subcarpathia.

Annexation of Subcarpathia by Czechoslovakia

Before 1918, the Rusyns (or Ruthenes, the citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary and the south of Austrian Galicia speaking a local dialect of the Ukrainian language) were a group whose ethnic consciousness had yet to be adequately profiled. Local intellectuals were divided on the basis of the identity they embraced: Ukrainian, Rusyn or Russian.10 In
terms of socio-economic development, the Rusyn-speaking areas belonged to the less developed eastern half of Hungary, which did, however, begin to prosper somewhat in the late nineteenth century, before being interrupted by the First World War. The region was marked by agrarian overpopulation, resulting in huge migration to the United States, and by the large presence of Jews, who migrated from Galicia to Subcarpathia during the nineteenth century. The local civil society and the movement for autonomy within Hungary were insignificant owing to the low level of education, restrictions on electoral rights and Magyarization policies.

The Rusyn-speaking area was barely discussed in the plans for the division of Hungary among the Entente Powers until 1917. The Czech and Slovak exile leaders did not originally demand its inclusion in the future state of Czechoslovakia, while the Romanian government was more interested in Romanian-speaking Transylvania. The Czech leader in exile, Tomáš Masaryk, expected the Rusyn territory to be included into Russia after the war, but the defeat of the Tsarist forces on the eastern front in 1917 made these plans impossible. During the course of 1918, the Czech leadership in exile began to understand that Bolshevik Russia would not be able to annex the Rusyn-speaking part of Hungary and started to demand it for the future Czechoslovakian state, owing to its strategic importance as a bridge to future Romanian and perhaps Russian allies after the supposed collapse of Bolshevism, as well as the fact that it would divide the future Polish and Hungarian states, which the Czechoslovak leadership in exile did not perceive as friendly nations. The Czechoslovak leaders in exile, having no direct influence in Subcarpathia, started negotiations with the leaders of the Rusyn diaspora in the United States, who accepted unification with Czechoslovakia in October 1918, a decision also approved by the Congress of American Rusyns in November. Although the right of a thousand American Rusyns to decide on the future of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Rusyns was somewhat dubious, this decision was immediately used by the Czechoslovak leadership in exile as justification for the plan to annex Subcarpathia. The local Rusyn elite was in disagreement about the future of the region during the autumn of 1918, with some dreaming of integration within independent Ukraine, and others preferring autonomous status within Hungary, an idea supported by most of the Uniate (Greek Catholic) clergy and also by the Jewish minority. However, the plans to make a part of the independent Ukrainian state (declared in October 1918) from Subcarpathia vanished after Bolshevik and Polish units began to occupy its core territory in Galicia in 1919.

The Hungarian government decided to react to local demands, as well as Ukrainian and Czechoslovak annexation plans, by granting autonomy to Subcarpathia in December 1918. This included granting the locals their own diet, rights on culture, education and language, and a governor appointed by the government of Hungary. The election to the local assembly was organized in March 1919 in the territory under Hungarian control. The disintegration of the Hungarian army, however, made the plan impossible. When Czechoslovak units occupied most of Slovakia and the Rusyn-speaking area north of Prešov in December 1918, the local national council of Rusyns switched their demands from unification with Ukraine to support for Czechoslovakia. In January 1919 Czech troops entered Uzhhorod, the most important city in Subcarpathia, situated on the Ung River, which had been designated by the western allies as the demarcation line between the Czech and Hungarian armies until a
decision about the region could be made. The east of the country was occupied by Romanian troops in April 1919. In the same month, the Entente Powers started to support the plan to cede Subcarpathia to Czechoslovakia. However, military actions could still play a decisive role. In Hungary, the Károlyi government, facing the loss of territories to Romania as dictated by the Entente Powers, resigned in March 1919. The Bolsheviks took power, and the Hungarian Soviet Republic was declared. Hungarian Bolsheviks thereafter refused to withdraw from the territories still in the hands of Hungarian troops. This was used by the Czechoslovak and Romanian troops as a reason to invade the central part of Subcarpathia and both armies met on 30 April in Mukachevo at the line dividing the country into approximately two halves: the eastern half occupied by Romania and the western half by Czechoslovakia. The upheavals were not yet over: the Hungarian Soviet Republic invaded the south of Subcarpathia and east of Slovakia in July 1919, thus cutting the Czechoslovak troops in Subcarpathia off from the troops in central Slovakia for several weeks. However, it collapsed under the pressure exerted by the western powers and because of a lack of help from Soviet Russia. The Paris Peace Conference in May 1919 finally decided that most of the Rusyn-speaking areas of Hungary would be included within Czechoslovakia. Romanian troops, however, continued to occupy the eastern half of Subcarpathia until July 1920 and moved out only after numerous requests by the Czechoslovak government. Romania also succeeded in annexing Sighetu Marmatiei, the most important city in the east of the country.

**New borders, censuses and administration as a source of disloyalties**

The most important territorial change after 1918 was that the Rusyn-speaking region now became the borderland, surrounded by foreign countries in the north, south and east, which contrasted with its former position as a region surrounded by other parts of the Habsburg monarchy. Determination of the new borders was one of the most difficult issues and had a strong impact on the loyalties to the new state. The least complicated was the northern border. Here the former administrative border between Cisleithania and Transleithania was transformed into a state border between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Only occasionally did some Czech or Rusyn political activists suggest that the territory inhabited by the Lemko ethnic group, which had formerly been Galicia and was now part of Poland, be annexed and included within Subcarpathia owing to the ethnic closeness of Lemkos and Rusyns.21

The new border brought important changes to the lives of locals, most importantly duties on transported goods and restrictions on migration where previously there had been none. As a result, contact with the Rusyn/Ukrainian-speaking population in Galicia (now in Poland) became more difficult. Because of the Czechoslovak–Polish Seven-Day War over Teschen in Silesia in January 1919, the Polish state was suspected by Czechoslovak authorities of organizing enemy activities in cooperation with Hungarians and Jews in Subcarpathia.22 A source of some frustration for the Czechoslovak authorities was the fact that the Subcarpathian border with Poland was difficult to guard because it was situated in inaccessible mountainous terrain covered by forests.

A more complicated issue was the creation of a completely new border in the south and west. Before 1918, the Kingdom of Hungary had been divided into 63 counties, and
the future Subcarpathian Rus had been a part of four (Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, Mármaros). These counties, which had been created during the fifteenth century for the purposes of administration, ignored language lines. Therefore, new borders could not be based on them. Paradoxically, the most difficult task proved to be the demarcation of the Slovak–Subcarpathian border. While this was, of course, an internal border in the Czechoslovak state, it was a significant one because of the promised autonomy of Subcarpathia. The reason for the intensity of the disputes over this border was that the language line here was fully incompatible with administrative and economic needs: the disputed territory inhabited by Rusyns was a strip of mountain valleys close to the northern border of Czechoslovakia, stretching westward from Uzhhorod to the eastern Slovak town of Stara Lubovna, approximately 100 kilometres long and 10 to 30 kilometres wide. The strip was easily accessible from the Slovak towns of Prešov and Humené, but not from the most westerly city of Subcarpathia, Uzhhorod.

In 1918 the Rusyn leader Zatkovich presented Masaryk with a map depicting his territorial demands. It included within the future Subcarpathia the whole of eastern Slovakia, which contained the cities of Košice and Levoča. From 1919 onwards, the Rusyn elite demanded that at least the northern parts of this territory be included in Subcarpathia, while the Slovak political elite demanded the whole of Ung county, including the city of Uzhhorod. At the Paris Peace Conference in May 1919 the international border commission initially supported the Slovak demands and proposed including Ung county within Slovakia, which would mean that at least a third of the Czechoslovak Rusyns would live in Slovakia (148,000 out of the total 460,000 Czechoslovak Rusyns, according to the 1921 census). The Czechoslovak (in fact, ethnically Czech) delegation tried to be more conciliatory and proposed including the part of Ung county east of the Ung River and the city of Uzhhorod within Subcarpathia and the west of Ung within Slovakia. The proposal was approved by the highest council of the Peace Conference in June 1919.

Hoping to further satisfy the Rusyn elite, the Czechoslovak government declared in the autumn of 1919 a plan to shift the border from the valley of Ung several kilometres to the west. This meant that the towns of Velke Berezne and Perencin, as well as other municipalities comprising about 20,000 inhabitants, were ceded to Subcarpathia. The first step in the handover was the general statute for organization and administration of Subcarpathian Rus issued by the Prague government in November 1919, which put the strip under the administration of Uzhhorod, even though it was still officially considered as part of Slovakia.

The publication of the 1921 census results become a crucial factor in the dispute. In most of eastern Slovakia, those who declared their nationality as 'Russian' represented only a minority. While some could argue that the results of the last Hungarian census in 1910 had been manipulated, the results of the latest Czechoslovak census did not differ dramatically from the Hungarian one. A certain degree of confusion was caused by the fact that the inhabitants of eastern Slovakia belonging to the Uniate church tended to call themselves Rusnaks (Rusňáci) and were therefore considered by the Rusyn elite to be ethnic Rusyns. Nevertheless, while a blurring of the lines between religion and ethnicity was a phenomenon well known in other parts of Europe, the census results ensured that it was impossible to conflate the Uniate faith with Rusyn ethnicity: out of the 169,000 inhabitants of Eastern Slovakia (in the county of Košice) declaring that they belonged to
the Uniate religion in 1921, only 99,000 of them also declared themselves to be of 'Russian' (ruská) ethnicity, while the rest declared themselves to be of 'Czechoslovak' ethnicity. It is difficult to say how many of them were willing to stay in Slovakia or to integrate within Subcarpathia, as no plebiscite was organized. The available data suggests that identity was relatively fluid or 'indifferent' in the region and that the actual number of people with Rusyn as their mother tongue was somewhat higher than those declaring 'Russian' ethnicity: the number of Rusyn native speakers recorded in the Hungarian census in the area in 1910 was 108,000, while only 99,000 declared themselves to be 'Russian' in 1921.

There is no disputing the fact that the results of the 1921 Czechoslovak census were to some extent manipulated in order to increase the number of Czechs and Slovaks and to decrease the number of Hungarians, Germans and Rusyns. The Czechoslovak census was criticized by the German and Hungarian elites for a number of reasons. First, the category of so-called 'language of daily use' (which was used in censuses from 1880 to 1910) was replaced by 'ethnicity', which was not a matter of individual choice, but was based on a citizen's 'mother tongue'. This category was introduced in order to discover the 'real' numbers of Czechs and Slovaks, as it was supposed that some had switched to German or Hungarian ethnicity during the course of their lives. If the ethnicity declared by a citizen did not correspond to his mother tongue, the census-taker had the right to 'correct' the statement. This contrasted with the praxis before 1914 when the 'spoken language' did not need to be officially approved by the census-taker in case of doubt. Second, the questionnaires were written only in Czech in 1921, whereas until 1918 they were written only in Hungarian in Slovakia and Subcarpathia and in Czech and German in the Czech lands. Third, for the organization of the census in Slovakia and Subcarpathia, the Czechoslovak Statistical Bureau decided that the questionnaires should be filled in by the census-takers and not by locals. This was justified by the high illiteracy rate and by the lack of knowledge of the Czech language among Rusyns and other ethnic minorities. In the Czech lands the questionnaires were given to the inhabitants to fill in; the census-takers' role was merely to supervise this process. Fourth, the commissars were mainly Czechs and Rusyns in Subcarpathia and Slovaks in Slovakia. Therefore, it can be supposed that – particularly in the territory where Slovaks and Rusyns (who were after all not so different in terms of language) were mixed – there was a tendency to increase the number of Slovaks recorded as 'Czechoslovaks', the term reflecting the theory of one ruling nation in the republic. Fifth, it was only Jews by religion (people declaring Judaism as their religion) who could freely declare themselves to be of any ethnicity and without being asked about their 'mother tongue'. This measure was understood by Hungarian and German elites as an attempt to decrease the number of these national minorities because many Jews had German or Hungarian as their 'mother tongue'. Finally, in Subcarpathia, the only possibility for Slavic locals was to declare themselves to be of 'Ruska' (Russian) ethnicity, which was an option refused by those identifying with the Ukrainian nation. Clearly, the category 'ruská' was being used in order to diminish the influence of pro-Ukrainian groups in the political life of Subcarpathia. Moreover, no possibility to give two ethnicities or to refuse the declaration of ethnicity was allowed, to the anger of those from bilingual families.

The incongruities between the 1921 census and the results of the 1920 election in Slovakia and the Czech lands showed that in some cases the census had been
manipulated, but the extent of manipulation differed from region to region. For example, in Ostrava, where the language difference between Czechs and Poles was relatively fluid, it is estimated that approximately 4% of Poles were pressured into declaring themselves as Czechs.\(^3^9\) As has been shown, in the case of Rusyns in Eastern Slovakia, the number of those pressured into declaring themselves Slovak can be estimated as even higher – perhaps one-tenth – but this is impossible to prove using the election results, as there was no specifically Rusyn party participating in the election.

Although the publication of the census results clearly demonstrated that the inclusion of the aforementioned strip in northeast Slovakia within Subcarpathia could not be justified in terms of ethnicity, it also demonstrated that the western bank of the Ung River should be incorporated within Subcarpathia (which happened officially only in 1928). The census results also clearly showed there were about 30 Rusyn-speaking municipalities with 20,000 inhabitants in the vicinity of Uzhorod\(^4^0\) that were still included within Slovakia, and this small territory was in fact easily accessible from Uzhorod. The mistake of the Rusyn elite was, however, that they continued to claim the whole of northeastern Slovakia, including the city of Prešov.\(^4^1\) According to the census, 85,000 Rusyns (in reality somewhat more) still found themselves in Slovakia,\(^4^2\) while only several thousand Slovaks lived in Subcarpathia. The Slovak–Subcarpathian border was finally approved in 1928, but it was still opposed by many Rusyns and some Slovaks and Czechs.\(^4^3\) In sum, the results of the 1921 census both benefited and hampered the Rusyn elite. While they did not gain the whole of northeastern Slovakia, as they had hoped, they did not lose the western bank of the Ung. In addition, the results of the census enabled them to argue there was still a territory of 30 Rusyn villages in Slovakia close to the border with Subcarpathia.

The Rusyn political elite perceived the issue of the border with Slovakia as a sort of national humiliation, and its revision became their most important political goal during the interwar period, together with the realization of autonomy they had been promised, but which remained largely unfulfilled.\(^4^4\) From the perspective of the local rural population, the new border was perhaps not quite so painfully perceived because it was not a border between two independent countries after all, and therefore its impact on daily affairs was less important than the border with Hungary and Romania.

The Subcarpathian–Slovak border was shifted westward after the Hungarian annexation of Subcarpathia in March 1939, and the territory east of Snina, including those 30 villages, was included within Kárpátalja, a formally autonomous part of Hungary. After 1945 the Soviet Union annexed Subcarpathia, and the 1928 border was restored with only a slight correction in the south, where the Soviet Union gained the railway from Uzhorod to Cop, a village with a junction essential for rail transport between the east and west of Subcarpathia. The new territory gained by the Soviet Union contained 13 villages with 10,000 mainly Hungarian-speaking inhabitants. In return, Czechoslovakia received a village with 1500 Slovaks in proximity to Uzhorod.\(^4^5\)

The border with Romania was also not an easy issue to resolve. During the First World War, Romania, fighting on the side of the Entente Powers, aimed to annex only the Romanian-speaking territories of Hungary. At the Peace Conference in February 1919, Romania’s demands grew larger. The Romanian delegation demanded the railway connection with Poland from Satu Mare to Kolomyja,\(^4^6\) which would mean the annexation of the whole Tisza river valley, a territory inhabited mainly by Rusyns, including the towns of Rachiv and Jasina. Several weeks later, during the brief existence of the Hungarian Soviet
Republic, Romania saw a chance to further extend its territory and to include all of Maramaros county. With this aim, Romania occupied those parts of Subcarpathia east of Mukachevo in March 1919. However, under pressure from the Entente powers, Romania agreed to hand over Maramaros county north of Tisza to Czechoslovakia in April 1919; even so, it removed its troops only in the summer of 1920. The Czechoslovak elite also had its own far-reaching demands in 1919 concerning the eastern tip of Subcarpathia. They demanded the city of Sighetu Marmatiei (21,370 inhabitants in 1910: 50% of them Hungarian, 37% Jewish and 2.4% Rusyn) and even the city of Borşa (9343 inhabitants in 1910: 69% Romanian, 24% Jewish and 1% Rusyn). One Czech author even claimed in 1919 that without Sighetu, the east of Subcarpathia could not be viable. The border between Romania and Subcarpathia was created by the decision of the Entente Powers in August 1919; final corrections were made with the agreement of the Czechoslovak and Romanian governments in May 1921, and four villages with 5000 inhabitants were ceded to Romania.

Situated mainly on the Tisza River, the new border with Romania largely respected the ethnic line. It did, however, cause numerous difficulties for transport and the economy. The most serious problem was that the only railway and road connecting the west and east of Subcarpathia was partly situated on the new Romanian territory (for 46 kilometres of the railway and 37 kilometres of the road). This was solved by the agreement of both governments, who were, after all, allies. Czechoslovak trains were allowed to travel through Romanian territory, while a new road was constructed between 1922 and 1924. It was also impossible to follow the language line exactly in all places, with the result that approximately 20,000 Rusyns stayed in Romania (according to the 1930 census) and approximately 12,000 Romanians stayed in Subcarpathia (according to the 1921 census). However, this ethnic overlapping was a minor issue compared to the border with Hungary or Slovakia. It was also relatively easier to create the border (in comparison to the creation of the border between Subcarpathia and Slovakia), because the language line between Rusyns and Romanians was obvious. Even in this case, however, the Rusyn elite considered the new border a humiliation, although not to the same extent as the border with Slovakia.

The division of Maramaros county was nevertheless painful for the everyday lives of those inhabiting the west of Subcarpathia, as its former administrative centre, Sighetu Marmatiei, became part of Romania and the new border on the Tisza River divided it from its northern suburb. This constituted a source of sorrow for Czechs and Rusyns, who understood the city’s importance for the local economy. Locals from the surrounding area who had become Czechoslovak citizens now had to go to the smaller and more remote towns of Khust or Rahovo to deal with authorities or do their bigger shopping. Pupils from Subcarpathia studying at the gymnasium in the city Sighetu Marmatiei also faced numerous difficulties (such as crossing the border and having their diploma recognized), while farmers could no longer sell their products in the city market. Even more difficult was the situation for those farmers who had their fields on the other side of the border. The loss of Sighetu Marmatiei was the most frequent complaint in the Czechoslovak press concerning the Subcarpathian border during the 1920s. The border changed once again in September 1940, when Hungary, which had been occupying Subcarpathia since 1939, gained territory from Romania after the Second Vienna Award, meaning that the former Maramaros county was once again unified. This
state of affairs existed only until the arrival of the Soviet army in 1944, when the pre-war border between Romania and Subcarpathia was restored.

Even though Romania was a Czech ally, Czechs considered the Romanian military administration of the Subcarpathian East, lasting 15 months until July 1920, a disaster. The Jewish minority was a particular target of violence by Romanian military units. Later on, the Czechoslovak police were shocked by the behaviour of Romanian border guards, which contrasted with the more correct behaviour of the Polish or Hungarian guards. According to the police reports, Romanian border guards conducted their inspections chaotically. Sometimes they did not allow people with the proper passport to enter Romania. At other times, 'after heavy drinking' on Sunday, the checkpoint opened only for a few hours on Monday. According to Czechoslovak reports, Romanian border guards were occasionally even drunk during their service. On occasion, they asked Czechoslovak citizens entering the country to pay a fine or even destroyed the ID cards issued by the local Czechoslovak police. It was reported that they allowed people to enter the country 'simply according to their mood'. Even though life was not easy at the new border, the election results from 1925 do not show any higher level of electoral support for anti-system parties than in other parts of the region. It seems the social and economic situation in the Tisza valley was still better than in remote peripheries, and therefore there were fewer reasons to vote for anti-system parties.

The creation of a new border between Subcarpathia and Hungary was the result of a decision made by the Entente Powers in July 1919. Most of the territories of the counties of Bereg, Ung and Ugocsa were given to Subcarpathia, while Hungary received only the smaller southern strip. Here the ethnic line was completely ignored, and the new border was drawn according to the transportation needs of the new Czechoslovak state. The reason for this was that the only railway line connecting the west and east of Subcarpathia, from Csap/Chop to Khust, essential for the functioning of the new country, lay deep in Hungarian-speaking territory. Although Czechoslovakia received territory here which was almost exclusively Hungarian-speaking, some Czech authors argued that the border between Subcarpathia and Hungary was still disadvantageous for Czechoslovakia as it was situated too close to the railway, which could therefore be easily cut off in the event of war.

In contrast to the border with Romania, the locals were not so greatly affected in terms of transportation and urban accessibility (with the exception of the citizens of post-Trianon Hungary living in proximity to Berego, which became a Subcarpathian border city). However, the reduction in the status of ethnic Hungarians from ruling nation to national minority in a foreign country was psychologically difficult, particularly for the urban middle classes, whose daily lives were affected by the restrictions on travelling to Budapest and other big Hungarian cities. During the existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and over the course of subsequent months, travel to Hungary was allowed only for the most urgent reasons; however, these restrictions were relaxed later on. In March 1920, it was reported that people could freely cross the Hungarian borders with Subcarpathia and Slovakia, and there were demands for the introduction of passports. In August 1920, when the Hungarian Red Army was approaching the Subcarpathian borders, it was again forbidden to travel to Hungary unless there was an urgent reason, such as a death in the family or a property matter to settle. In such a situation, the
Czechoslovak administration could at best hope for the passivity of ethnic Hungarians towards Czechoslovakia rather than their loyalty.

The new border meant that, according to the 1921 census, 100,000 Hungarians were incorporated into Subcarpathia. If we compare the censuses of 1910 and 1921, a clear decline in the number of Hungarians living in the territory of Subcarpathia was recorded. According to the last pre-war census, 31% of people declared Hungarian as their language of daily communication, but in 1921 only 17% declared their ethnicity as Hungarian. We can estimate that only a small minority of them emigrated to Hungary after 1918. Approximately a third switched to Russian nationality; another third, mostly Jews and Hungarians, did not receive Czechoslovakian citizenship as they were born outside the territory of Czechoslovakia. Although they were allowed to stay in Subcarpathia, they were recorded in 1921 as being without citizenship. The final third were those who decided to declare their nationality as Jewish in 1921, which was given as a possibility for the first time. In spite of the reduction in the number of ethnic Hungarians, the census made it clear there was a belt inhabited almost exclusively by the Hungarian minority along the border of post-Trianon Hungary (approximately 80 kilometres long and 30 kilometres wide). The Hungarian-speaking territory was re-annexed by Hungary in 1938; however, after the war the border was returned to its pre-1938 state.

The results of the 1921 census raise another question. What proportion of the population of Subcarpathia could be defined as indifferent in terms of ethnicity? First, the Jewish minority, which is often cited as an example of ethnic indifference or ambiguity, consisted mainly of orthodox Jews who were clearly distinguishable from the rest of society, marrying mainly within their own group and, according to the censuses of 1920 and 1930, strongly identifying with the concept of Jewish nationality (86% of Jews by religion declared their nationality as Jewish in the census of 1921, and 89% did so in 1930). Only a minority of Jews by religion declared their nationality as Hungarian in the Czechoslovak census, mainly those who lived in rural Hungarian-speaking areas. This contrasts with the attitude of the Jews by religion living in the Czech lands, of whom only a third declared their nationality as Jewish in the 1921 census; the rest identified either with German or Czech ethnicity. There were also people whose ethnicity lay somewhere between Rusyn and Hungarian; these were mainly members of the middle class of Rusyn origin who had, upon marriage to a Hungarian, become Magyarized over the course of their lives. However, the majority of the Hungarian ethnic group remained separate from the Rusyn-speaking population. These were either middle- and upper-class people living in the cities and separated from the Rusyn lower classes along class lines or those living in the Hungarian-speaking lowland and separated spatially from the Rusyn-speaking people in the highland. The relative separateness of Rusyns, Hungarians and Jews is indicated by the number of interethnic/interreligious marriages. Consider the percentage of Czech–German weddings in Czechoslovakia during the 1920s, a time when relations between the two groups were by no means friendly, but where approximately 2.5% of the weddings involving Germans and Czechs were interethnic (i.e. between a German and a Czech; the other 97.5% were between two Czechs or two Germans). This number is significantly higher than the percentage of Rusyn–Hungarian weddings in Subcarpathia, where only 1.8% of the weddings involving
Rusyns and Hungarians were interethic. The percentage of ethnic Jews or Jews by religion marrying outside their community was even lower, less than 0.5%\(^70\).

Along with the ethnically Hungarian rural lowland, the three biggest Subcarpathian urban centres, consisting largely of ethnic Hungarians and Jews, were also incorporated into Czechoslovakia. According to the statistics, in 1910 Uzhorod/Ungvár had a population of 16,919, 80% of whom declared Hungarian as their language in use, and more than a third of whom declared themselves religiously Jewish.\(^71\) The city was situated on the language line of three ethnic groups: Slovaks from the west, Rusyns from the north and east, and Hungarians from the south. Mukachevo, a city with 17,275 inhabitants situated on the language line between Rusyn and Hungarian, had a similar demographic structure to Uzhorod, with 73% Hungarian speakers in 1910. However, a majority of them were Jews by religion,\(^72\) and the city was known as a centre for the Jewish community in Subcarpathia. While Uzhorod fell into the hands of the Czechoslovak army in January 1919 and remained there even during the military campaigns of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in the spring of 1919, Hungarian control of Mukachevo lasted until April 1919. The city was subsequently occupied by Romanian and Czechoslovak units, and the demarcation line between them lasted until July 1920. When the political situation stabilized, Mukachevo seemed to many a natural candidate for capital of the country, since it was situated towards the centre and was slightly bigger than Uzhorod, but this was not approved by the Czechoslovak authorities.\(^73\) The third of these urban centres, Beregovo, was situated deep in Hungarian-speaking territory; in 1910 two-thirds of its inhabitants were ethnic Hungarians, while the other third were Jews by religion.

The division of the Kingdom of Hungary had an impact not only on the inhabitants living in the vicinity of the new border, but on the whole population of Subcarpathia. Rusyns from the mountains, who had once used to work in agriculture during the summer in the Hungarian lowland now had to apply for passports\(^74\) and found that they were no longer in demand because Hungary faced an economic crisis. Industrial products ceased to be imported from the west of Hungary and were replaced by the products of Czech industry, which were more expensive as they were transported over greater distances.\(^75\) Subcarpathian wood lost its markets in Hungary and was not needed in Slovakia or the Czech lands.\(^76\) University students studying in Budapest or Debrecen were allowed to finish their studies when the situation stabilized in 1921, but they had difficulties commuting and having their diplomas recognized. In Czechoslovakia they could study at the universities of Prague, Brno or Bratislava, but two Hungarian universities were closer. The situation with grammar schools was better: the Czechoslovak government established Rusyn grammar schools in Hust, Uzhorod and Mukachevo, while Hungarians were allowed to keep their classes in the grammar schools of Mukachevo, Uzhorod and Beregove. However, after several years the authorities closed down the first two Hungarian grammar schools owing to the low number of applications.\(^77\) There were also dozens of students who studied before 1918 at gymnasiuims in Sighetu Marmatiei (Máramarossziget) and Satu Mare (Szatmárnémeti), which became part of Romania. These students subsequently demanded that they be allowed to continue their studies. In April 1920 a Czech police officer in Beregovo asked the headquarters in Uzhorod how to deal with the issue.\(^78\) Th headquarters recommended issuing passports to all applicants except those who represented a political or military threat.\(^79\)
The Czech administrators arriving in Subcarpathia perceived Hungarians, and to some extent also Jews, as a group with no loyalty to the state, and which should be deprived of political and economic power. In order to do this, the Czechoslovak authorities introduced several measures. The first measure was land reform, which aimed to reduce the amount of property belonging to large Hungarian landowners. In a symbolic way, the public exhibition of Hungarian state symbols was also prohibited. An oath of loyalty and a language exam were used in order to force Hungarians out of the civil service. A telling example of this is the police headquarters in Uzhorod, a body which had already been ethnically 'Slavicized' at that time. In 1921, of the 50 people employed there, 39 were Czech, 5 Slovak, 4 Rusyn and only 2 Hungarian. In order to fill positions, the authorities accepted applications even from Czechs without the necessary qualifications, work experience or knowledge of the local languages. If the new administrators knew any language at all, it was usually German, which did at least prove useful when communicating with Jews or Hungarians. Even if one looks at the lowest category of officials, the so-called 'office assistants', the Czech heads of administration preferred to employ mainly ethnic Slovaks. It seems from the archive materials that even those Hungarians who were willing to continue their careers in the civil service and who set about learning Czech or Slovak (significantly, Rusyn was not demanded) still had to pass difficult language exams after two years, and the Czech inspectors examining them were not willing to show any leniency. The professional qualities of Hungarian and Jewish employees were also disputed.

Another measure against the 'untrustworthy' minorities was the refusal of citizenship to those born outside the country, particularly if they were poor or were still employed in the state apparatus. An example is the Hungarian clerk who professed loyalty to the Czechoslovak state and learned Czech but had, unfortunately, been born outside the territory. The Czech officer examining his request concluded that even though there were no complaints about his work and public behaviour, 'there is a surplus of intelligent Czechoslovak citizens who cannot find a job. Therefore, we have no interest in granting him citizenship.' Another example is the application by a Jewish coachman from Uzhorod, who had been born outside the territory of future Czechoslovakia but had, however, lived there for decades. The Czech clerk refused him with the following words:

[H]e has no property, just two bad horses and a coach, his family and his household look filthy .... The family claims it is because of their poverty and small apartment, but in fact it is their innate laziness ...

In both cases they were able to continue living in Czechoslovakia, but without the possibility of getting a job in the civil service or participating in elections.

Restricting the influence of the Jewish minority was a more complicated matter for the state authorities, as Jews were much less likely than Hungarians to seek work in the civil service. The Israeli historian Yeshayahu Jelinek claims that the Czechoslovak administration in Subcarpathian Rus was more antisemitic than the Hungarian one before 1918 because the Czechoslovak authorities saw the Jews as tools of the former Hungarian regime. In this case, the state aimed to place restrictions on Jewish religious schools and Jewish businesses selling alcohol, which constituted a serious issue in a country beset with widespread alcoholism among the rural population. A telling example is the Czech school inspection report on a local Jewish religious
school in Beregove, filled with antisemitic prejudice and recommending the closure of the school owing to the lack of hygiene and its teachers’ lack of any knowledge of modern pedagogy. The idea behind restricting the sale of alcohol was that the state would be able both to combat peasant alcoholism and reduce Jewish profits. There were, however, methods by which the Jewish shop owners could circumvent this restriction, such as selling the spirit as a fuel for lamps. The police eventually discovered this ruse in February 1922, upon noticing that sales were much higher than necessary for the number of lamps in a given locality. Another way in which the state attempted to marginalize Jewish shops was the opening of state cooperative stores that subsidized the price of basic foodstuffs. The Jewish merchants reacted to this by giving alcohol to locals, provided they bought foodstuffs at twice the normal price.

One characteristic of the Hungarian and Jewish acts of disloyalty seems to have been an apparent unwillingness to accept Czechs as tenants in their apartments. However, it should be noted that the overall housing situation in Subcarpathian towns was lamentably bad, so much so that it constituted the most frequent source of complaint among Czech officials in Subcarpathia in the early 1920s. The central authorities were bombarded by letters describing the terrible housing conditions, the difficulties for clerks in bringing their families over from Czech lands or getting married, the effects of the unhealthy apartments on their children, and the financial costs caused by the absence of kitchens in rented rooms.

Nevertheless, both Hungarians and Jews showed remarkably little willingness to engage in radical, violent acts of disloyalty to the new authorities. Compared to the German minority in Czech lands, there were no mass acts of political violence. As far as we know, only one political death of a Hungarian nationalist at the hands of the police during a demonstration was reported, contrasting with several deaths during the anti-Bolshevik campaigns by the Czech police in Subcarpathia, where protestors were shot during food riots organized by the communists, or the dozens of deaths during the Czech seizure of German-speaking cities in Bohemia in March 1919.

(Dis)loyalties of Hungarian and Jewish minorities in the 1925 election

The next sections will be based primarily on the statistical data from the 1921 census and the 1925 election result, which have yet to be compared by the historiography. These data provide us with information concerning the ethnic and religious composition of each commune. We also know the level of socio-economic development of the districts in which they are situated (which I operationalize as the illiteracy rate). However, it should be kept in mind that, as we have already seen, ethnicity was a more complicated issue than might appear from the statistics, where everybody had to be categorized under one label. It should also be kept in mind that voting for political parties with either loyal or disloyal attitudes to the Czechoslovak state does not automatically signify loyalties or disloyalties at the personal level, but rather indicates certain attitudes. Moreover, the reduction of parties’ political positions to either loyal or disloyal somewhat simplifies the issue. Therefore, such a comparison is only of limited use in helping us better understand which groups of Subcarpathian society supported which parties and can therefore be considered as more or less loyal or disloyal.
Analysing social class is also a complicated matter. Unfortunately, there are no detailed census data on wealth or income distribution in interwar Czechoslovakia, but there are statistics of occupation groups, which can help to reconstruct the ratio of middle and lower classes in different districts and cities in Subcarpathia (but no data are available at the level of smaller communes, in contrast to the wealth of data on ethnicity and religion). The bulk of the population consisted mainly of small peasants or labourers in agriculture and forestry. If we consider 'clerks' and 'independent individuals working in business, industry, transportation, and finance', along with their family members, as an occupational group representing the upper and middle classes, we can estimate that they constituted approximately 20% of the Subcarpathian population. The number of members of the middle class was fairly equal across rural parts of the region, constituting approximately a tenth of the population, while they constituted approximately half of city dwellers. Therefore, it can be said that the rural–urban cleavage was largely congruent with the middle–lower class cleavage.

In order to examine the attitudes of the Subcarpathian Hungarian minority towards Czechoslovakia, I decided first of all to analyse the 1925 electoral results from municipalities inhabited almost exclusively by Hungarians (more than 90% according to the 1921 census). I found 15 such places, all of them villages making up together approximately 15,000 inhabitants situated close to the border with Hungary. The vast majority of these inhabitants were Protestant and either agricultural labourers or small peasants. The analysed municipalities contained only one substantial national/religious minority: Jews (approximately 6% of the population), who often, however, identified as Hungarians.

Most surprisingly, only a minority voted for explicitly Hungarian political parties. Moreover, only a minority of Jewish voters supported the two Jewish parties (both of which presented themselves as broadly loyal towards Czechoslovakia, while the Hungarian party was highly critical towards Czechoslovakia). Of the approximately 7000 Hungarian adults, only 2703 voted for the Hungarian party (or perhaps slightly fewer, as some of its voters were possibly Jews); of the approximately 400 Jewish adults, only 156 voted for Jewish parties. A substantial number of people voted here for communists, with the party winning 34% of the vote (2381 votes) in these communes, while the preference for communism among the Hungarian and Jewish lower classes is well known in the literature on interwar Czechoslovakia. More surprising is the result of the pro-government Czechoslovak parties, which existed before 1919 only in the Czech lands and had to be established in Subcarpathia (and also Slovakia) from scratch. Fielding only Rusyn and Czech candidates, in the analysed Hungarian villages they nevertheless won 22% of the votes (1540 votes). This happened in spite of the low proportion of Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns in the area, which made up about 2% of the population. In the five municipalities, the Czech agrarian party achieved spectacular results, in three of them even emerging victorious. It can only be speculated what the reasons for this success were. The electoral victory of the agrarian party in several villages could be explained by the party’s redistribution of large Hungarian estates into the hands of local farmers, and thus voting for it was a clear gesture of loyalty to the Czechoslovak state.

As can be seen in Table 1, in Uzhhorod, Mukachevo and Beregove, cities inhabited largely by middle classes of Hungarian and Jewish ethnicity, their national parties dominated and the communists achieved only a fifth of the vote (but even still, a so-called 'red belt', where the communists achieved a majority of the vote, appeared around the cities). The Czechoslovak
Table 1. Estimation of voting by nationalities in the 1925 election in Uzhorod and Mukachevo (in thousands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Uzhorod Estimated Number of Voters</th>
<th>Uzhorod 1925 Election: Votes for Political Parties</th>
<th>Mukachevo Estimated Number of Voters</th>
<th>Mukachevo 1925 Election: Votes for Political Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovaks</td>
<td>3928</td>
<td>Czechoslovak 2808</td>
<td>Czechoslovaks 1124</td>
<td>Czechoslovak 1454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (nationality)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Jewish 1999</td>
<td>Jews 3271</td>
<td>Jewish 3173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>2865</td>
<td>Hungarian-German 2102</td>
<td>Hungarians 2180</td>
<td>Hungarian-German 2073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>1806</td>
<td>Rusyn 224</td>
<td>Germans 288</td>
<td>Rusyn 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusyns</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>Communist 2115</td>
<td>Rusyns 2068</td>
<td>Communist 1813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total        | 9266                              |                                              | Total 8740                        |                                               |

Sources: Calculations and estimations are based on the following sources: Volkszählung in der Cechoslovakischen Republik vom 1. Dezember 1930, 1. Teil, 13, 130, 163, 165, 181, 182, 185; Volby do národního shromáždění na Podkarpatské Rusi v roce 1925, Civilní správa v Podkarapatské Rusi, 26; Statistický Lexikon obcí v republice československé, IV. Podkarapatská Rus, 35; Statistický lexikon obcí v republice Československé, IV. Země podkarpatská, XV.

parties achieved 30%, 16% and 18% in these cities. I was able to estimate the electoral behaviour of different ethnic groups, which, despite the limitations mentioned earlier, constitutes a good data sample. Comparing the census and election results, our estimation is that in all cities the Czechs, Jews and Hungarians voted largely for their national parties. Only local Rusyns (and perhaps Slovaks in Uzhorod), who belonged to the urban lower classes, voted for communists. While the Jews and Hungarians from rural areas also voted for communists, urban Jews and Hungarians preferred their national parties, either because of the greater intensity of ethnic conflicts in the cities, or due to their higher social status.

In conclusion, the Hungarian and Jewish minorities cannot be characterized as being only disloyal to the Czechoslovak state during the 1920s. Loyal attitudes were concentrated among those Jews or Hungarians voting for Czechoslovak parties, while disloyal attitudes were concentrated around the lower-class Jews and Hungarians voting for communists or urban middle-class Hungarians supporting Hungarian nationalists.

Communism as a transnational disloyalty

Communism became an important political movement in Subcarpathia after 1918. There was no other region of this size in interwar Europe where the Communist Party achieved more than 30% in free elections. Before the war, the political left had been a marginal presence in Hungary: a country with no universal suffrage and few factory workers. Until the war years, the left existed mainly in the big cities. However, this started to change in the general political radicalization that emerged during the war and after the Bolshevik revolution, which found an echo particularly among the Rusyn-speaking population of Hungary and also among some local Jews. The declaration of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and its brief rule over a certain part of Subcarpathia in May and June 1919
contributed to further radicalization. In March 1920 the first pro-Bolshevik party in
Czechoslovakia was established here, and a year later it merged with the left wing of
Czechoslovak social democracy to become the Communist Party. Subsequently, the
strong Czech core of the Communist Party, having its base mainly among industrial
workers and miners, also helped their comrades in Slovakia and Subcarpathia to build up
the local branches. Subcarpathian communism can thus be characterized as a result of
internal social tensions and strong external pressure from Moscow, Budapest and Prague.

In 1920, the Czechoslovak authorities began to perceive communism as representing a
more dangerous force than Hungarian irredentism and Jewish economic strength. Their
fear of Bolshevism reached its peak during the summer of 1920 when the Red Army
began its invasion of Poland and briefly reached the territory of Galicia, 50 kilometres
from the Subcarpathian borders. As a reaction to this, martial law was declared in
Subcarpathia in August 1920 and lasted until January 1922. However, the harsh punish¬
ments for various crimes and other restrictions of human freedoms seem to have
remained on paper. For example, nobody was executed during this time, according to
the available evidence. During this period, the Czechoslovak police constantly
reported that the communists were preparing for a coup d’etat. The police concentrated
mainly on searching for weapons, spies and ‘foreign agitators’ (the Hungarian govern¬
ment was accused of sending spies, including prostitutes, to Czechoslovakia). The
border guards were instructed to examine carefully the documents of foreigners to check
whether or not they were falsified. Political meetings were prohibited.

The anxiety felt by the Czechoslovak authorities concerning the supposed communist
plot was felt all over Czechoslovakia (in the Czech lands, the core of Bolshevism was the
industrial city of Kladno), but this anxiety was most pronounced in Subcarpathia,
particularly because of the Czech authorities’ unfamiliarity with the terrain and the
alleged proximity of Rusyns and Jews to Russian Bolsheviks. The police expected a
Bolshevik coup on several occasions. There were, for example, rumours of Bolshevik
plans to blow up the chateau of Uzhorod and to assassinate Governor Zhatkovich and
Vice-Governor Rozsypal. In March 1921, the Ministry of the Interior wrote in a letter
to the police headquarters in Uzhorod that, according to its informers, the situation was
serious: ‘The communists had thousands of men with rifles and several dozen men with
machine guns.’ However, local police reports do not confirm this impression. The local
police tended to view the communists as a radical but not particularly dangerous move¬
ment. The whole communist movement is described by police reports as being chaotic,
with many internal squabbles and a number of self-proclaimed leaders quickly appearing
and disappearing, some of them going into exile. The local Bolshevik leaders were
depicted in Czech police reports as a bunch of rabble-rousers and degenerates. In fact,
there were about 10 cases of serious political violence in Subcarpathia during the early
1920s, with dozens injured and several deaths, but this violence tended to take the form of
mobs of impoverished peasants spontaneously attacking the police during strikes and
food riots rather than organized plots.

If we analyse which ethnic groups supported the Communist Party in Subcarpathia,
we can again use the data from the 1921 and 1930 censuses, along with the data from the
1925 election. The communists were clearly less supported by the middle and upper
classes, as the results from the cities demonstrate. As mentioned earlier, the communists
had substantial support in Hungarian-speaking rural areas (34% of the vote in communes
where more than 90% of the inhabitants were Hungarian). It is difficult to reconstruct its support among the Jewish population, because there were no municipalities with a Jewish majority, but it seems their affiliation to communism was lower than among ethnic Hungarians. This seems to correlate with the fact that the economic status of Subcarpathian Jews was above average. According to the 1921 census, 46% of those who declared Jewish ethnicity belonged to the middle and upper classes, while only 17% of Hungarians and 4% of Rusyns did so. Among the Rusyn-speaking population, there were strong religious and regional differences in the support for communism, which will be analysed further.

The Rusyn communist movement in Subcarpathia was perceived by both the Czech authorities and the Czech communists as closely connected to the postwar wave of conversions from the Uniate (Greek Catholic) to the Orthodox church. The Czech authorities initially supported the Orthodox movement, as they saw the Uniate church as pro-Hungarian, but they soon realized the radicalizing impact of Orthodoxy. The municipalities that converted to Orthodoxy were characterized by the Czech officials as completely disloyal, a sort of millennial sect, whose ideas were therefore dangerously close to those of communism. In a police report from 1921, we can read:

The locals claim they do not need state offices and municipal property at all and demand that these properties be redistributed to them. They refuse to pay taxes, do not accept the decisions of the courts and tax authorities, and threaten anyone who wants to deliver any official act.

A typical conflict arose concerning the ownership of the churches, which were demanded by the Orthodox mobs in those villages where the Uniate religion had largely disappeared. Events often took the following course: the church was seized with force by the mob (often led by the Orthodox priest). The Uniate priest called the police, who attempted to restore order, sometimes peacefully, sometimes by force when attacked by the mob. Bolsheviks were often considered responsible for organizing the occupation of Uniate churches and declaring them Orthodox. A police officer claimed in 1924 that all Orthodox villages voted for the communists.

In order to examine the connection between Greek Orthodoxy and the communist movement, I took a sample of 13 Subcarpathian villages where more than 80% of the inhabitants were members of the Orthodox church according to the 1930 census, and compared them with the 1925 electoral result. The Orthodox faith was almost non-existent in the examined municipalities before 1918, but it spread quickly afterwards, mainly as a result of the initiative of local priests who decided to leave the Uniate Church. As regards their ethnic and social characteristics, these villages were inhabited mainly by Rusyns. These villages were situated in a part of the country that was not the most impoverished periphery, but was a greater distance from Uzhorod, where the Uniate bishop had his seat. The Communist Party gained 46% of the vote in these villages, which was above the average in Subcarpathia. However, it should be noted that the Czechoslovak pro-government parties also achieved significant results in these villages, gaining 36% of the vote. By contrast, Rusyn nationalists (the Union of Farmers) managed only 6% here.

Obviously, there was also another factor behind the support for communism apart from national and religious issues, which can be termed the presence of industrial
labour among the population. If we examine the Subcarpathian communes where the communists had the highest support (more than 50% of the vote in 1924 and 1925), almost all of them lay in the vicinity of towns or cities. While in urban areas the communists gained fewer votes owing to the higher proportion of middle and upper classes, the surrounding semi-urban communes were populated by labourers from several factories situated in the towns or by agricultural labourers. Owing to the proximity of towns, both groups were more exposed to new ideas and, as wage labourers, were more willing to support left-wing parties. It is also necessary to stress that most of these areas were part of the Hungarian Soviet Republic for several weeks, which perhaps sparked a radicalization among the locals. On the other hand, the party suffered its worst results, apart from in the cities, in those regions where the small land tenants prevailed. This was the hilly belt between the lowlands, inhabited by ethnic Hungarians with large estates employing many agricultural labourers, and the mountainous periphery with a large number of day labourers in forestry or agriculture and characterized by unfavourable living conditions. The most underdeveloped periphery of Subcarpathia (for example, in terms of literacy) situated deep in the mountains close to the border with Poland also substantially supported the communists, but not as strongly as the regions close to urban centres. Table 2 summarizes these findings.

The unexpected rise of Subcarpathian communism was a huge surprise not only for the authorities, but also for the Czech communists, who had hitherto associated its strongholds with urban-industrial centres in the Czech lands. The Czechoslovak Communist Party achieved 13% in the election of 1925, which was a spectacular result in comparison to other European communist parties, but still lagged far behind its results from Subcarpathia. Subsequently, the Czech communists started to pay more attention to Subcarpathia. It was a subject of the interpellations of communist members of parliament, concerning mainly the local poverty and the behaviour of the Czech authorities. The Czech communist press wrote about it frequently, and it appeared in the travelogues and novels of numerous communist intellectuals and journalists.

The Czech communist discourse about Subcarpathia combined two narratives. First, this was territory that had been kept in incredible poverty by the remnants of feudalism and the Czech bourgeoisie. This narrative often employed the strongly paternalistic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semi-urban Rusyn and Hungarian villages</th>
<th>Results of the Communist Party in the 1925 election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities where 80% or more of the inhabitants switched to Orthodoxy</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remotest region from the capital with the highest illiteracy rate (Volowé)</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities (villages) where more than 90% of the inhabitants were Hungarian</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns with more than 5000 inhabitants</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cities of Uzhhorod and Mukachevo</td>
<td>23%, 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusyn-speaking regions in the vicinity of Uzhhorod with a substantial number of small land tenants (Velka Berezena, Velky Sevlyus)</td>
<td>15–22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

metaphor of ‘the suffering child’ when referring to the region. The second narrative perceived the Subcarpathian Ukrainians (communists never called them Rusyns) as revolutionary people, owing to their huge support for the Communist Party and their ethnic proximity to Soviet Russia. In the second narrative, however, Hungarian and Jewish support for communism tended not to be mentioned, even though they made up about a quarter of communist voters in Subcarpathia in 1925. The communist discourse on Subcarpathia remained broadly unchanged during the interwar period and became the official interpretation of Subcarpathia’s modern history after its annexation by the Soviet Union in 1945.

Conclusion

As has been demonstrated, using the 1925 election results to reconstruct the degree of loyalty felt by the Subcarpathian population towards the Czechoslovak state is no simple matter. It is clear this disloyalty was not only concentrated among the Hungarian majority, and to a lesser extent the Jewish minority, but also among the Rusyn community, particularly workers, Orthodox believers and inhabitants of the central and eastern parts of the country. Given that the Czechoslovak pro-government parties received 31% of the vote in Subcarpathia in 1925, it can be estimated that they received 36–39% of the Rusyn vote, 13–19% of the Hungarian vote, and 9–14% of the Jewish vote. Rusyn support for the state can be explained not only by the fact that Czechoslovakia was still perceived by some as a liberating force, but also by a number of other factors. Although it was Prague that established Czechoslovak parties in Subcarpathia in the early 1920s, these parties were often joined by members of Rusyn political groups. Therefore, the majority of the candidates chosen for the electoral lists by the Czechoslovak parties were Rusyn; only a few were Czech, and none were Hungarian or Jewish. Moreover, election materials, such as posters and programmes, were written in the Rusyn/Ukrainian language. The number of votes cast by Jews and Hungarians for the Czechoslovak parties is particularly surprising given that these parties had no Hungarian or Jewish candidates and did not even prepare election materials in Hungarian, German or Yiddish.

Nevertheless, approximately a third of Hungarian and Jewish voters supported their own nationalist parties, and every sixth Jew and every fourth Hungarian voted for the communists. Rusyn votes were split between the communists and Czechoslovak pro-government parties, while the Rusyn nationalists remained relatively insignificant. If we compare the results from Subcarpathia with Slovakia, there were broadly similar levels of support for the governing Czechoslovak parties. The main difference was that in Slovakia the strongest local party (receiving approximately one third of the vote) was the national conservative Slovak People’s Party, which at that time was considered as being relatively loyal to the new state, participating in the government from 1927 to 1929. A similar political party in Subcarpathia, the Rusyn nationalist Farmers’ Union, which was a strongly oppositional party, received only about a fifth of the ethnic Rusyn vote and 11% of the vote in the whole of Subcarpathia.

It can thus be argued that much of the ‘disloyalty’ manifested in the 1920s elections can be straightforwardly explained by the inclusion of the Hungarian and, to a certain extent, Jewish populations within Czechoslovakia. The establishment of the border with
Slovakia (and, to a lesser extent, with Romania) had a somewhat similar impact on the attitude of the Rusyns. The second factor was the intensity of the postwar social crisis: the Communist Party, which ended up as the strongest force, did not base its electoral appeal primarily on a demand for national rights, but rather focused on social issues. The question of ethnic and social rights (or, rather, their lack thereof) in the Czechoslovak state remained the keystone of Subcarpathian politics until the end of the Czechoslovak republic.

A further reason for the lack of loyalty was the semi-colonial practices of the Czechoslovak administration, a factor often mentioned in the literature. Most importantly, there was the question of autonomy, which had long been promised but was only granted in 1938. Although the autonomy of Subcarpathia had been included in the Czechoslovak constitution from 1920 onwards, the only aspect of it realized was the office of ‘governor’. Moreover, the Rusyn diet, also promised by the constitution, was never established. Instead, a 1927 law created four lands of Czechoslovakia (one of which was Subcarpathia) with partly elected land councils. However, these councils had many fewer competencies than the expected diet. The heads of these lands were named ‘land presidents’ (zemský prezident), and, in the case of Subcarpathia, this office was always filled by a Czech. The office of governor (who was always a Rusyn) therefore became a purely ceremonial position. The first land president, Antonín Rozsypal, delivered his opening speech at the land council in the Czech language, to the fury of many Rusyns.

There were other policies that alienated the locals, such as the decision to make Czech the second official language of the region (including public inscriptions), even though the number of ethnic Czechs never exceeded 2% of the population. There were also cases of public inscriptions being written exclusively in Czech. A crucial issue was the organization of censuses, the results of which were to some extent used for justification of the borders. These censuses were perceived by the Rusyn elite as unjust (since they made Rusyns in eastern Slovakia partly into Slovaks) and to some extent did not allow free choice in the expression of ethnic identities, particularly Ukrainian. Another problem was the composition of the civil service. The Czechoslovak state apparatus soon showed a reluctance to employ members of the Rusyn intelligentsia or Russian and Ukrainian émigrés from the former Tsarist Empire or Austrian Galicia and Bukovina, who were culturally closer to the locals. Instead, ethnic Czechs were preferred. It was frequently young Czech people who were sent here, full of enthusiasm but without either work experience or knowledge of the local language. The Czechoslovak school policy was also strongly criticized. The network of elementary and secondary schools certainly improved a lot under the Czechoslovak administration. However, the schools with Czech as the language of instruction received even more support, gaining new buildings even in villages with only a few Czech families. The prioritization of the Czech language gymnasia (three out of nine in Subcarpathia) also proved controversial. Construction works served as a shop window for Czechoslovak policy in Subcarpathia, but these were often administrative buildings and residential districts built for Czech employees. Similarly problematic was the expansion of Czech national symbols into public space: street names, school curricula and monuments. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to call Subcarpathia ‘a Czech colony’ at that time, as the communist press did. In contrast to European colonies overseas, Subcarpathians were full citizens of Czechoslovakia with all rights guaranteed, including electoral. However, elected
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members of parliaments were often Czechs (for example, 5 of 16 in 1929). The final controversial aspect was the Czech discourse regarding the country, which employed typical orientalizing practices, depicting the country as an infant oppressed for a thousand years by Asia (i.e. Hungarians and Jews). In this narrative, the Czechs presented themselves as saviours, introducing European culture to a benighted region, combined with a sense of Slavic brotherhood. In fact, the notoriously controversial practices of the Czech administration in Subcarpathia damaged the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak state in the eyes of the locals and diminished the chance to turn them into loyal citizens. Analysing these practices helps to correct the traditional positive picture of interwar Czechoslovakia as an 'island of democracy', which persists to the present day in both Czech and Western historiography.

Notes

1. The region is sometimes also named Subcarpathia, formerly known as Hungarian Rus, today known as the Zakarpattie province of Ukraine. We can find other names for the country in the literature: Carpathian Ruthenia, Carpatho-Ukraine, Zakarpattia. The most distinguished historian of the region, Paul Robert Magocsi, uses the term Carpathian Rus' (Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains). Later on in the text, I use the term Subcarpathia for the purpose of abbreviation.

2. In this article I use the name 'Rusyn', although the identity of the ethnic group speaking this dialect of the Ukrainian language was rather blurred. They appear in the official Czechoslovak statistics as 'ruská národnost' (Russian ethnicity) in the 1921 census and 'ruská a maloruská národnost' (Russian and Little Russian ethnicity) in the 1930 census. In the Hungarian census of 1910, they were called 'Ruten' (Rusyn), a name that also appears in Czechoslovak sources. The name 'Ukrainians' existed only in a minority of sources before 1938.

3. For example: Egry, "Phantom Menances?", 656, 658, 675.


7. Egry, "Navigating the Straits", 470.


12. Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains, 144.


15. Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains, 135.


18. Magocsi, With Their Backs to the Mountains, 179–82.

19. Rychlik and Rychliková, Podkaraptská Rus v dějinách Československa, 40.

20. Švorc, Zakletá zem, 38.


23. Švorc, *Krajinská hranica*, 106. In a memorandum from November 1918, the Rusyn representation in the United States proposed the creation of an Uhro-Rusinian state as an autonomous unit within a Czecho-Slovak-Rusyn republic. It demanded the territory of eight Hungarian counties (Magocsi, *With Their Backs to the Mountains*, 188–9). According to Hungarian statistics from 1910, these territories were inhabited by 1.75 million people, of whom at most 30% were Rusyns (*A Magyar Szent Korona országaínak 1910*). This was also confirmed by Czechoslovak censuses from 1920 (*Statistický lexikon obcí v republike československej, III. Slovensko*).


27. See Švorc, “Stanovenie hranice mezi Slovenskom a Podkarpatskou Rusí.”


29. For example, Protestant Polish speakers living in East Prussia understood themselves as Germans (Blanke, *Polish-Speaking Germans*).


31. According to the census of 1910, approximately 194,000 inhabitants of eastern Slovakia declared themselves to be Greek-Catholic, no Orthodox faith was present, and 108,000 Rusyn speakers were recorded. In the 1921 census, 190,000 of eastern Slovakia’s inhabitants declared themselves to be Greek Catholic, 2000 Orthodox, and only 85,000 were recorded as Russian ethnic (ruská národnost). If we take into consideration the fact that the population of the region grew very slowly over the course of the decade (by 2.6%) and the Czechoslovak census was not fully fair, we can suppose that the number of people who could be included within the Rusyn minority in eastern Slovakia in 1921 was somewhat higher (perhaps by a fifth) than the number of those declaring Rusyn nationality, but not as high as the Rusyn leaders expected. (*A Magyar Szent Korona országaínak 1910, 235, 247, 259, 262; Statistický lexikon obcí na Slovensku*, 159).


33. Ibid., 34–5.


35. Ibid., 38.

36. Ibid., 76.

37. Ibid., 35.


43. For example, even in the 1930s a distinguished Czech geographer claimed that the ‘natural’ Subcarpathian–Slovak border is the Latorica River running through Mukachevo, which would mean the western third of Subcarpathia belonging to Slovakia (Korcák, “Východní hranice Slovenska,” 160).

44. Magocsi, *With Their Backs to the Mountains*, 193.


47. *A Magyar Szent Korona országaínak 1910*. Évi népszámlálása, 304.


50. Hora, Uherská Rus za války a v míru, 8.
51. Král, Podkarpatská Rus, 7.
52. Ibid., 8.
53. Rychlik and Rychliková, Podkarpatská Rus, 128
54. Ibid., 133.
55. Kozauer, Die Karpaten-Ukraine zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, 136. According to the 1921 census, 13,612 inhabitants declared Romanian nationality, but 2802 lived in the villages which were six months later ceded to Romania (Statisticky Lexikon obcí, IV. Podkarapská Rus, 35, 46.)
56. See Král, Podkarpatská Rus, 9.
59. Jelinek, The Carpathian Diaspora, 119
62. See Král, Podkarpatská Rus, 8.
63. Ibid., 9.
65. Županský úřad v Užhorodě, číslo 1109 pres. si. 20, Užhorod dne 24. srpna 1920, všem správcům hlavoslužnovských úřadů. Folder 1, Listuvanja s ministerstvom vnútrišnych správ, zupanskimi i okružnymi urjadami pro komunistickuyu agitaciu na Podkarpatskoj Rusi. Volume 2, fond 63. Ukrainian State Archive Berehove.
66. Estimation is based on the data published by Csernicskó and Ferenc, “Hegemonic, Regional, Minority and Language Policy in Subcarpathia.”
67. There were 1535 Jewish–Jewish marriages in Subcarpathia from 1925 to 1927, but only 22 Jews (defined by ethnicity) marrying outside their ethnic group (Pohyb obyvatelstva, 68).
68. Statisticky Lexikon obcí v Republice československé, IV. Podkarapská Rus, XV; Statisticky Lexikon obcí v republice československé, IV. Země Podkarpatorská, XV. The rest of the religiously Jewish Subcarpathian population declared their nationality as Hungarian or Rusyn.
69. The remaining two-thirds declared either Czech or German nationality. (Čapková, Češi, Němci, Židé?, 50.)
70. Pohyb obyvatelstva, 68–9.
71. A Magyar Szent Korona országainak 1910, 263.
72. Ibid., 217.
74. Rychlik and Rychliková, Podkarpatská, 93.
75. Ibid., 120.
76. Ibid., 103.

80. I refer to Czechs as there were almost no Slovaks who moved to Subcarpathian Rus in order to serve the new state, with the exception of the west of the country around Uzhhorod where a substantial Slovak minority lived.


83. Konceptní úředníci, 4379-4387 Folder 1, Listuvannja z ministerstvom vnitriných sprav i zupanskimi upravlinnjami po osobovomu skladu službovíc, Ukrainian State Archive Berehove. Volume 60, fond 29. Presidia civilnovo upravlenija Pidkarpskoi Rusi m. Uzgorod.

84. Ibid.

85. For example, doctors in state hospitals were accused of treating only the rich and often prolonging the treatment in such cases in order to get as much money as possible from the patients. (Civilni sprava Podkarpske Rusi- zdravotni referát. V Užhorode dne 27. května 1921, číslo 306 ai 21, 2. Uzhhorod, Folder 1, Listuvanija z ministerstvom vnitriných sprav i zupanskimi upravlinnjami po osobovomu skladu službovíc. Volume 60, Fond 29. Ukrainian State Archive Berehove).


87. Velitelství četnické stanice ve Velke Dobroni, č. j. 704, Löwenstein Markus z Velke Dobroni, žadost o cechoslovenske státní občanství, dne 3. 4. 1924. Folder 5, Probsi galikanskich emigrantiv pro nadanija im cechoslovakogo izidastva i peregiska z ministerstvom vnitriných sprav, peticijnimi i zupanskimi urjadami po comu mitannju. Volume 30, fond 63. Ukrainian State Archive Berehove.


91. Ibid.

92. See more: Kučera, "Exploiting Victory, Sinking into Defeat."


94. The first postwar elections took place in 1924. Although we have no detailed results from them, they did not go well for the government, as it was decided that the Czechoslovak election of 1925 would take place in Subcarpathian Rus, even after such a short time span.

95. This religious affiliation was only rarely mentioned by Czech authors, since Protestantism, a religion admired by Czech intellectuals because of its historical traditions (namely, the Hussites) and the popularity of western Protestant nations, did not align with their
prejudices about Hungarians, whom they perceived as 'Asiatic, violent, boastful' and so on: Matoušek, Podkarpatská Rus, 82; "Američtí Rusini"; Podkarpatské hlasy, 1, n. 23 (April 15, 1925), 2; Václav Bartoníček, "O významu zájezdu sokolského na Slovensko a Podkarpatskou Rus r. 1921," 233.

96. Of the 879 people who declared themselves religiously Jewish, only 480 declared their Jewish nationality in 1921; the rest declared themselves Hungarian. Statisticky Lexikon obci v Republice československé, IV. Podkarpatská Rus, 3–30.

97. The Hungarian minority was considered by the Czech authorities in early 1920s as highly disloyal and only in the late 1920s did their attitudes change (see Holubec, "We Bring Order, Discipline," 244.) The attitudes of the Czech authorities concerning the Jewish minority differed strongly in early the 1920s from fiercely antisemitic, as was then prevalent, (Matoušek, Podkarpatská Rus, 91–103; Drahny and Drahny, Podkarpatská Rus, 32–103) to somewhat more positive, stressing their loyalty (Nečas, Politická situace, 76).

98. In fact, a coalition of Hungarian and German parties, Bund der Landwirte (Union of Farmers).


100. It seems that Hungarian peasants profited more from the redistribution of big properties than the Rusyn peasants did because they lived in areas where the farming soil could be distributed, while in Rusyn areas the large estates were mainly forests, which had no use for small peasants (“Pozemková reforma na Podkarpatské Rusí,” 23). Czech authors dreamed of the colonization of the Hungarian lowland by Rusyn and Czechoslovak colonists (Jan Voženílek, “Pozemková reforma a Podkarpatská Rus, III,” Venkov, February 28, 1922, 1), but it was a long process, and the colonists never represented more than a fraction of Hungarian peasants.

101. Their number as estimated as the average of the censuses of 1921 and 1930. Concerning the method used, see the conclusion.


103. Ibid., 57.

104. Minister československej republiy pre Správu Slovenska, protokol. Bratislava, dňa 19. března 1920, 1. Folder 23, Perepiska z ministerstvom vnútrinných sprav i organami policii pre protiderzavnu agitáciu ugorských gromadaj. Volume 5, fond 63. Ukrainian State Archive Berehove. One attendee of a Bolshevik meeting in February 1921 reported to the police about the incredible plans of the communist plotters: ‘I heard at several meetings, taking place in Svaljava, in Kolonia and Koruna [the names of local pubs in Svaljava], that they want to kill the King and ministers of Romania at the end of March, then the King of Italy and the King of Bulgaria. With these assassinations they want to spark chaos in Romania and seize the government ... They want to start a rebellion in Subcarpathian Rus’ and Slovakia, in order to help Romania. They want to kill the Governor’ (Opis, p. 0083 Civilnyje Upravljenija Pidkarpatskoi Rusi m. Uzgorod. Folder 1, Listuvanja s ministerstvom vnitriných sprav, zandarskim kancelarimi i zupanskimi urjadami. Volume 128, fond 63. Ukrainian State Archive Berehove).

105. The stereotype of Subcarpathian communists organized and supported mainly by Jews and Hungarians survived over the next two decades. (Sláma, “Die Parlamentswahlen im Jahre 1935 in Karpatorussland,” 43.)


109. I estimate that in the year 1925 there were about 49,000 religiously Jewish inhabitants over the age of 21 in Subcarpathia (42,000 of them also declared Jewish nationality, the rest Hungarian and Rusyn). I estimate their electoral participation at around 43,000 with almost 32,000 voting for Jewish parties. (Scítání lidu v republice československe ze dne 15. února 1921, III. díl, 2*, Statisticky Lexikon obci v republice československe, IV. Podkarpatksa Rus, 35. Volkszählung in der Čechoslovakischen Republik vom 1. Dezember 1930, 180-184. Volby do národního shromáždění na Podkarpatské Rusi v roce 1925, 26.)

110. Scitanie l'udu, 437–53.

111. The communist writer Ivan Olbracht painted an impressive picture of Rusyn communists interrupting a demonstration in order to perform religious services in an Orthodox church. Olbracht, Hory a staletí, 115.


116. In these villages, Jews by religion almost completely identified with Jewish ethnicity and almost all local Jewish adults voted for Jewish parties. The main factor in the identification of Jewish believers with Jewish ethnicity seems to be the non-presence of Hungarians, who would otherwise be perceived by Jews as an elite worth identifying with.

117. Volby do národního shromáždění na Podkarpatské Rusi v roce 1925, 1–2. In four villages the Czechoslovak Socialist Party won spectacularly, while in three villages the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party won.

118. The Communist Party gained 27% of the vote in communes with more than 5000 inhabitants, and 30.7% of the vote in the whole country (Volby do Poslanecké sněmovny v listopadu 1925, 55, 67).


120. This belt was also characterized by its proximity to the authorities in the capital of Uzhhorod. Nor was this region occupied by Hungarian Bolshevists in 1919. We can only speculate as to whether there were some other reasons for this, perhaps the proximity of the episcopate in Uzhhorod or the status of the region as the core of the Rusyn national movement.

121. Some of them became classic works of Czech literature (most importantly, Ivan Olbracht’s Nikola the Highwayman published in 1933, and by writers such as Stanislav Kostka Neumann and Vladislav Vančura): Olbracht, Nikola Suhaj Loupeznik; Olbracht, Hory a staleti; Neumann, Československá cesta; Vančura, Poslední soud.

122. The Communist Party never agitated for the secession of Subcarpathia to the Soviet Union, which would mean breaking the law on the defence of the republic. The communists merely called for Subcarpathian autonomy (“Proc nedá vláda provést plebiscit v Příkarpatské Rusi,” Rudé právo, March 24, 1921, 1).

123. The same could be said about the first election in 1924, which had very similar results as the election in 1925, but we do not have more precise statistical data on them. The fact that they took place more than five years after the birth of Czechoslovakia and one year before regular parliamentary elections (meaning they had to be repeated in 1925) put the Czechoslovak
administration, which often depicted itself as very efficient in contrast to the former Hungarian administration, into a different light (Matoušek, *Podkarpatská Rus*, 206).

124. In order to reconstruct the general electoral behaviour of ethnic, religious and social groups in the elections of 1925 I used the electoral results from different districts of Subcarpathia and the censuses of 1921 and 1930. The first step was to estimate the size of ethnic groups in 1925, which I did by taking an average from the 1921 and 1930 censuses. Then I had to calculate the number of people older than 21 from each group from the census (since people could vote from the age of 21). I discovered the lowest number of people under 21 among the Czechoslovaks (37%), followed by the Hungarians (53%), the Jews (57%) and the Rusyns (60%). Afterwards I had to estimate the electoral participation of each ethnic group. This step was the most difficult, as I had only the data on electoral participation from different districts and not from different ethnic groups. The average participation was 81%, with above average participation in the Hungarian parts and the Rusyn-speaking west of the country. Lower participation occurred in the Rusyn-speaking periphery in the east of the country. Generally, the lowest participation was in the peripheral mountainous districts, which could be explained by the high rate of illiteracy and the distance many people had to travel in order to vote in these areas. Based on this I estimated Czechoslovak participation at 95%, Hungarian and Jewish participation at 85%, and Rusyn participation at 80%. The next step was to subtract the votes for national parties as I could assume that the Hungarian-German electoral union (Union of Farmers) was supported almost exclusively by Hungarians and Germans, the Jewish parties only by Jews, and the Rusyn Farmers’ Union (Zemedelský Sojuz) only by Rusyns, while the Czechs and Slovaks voted largely for Czechoslovak parties, and only a small minority of them (local Slovak labourers) for communists. The last and most difficult step was to estimate the ratio of Rusyn, Hungarian and Jewish votes for Czechoslovak parties and communists, but I could rely on the data from ethnic Rusyn and Hungarian regions and from the general result of parties in Subcarpathia. Calculations and estimations are based on following sources: *Volkszählung in der Čechoslovakischen Republik vom 1. Dezember 1930*, 1. Teil, část tabulková, pp. 13, 130, 163, 165, 181, 182, 185; *Volby do Národního shromáždění na Podkarpatské Rusi v roce 1925*, 26; *Statistický lexikon obcí v republice československé, IV. Podkarpatská Rus, 35; Statistický lexikon obcí v republice Československé, IV. Země podkarpatorská, p. XV.*

125. See, for example: Magocsi, *With Their Backs to the Mountains*, 204–5; Rychlik, Rychliková, *Podkarpatská Rus* v dějinách Československa, 54; Puškaš, *Civilizacija ili varvarstvo*; Holubec, “We Bring Order, Discipline.” On the Czechization language policy, see: Brown and Maxwell, “Czechoslovak Ruthenia’s Latinization Campaign.”

126. While in the European tradition the ‘governor’ is a title used for the ruler of a colony, in the case of Subcarpathia, it was created as a title for the highest representative of the supposed autonomous government, with inspiration from the United States. According to the constitution, he was the highest representative of Subcarpathia and was appointed by the Czechoslovak president (which itself was not welcomed by many Rusyn leaders). The constitution was rather unclear on whether the governor was responsible to the Czechoslovak or Rusyn governing bodies. (“Ústavní listina Československé republiky,” 256.)


132. See note “Ustavující schůze zemského zastupitelstva v Užhorodě,” 2.

133. For more, see: Holubec, “Mezi slovanskou vzájemností a orientalizmem,” 240.


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The new borders as local economic possibility? The case of post-1920 Hungary

Peter Bencsik©

ABSTRACT

Hungary lost large parts of its historical territory as a consequence of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty. Although the new borders in general followed ethnic boundaries, neighbouring states had clear strategic and economic interests even in areas where Hungarians constituted the majority among local people. Taking these interests into consideration, the peace treaty deprived Hungary of most of its economic resources. The new borders also meant new customs frontiers. Railway lines were cut, and most economic connections were broken. Passport obligations and customs formalities were introduced overnight in the middle of the old kingdom, separating families and cutting estates in two. Once prosperous regional centres now became peripheries in their own country. However, local communities were able to take advantage of the new possibilities – both legal and illegal – arising from the borderland situation. This paper provides examples of such cross-border economic activities in the 1920s. For instance, dual landowners could cultivate their land on both sides of the border, and thus had the possibility to cross the border legally anywhere within the territory of their estates during daylight. Others traversed the border without a passport or the necessary documentation, mostly to engage in contraband activities. Smuggling was also common among dual landowners. The paper focuses mostly on these illegal acts. Since contraband was not confined to cross-border transportation (illicit domestic transport was also deemed smuggling), the author gives an overview of legal regulations on contraband and shows how these rules were enforced. He examines what kind of goods were smuggled, what the motives of the contrabandists were (both in time and space), and compares the contraband activities of the lower and upper classes. The presented case studies show that illegal border crossings and even contraband offences were treated rather differently by local authorities.

Introduction

In the case of Hungary, economic aspects played a significant role in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. While defeated countries such as Austria and Hungary were not invited to the negotiations, Czechoslovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs were able to participate and tell peacemakers what kind of economic interests they had. Most of their wishes were
fulfilled. These included several railways with important junctions, a long section of the left bank of the Danube for Czechoslovakia and large areas of arable land, which in many cases had a large Hungarian population. However, several railways claimed by the small allies were refused by the conference, like, for example, the Hegyeshalom–Szombathely–Nagykanizsa line in the territory of the so-called ‘Slavic corridor’. Another unfulfilled wish was the Yugoslav claim on Pécs and the coalmines in the Mecsek mountains. When Hungary was finally invited to receive the peace conditions, the Hungarian delegation responded by demanding its previous territorial integrity. In their eyes, Hungary constituted a geographic and economic unit which could not be dismembered. The country was an ‘organic life entity’ and language differences could not serve as the basis for the proposed partition, argued Albert Apponyi, the leader of the delegation, when he had a chance to make his case.

Hungarian revisionists focused attention on the state-wide effects of the border changes. It is obvious, however, that the new borders had an even greater effect on local communities, disturbing old economic ties. Regional centres became peripheries, losing their hinterlands and local markets. The questions I try to answer in this paper are the following: How did the new borders change everyday life? What kind of cross-border activities and practices were introduced? Who could exploit the new borders for their own benefit? The most simplistic answer is that smugglers could. Was smuggling a new phenomenon or not? What types of contraband activities existed in the 1920s and what were the motives of the contrabandists? Was contraband different near each of the four neighbouring countries? And, finally, what were its outcomes?

**Economic consequences of the Trianon peace treaty**

According to the traditional view, which arose shortly after Trianon, the peace treaty not only truncated Hungary, but also resulted in blocking its economic development. This opinion was held for many decades. Many scholars argue even today that the new borders meant economic disaster for Hungary for several reasons. One is the dismemberment of the old historic country. Hungary lost two-thirds of its former territory and slightly less than 60% of its inhabitants. Although the biggest industrial centres remained in Hungary, most of the raw materials were now in the successor states (89% of iron ore, 85% of wood, 65% of coal and so on). The border cut in two several roads, railways and even settlements, separating mutually interdependent territories. The second reason was the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy itself, which had constituted an economic entity for two centuries. Inside the old empire, Hungary had a stable market for its agricultural products, among which the most important was wheat flour. The large Hungarian estates produced wheat at a relatively high price, but the protective agricultural tariffs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy guaranteed profit for Hungary. Budapest became one of the world’s largest centres for the milling industry (allegedly the second largest after Minneapolis), so Hungary ‘exported’ flour and not wheat to the Austrian part of the empire. After the war, Czechoslovakia, Austria and other neighbours refused to buy Hungarian flour. They wanted to mill wheat for themselves and could buy it at a much lower price on the world market. Many problems arose from the dissolution of the common monetary, credit and banking system of the Dual Monarchy. However, these consequences originated not only from the changing borders but also from global
economic trends during and after the war (autarchy, protective tariffs, falling wheat prices and so on). The technical underdevelopment and high production expenditures made it almost impossible to maintain Hungary’s balance of trade. In a macroeconomic sense, the new borders and the new economic world order were more of a disaster than an opportunity, according to most scholars. The most important consequence was that the Hungarian economy abruptly became exposed to the world market and the country was not prepared for it. The biggest problem was that Hungary could not modernize the base of its economy: agriculture. Neither the small nor the big estates were able to invest and reform themselves.4

In a sense, however, we can speak about new economic possibilities for Hungary. The least developed areas (Subcarpathia, Transylvania) were detached from the country. So, the per capita industrial production was higher in post-Trianon Hungary (30% of the relevant British data) than in the historic kingdom (which was only 23% in 1910).5 The European comparison is an important aspect: it is obvious that – unlike Hungary – the economic growth of France and Britain was not hit by border changes. Still, this growth was decreasing even in post-war Western Europe. In the same period, Hungary’s economic growth was close to the European average and hardly below the growth in the last two decades before the Great War. Although the Treaty of Trianon had negative effects on the economy, mostly owing to the loss of natural resources, there were other factors for economic growth, such as the sectoral distribution of the labour force, capital intensity, technological development, human capital and (least importantly in the given period) integration into the world economy. The effect of these factors was much more important than the loss of natural resources.6

In the short run, however, the war and border changes hit Hungary hard. A rationing system was introduced in 1916. Foreign trade was blocked by the country’s new neighbours from 1918. Serb and Romanian forces occupied even territories which were not detached from Hungary. There were coal shortages and important raw materials were missing.7 Even food supply was a great problem. During the Great War, food production had fallen throughout Europe (except in Great Britain). Although the area of cultivated land in Hungary was growing during the war, yields were dropping. As early as 1915, the distribution of food was an important new challenge facing the state authorities. A so-called ‘food dictatorship’ was created, with compulsory delivery of agrarian products (most importantly, wheat). Food prices were regulated by the government. These prices were relatively low, but things were different on the black market. Owing to price differences, the smuggling of cereals was widespread, both within the country and abroad, and even by post. The situation deteriorated year by year, and food supply struggled to keep up with demand in the winters of 1918/19 and 1919/20. Two revolutions and the occupation of large parts of the country were the main reasons, but the area of cereal cultivation was decreasing after the war, even in the remaining territory of the country. Smuggling of wheat abroad also continued, owing to the much higher prices in the neighbouring countries.8 Food shortages affected other countries, especially Austria and Germany, which were also under Entente blockade. Starvation remained a daily phenomenon for Austrians. The dissolution of the empire cut all previous transport of food from the Czech lands and from Hungary.9 The territory of what later became the Republic of Austria relied on food produced in other parts of the empire and the situation hardly changed in the interwar period, either. The ‘hunger blockade’ was lifted only in
early 1919. From that time onwards, Allied support helped prevent a major famine. However, guaranteeing a sufficient supply of food remained a severe problem for years. Even the Allied nutrition-controller stated that 'survival was impossible without goods from the black market'. Foodstuffs on the Austrian black market were mostly smuggled from abroad, probably chiefly from Hungary. According to archival sources, the situation was hardly any better in Czechoslovakia. Even in the first half of 1920, several strikes and demonstrations were held by starving workers.

**Small border traffic**

The biggest change for rural inhabitants near the new border was that their estates were often divided into two parts. Local (or small) border traffic is a type of border-crossing without a full passport, but only for the inhabitants of the border zone. It was first introduced in Hungary in 1873 and operated between Hungary and Romania (later also Serbia) until the First World War. A special borderland certificate was needed to cross the border. This kind of traffic was reopened in 1919 and 1920 near the new demarcation lines (later borders) with all neighbouring countries. At the beginning, only local agreements were concluded, but later full bilateral treaties were signed with each neighbour (most often as part of a trade treaty). Most local border crossers were dual landowners. These people had holdings on both sides of the border, so they had to cross it almost daily to cultivate their lands. Given that these people were working on the very same properties as before, it is logical to say that the new border, which separated their holdings, was not really a possibility, but rather an obstacle. Not only did they have to spend time and money getting the necessary permissions, they also had to use official border crossing points, which resulted in costly, time-consuming detours. In one sense, however, they were able to compensate themselves. If the prices of special goods on either side of the border were significantly different, they could take advantage of these price differences. Given that they could transport any goods they produced on the other side of the border without duties or taxes, this activity was legal (assuming they were indeed transporting their own products). But, of course, they tried to smuggle out other valuable goods – or even people. For this reason, dual owners' border crossings had a lot in common with smuggling.

The new border separated not only properties but also families. Most people living near the new border were poor peasants, who either had no money or just did not care about applying for a passport or a borderland certificate. Consequently, they simply crossed the border to meet their relatives as they had done before the 'demarcation line' was created. They took some goods (food, clothes, tools and so on) with themselves as before, paying no heed to the fact that they were violating customs regulations and crossing the border illegally.

**Anti-contraband rules**

Hungarian criminal law distinguished three kinds of criminal offences: felony (bűntett); misdemeanour (vétseg); and infraction (or summary offence; Hungarian: kihágás). The least serious of them, infraction, was tried not by juries or a judge but by local 'high sheriffs' (főszolgabíró; French: juge des nobles) or sometimes by their deputies (szolgabíró). High
sheriffs were the administrative leaders of the districts (járás), the sub-units of the county. In the cities and bigger towns, the police gave such verdicts instead of (high) sheriffs.

Originally, both illegal border crossing and trading in contraband were infractions. However, under the given circumstances (food shortages, supply difficulties), the transport of any food was strictly limited during the war and these rules were renewed in 1919. What is more, a new law was enacted in 1920 on ‘overpricing’, which reclassified certain contraband cases as a misdemeanour or even as a felony. According to the regulations, any illegal transport (i.e. without a special permit to do so) inside the country was also trafficking. Peasants had to deliver most of their crops to state authorities. In fact, all these rules referred to a law from 1912: ‘Special Regulations in Case of War’. The war ended in autumn 1918, but new orders as late as 1921 were justified by this law. Although there were several regime changes in Hungary in 1918 and 1919, all governments reinforced these restrictions. Even the penalties were the same: any contraband had to be confiscated and those guilty were sentenced to up to six months’ imprisonment and fined up to 2000 crowns. (As the years passed, the value of this fine fell because of inflation.) It is more difficult to understand why imports were also limited (mostly with permission only); buying food abroad was also prohibited.

The first restrictions at the end of the war were limited to cereals (not only to wheat). It was the country’s most important agricultural product, but production had fallen during the war and famine was threatening Hungary (not to mention Austria and Germany). Buying food on the world market was not possible as the Central Powers were under Entente blockade. Therefore, all cereal crops were to be delivered to the state, except seed-grain and what was defined as ‘household need’. The transport of grain became a state monopoly and all private trade was made illegal. Anyone who tried it was a trafficker, even inside the country.

Limitations were extended in February 1919 to pork, fat, salami, coffee and sugar. In the case of transport beyond the border, rice, vegetables, fruits and all kinds of meat could be transported only with special permission. The export of all kinds of food was strictly prohibited in October 1919, but import was also limited. The foreign trade of food was the privilege of the Minister of Public Food Supply. In May 1920, before the peace treaty was signed, the export of livestock was prohibited. Also in this month and during the summer, the Minister of Agriculture issued several orders in which the transport of animals (especially horses) and paprika was made possible only with special permission. Compulsory delivery of cereals remained in force even during the harvest of 1920. The size of this delivery depended on how much arable land a farmer had (based on the so-called graded taxation). An important new rule was introduced: those farmers who had fulfilled their compulsory delivery were free to trade the rest of their grain. However, delivery was the top priority and was compulsory even if the remaining quantity of cereals was less than the ‘household need’. Henceforth, all transport of cereals was possible only with written permission, even inside the country.

In order to fight more effectively against smugglers, a ‘military inspector for border traffic’ was appointed in September 1920; now even the small Hungarian army could be mobilized in case of emergency to prevent contraband activities. Following these precedents, a comprehensive new order ‘for the prevention of export and import contraband’ was issued in October. Most movable properties could be transported through the borders (either in or out) only with permission from the Minister of Public Food Supply.
DEBORDERING AND REBORDERING

(in the case of foodstuffs), the Minister of Agriculture (livestock), or the Minister of Finance (all other movable properties). Transport beyond the border was allowed only through customs formalities and via customs roads (except for dual landowners). All border-control authorities were obliged to prevent unauthorized export and import and to enforce all legal rules. These authorities included customs offices, the gendarmerie, state police, the financial guard and even the army. Speculation and profiteering were to be sentenced more seriously than simple smuggling. All of these regulations were reinforced in June 1921, but the export and import restrictions were no longer general; the list of goods which could be transported abroad with ministerial permission was attached to the order. These rules remained in force until February 1923.

The smuggling of cereals was most widespread near the Austrian border. This is why a separate order was issued for counties neighbouring with Austria. In addition to general rules, the transport of certain goods was also regulated separately. The import of salt was possible with permission. Special rules applied even to tobacco, which (together with salt) was among the excise goods.

Instead of various border-control authorities, a new central organ named the customs guard was created in August 1921. Its main tasks were the supervision of long-distance and small border traffic and the fight against smuggling. The 'theatre of operation' of the new body was the so-called border zone. People living in this zone (usually 10 to 15 kilometres from the borderline) were entitled to take part in small border traffic. Special rules issued by the Minister of Finance could be applied in this zone in order to prevent smuggling. For example, certain goods could be transported further on only with a special certificate or permission; of course, this rule applied to products or crops which were usually smuggled in or out of the country.

Smuggling and trafficking in reality

Although 'illicit flows', i.e. contraband and smuggling, have a very broad literature, most papers and books deal with such problems in the era of globalization. Historical studies dealing with this topic are not as common and these deal with different periods and geographical areas. Fortunately, there are also some studies on smuggling in neighbouring Czechoslovakia in the interwar period. Previous Hungarian historical research has dealt with smuggling only sporadically. Most works refer to this topic in just a few words. Exceptions include a paper on contraband near the Romanian border in the 1880s and another one on smuggling near the Czechoslovak border in the early Cold War. In addition, ethnographers have published studies on contraband and trafficking. The 1920s is now too far away for an oral history research project. Unfortunately, the archives are not of great help either: most primary sources on contraband were discarded except for a few districts. Therefore, the most important sources are newspapers. I have selected more than 40 different newspapers from the 1920s. The bases of the selection were as follows. Virtually all national newspapers (more than 20, including pro-government and opposition ones) were selected. I chose those local papers that were published in counties close to the border, mainly those near Romania and Yugoslavia, but also some close to Czechoslovakia and Austria. In addition, I checked some professional journals in the fields of agriculture, milling, wine making and the catering trade. Reading those papers,
I found several hundred articles which dealt with the topic. In this short paper, however, I cannot cite all these sources separately.

Newspapers and ethnographers agree that smuggling was a new phenomenon in the territory of post-Trianon Hungary (with the sole exception of tobacco smuggling, which was created as a result of the state’s 1851 inland revenue policy). Therefore, it was the biggest direct economic consequence of the new borders (and also an aftermath of the controlled economy caused by the war).34

What were the reasons for smuggling? One was hunger and poverty. In 1920, when the consequences of the war and the new ‘demarcation lines’ were the most severe, even compulsory delivery and food rationing was not enough to ensure food supply. In some regions, smuggling food into the country was especially necessary. The city authorities in Szeged even decided to organize contraband themselves in order to supply people with food.35 Moreover, Horthy’s ‘National Army’ also tried to smuggle in wheat and flour from the territory under Romanian occupation, but with no great success: the amount of wheat was negligible and the cost of the action was high.36 The official paper of Esztergom County wrote that without contraband, starvation would have been widespread in the region.37 Four years later, the very same paper condemned smugglers who ‘did serious damage to the state’ and clamoured for draconian measures against such activities. Interestingly, the same text appeared in another local paper in the eastern part of Hungary.38 Another reason was profit (or even profiteering). Prices were often different on the two sides of the border. Since cattle were much cheaper in Hungary than in Czechoslovakia, many poor people smuggled their livestock across the border and sold the animals there. Some did it only once, but others made a business of it, again and again buying new cows or horses in Hungary and crossing the border to sell them. Meanwhile, horses were cheaper in Yugoslavia than in Hungary. Many horses were smuggled in and a few weeks later smuggled out to the north, making Hungary a ‘transit country’ for horses.39 The smuggling of livestock was the biggest cause of animal epidemics, and therefore farmers were advised not to buy horses or cows of uncertain origin.40 The difference in price was also the biggest reason for Czechoslovak smugglers. Food, livestock, alcohol and tobacco were much more expensive than in Romania, Poland or Hungary. Therefore, these items were all smuggled into the country. Another phenomenon was religious, ideological and political smuggling, with forbidden propaganda materials being transported across the border.41

What we learn from the existing literature and from the numerous articles is that agricultural products were the most common contraband objects in both directions. However, the beginning and the middle of the 1920s differ significantly. In the first years, grain (cereals), livestock (cattle and horses), tobacco and eggs were the most common contraband items. Some years later, these goods were succeeded by more processed items, such as cigarettes, alcohol (including wine), textiles, saccharine and sugar. This change serves to demonstrate that it was not the new borders, but rather the war which caused economic disorder. Therefore, most vital foodstuffs were needed in the first years. Later on, when food supply was consolidated, and bread, milk, egg and meat shortages were over,42 more processed goods were smuggled.43 Given that smuggling continued even after the economic consolidation, we can state that the role of the new borders was vital in the creation and continuation of contraband.
Ethnographic research shows that there were other contraband items in the interwar period, e.g. salt, walnuts, pepper and even gold near the eastern (Romanian) border. At the Czechoslovak border the most common ‘exports’ were livestock, spirits and food, while industrial products (most often the famous Bata shoes, but also clothes, chemicals, tools and so on) were smuggled in. In the south, at the Yugoslav border, the smuggling of wheat and money were the most common. My archival findings show that in the south-eastern part of Hungary red pepper (paprika) was one of the most common contraband items to be ‘exported’, mostly to Romania. Besides that, livestock, flour, onion and lard were smuggled in and out. Paprika was perhaps the sole agricultural product to yield a profit from the war; its production increased because the importation of the cheaper Spanish paprika became impossible, and Hungary gained new markets in Austria and Germany. Paprika was a replacement for black pepper, which was also unavailable owing to the Entente blockade. Paprika became subject to excise duties (like tobacco), and its trade was a state monopoly. Therefore, smuggling started even during the war and continued after war restrictions were over. The production of paprika continued to rise even after 1918. It seems obvious that the continuation of paprika smuggling was caused by the new borders because almost the whole paprika producing area remained in Hungary, and the residents of the detached territories could not buy it legally. (However, some Spanish paprika was also smuggled in.)

Contraband was most common on the Austrian border after the war. The reason for this was the food shortage in Austria, which significantly raised prices, while food was very cheap in Hungary because of the aforementioned state intervention. For this reason, it was worth trying to smuggle out food and sell it in Austria. The western border was famous for smuggling out wheat (also in the form of flour or bread), eggs, beans, potatoes, livestock and butter to Austria. This should not come as a surprise given that more than 70% of Hungarian agricultural exports had gone to Austria during the Dual Monarchy. ‘Residents of western Hungary could not accept that the economic connection with Austria was over within a day’, wrote an anonymous journalist. Smugglers just continued the old exports in a different way. Hungary tried to stop trafficking goods to Austria as early as 1919. However, members of the Red Guard of the short-lived communist regime allegedly took part in the illegal activities. After the fall of the Republic of the Councils (the Hungarian Soviet Republic), customs offices were set up to tackle the problem of the ‘chain traders’. The government created a so-called ‘food protection area’, which was a 40-kilometre zone parallel to the demarcation lines. If we believe what newspapers wrote, smuggling near the Austrian border was over in the summer of 1920. Before that, contraband was a very widespread and well-organized activity, which included forerunners, rear- and sideguards, who would warn the smugglers if gendarmes or the borderland police appeared.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, a clear territorial difference can also be seen among smuggled items. In the western part of the country, neighbouring Germany, sugar, saccharine, coffee and industrial products were smuggled, while the most common contraband items in Subcarpathia were wheat, livestock and alcohol. Surprisingly, cigarettes were smuggled more often in the east, while unprocessed tobacco was usual in the west. At the Czech-Polish border, livestock, meat, food and alcohol were the main smuggled items.
In the mid-1920s, contraband reached such an extent in Hungary that leaders of the textile industry in 1924 suggested that borders be fortified using barbed wire and 'Spanish riders'. They argued that, although investing in such fortifications would be expensive, it was worth doing for the sake of the state treasury. According to these industrialists, exceptionally large amounts of textiles were being smuggled into Hungary, mostly on horse-drawn carriages. While the suggestion was not realized, it is interesting to see how security concerns were starting to override the official anti-Trianon national rhetoric. Instead of arguing for the economic unity of the pre-war Hungarian Kingdom, these industrialists in fact accepted the reality of the new borders and even demanded their fortification. In other words, economic interests took a prime role in the post-war territorialization process.

Textile smuggling created a strange situation in Szob, the biggest railway station on the Czechoslovak–Hungarian border. Customs officers told journalists that almost all passengers were carrying some illegal goods, including 90% of women. A suspiciously ‘fat’ lady wore large amounts of clothing, including four jumpers and 260 metres of lace. Silk was also smuggled into the country. However, if any of these contraband items were found, high duties and fines were levied on travellers. Sugar was also smuggled into the country, and interestingly even Hungarian sugar, the price of which was high because of the excise duty. Legally exported sugar was not subject to duty and was much cheaper, so smugglers ‘reimported’ it in large amounts.

In sum, these sources enable us to draw a portrait of a typical post-war rural smuggler. He or she would cross the border on foot with a rucksack, that is, only with a small amount of contraband. There were even cases where women carried more than 20 kilogrammes. Some smugglers used horse-drawn carriages, but of course this was very risky because of the possibility of confiscation. However, if a dual landowner crossed the border, he or she could use a carriage to transport the crops legally to the other side. Many of them also smuggled contraband under the cornstalk; sometimes even people were smuggled in this way. More experienced smugglers invented creative techniques: one of them tried to smuggle out five kilos of tobacco on his back, pretending he had a hunchback. Smugglers were respected by local residents. When they were interrogated as witnesses, they usually gave false testimony. Some officials even helped smugglers, e.g. a village mayor in Slovakia regularly falsified cattle licences, so that the cows and bulls which were smuggled in could be sold ‘legally’ in Czechoslovakia. Many smugglers were caught by gendarmes or by the customs guard. Poor people, especially in 1920, did not even understand why it was illegal to go to the next village or town, which was now on the other side of the new border. They simply did what they had done before and of course most of them ‘had no idea’ that transporting goods across the border (without a permission and avoiding customs formalities) was illegal. It was hard for them to accept that they had to apply for a passport or a borderland certificate and that they could not transport anything they used to carry with themselves, regardless of whether they wanted to give it to their relatives or to trade with it. Those who were captured were convicted of an infraction and fined (convertible to custody). According to a newspaper: ‘Inhabitants of whole villages near the border make a living from smuggling.’

The situation was similar in Czechoslovakia, where all social strata took part in this illegal activity. There were whole families living off smuggling, and this ‘profession’ was inherited from father to son (or from mother to daughter). The number of smugglers was
higher in transition (1918–19, 1938–39) and crisis periods (1929–33). Greater numbers also meant organized gangs, which could not be dissolved easily, especially when they had guns.67

Although most smugglers were simple poor people, several cases are known where armed gangs were also formed in Hungary. Members of these groups did not hesitate to use their weapons against members of the financial (or customs) guard. Such cases were most frequent near the Austrian border. Even in June 1920, a large group of smugglers opened fire on the guards, who fought back, killing one and wounding four smugglers.68 Sometimes smugglers did not shoot but gendarmes did, killing a runaway.69 In the summer of 1922, smugglers killed two gendarmes near Sopron.70 There were gunfights and deaths near the other borders as well.71 There were also other reasons for fatalities. A Czechoslovak financial guard was beaten to death by a group of smugglers.72 Occasionally, some people even tried trafficking drugs. In 1925, cocaine smuggling was discovered. The drug was transited to Romania.73

Smuggling continued into the 1930s. Both sides, the smugglers and the authorities, continued to use weapons against each other. Somewhat surprisingly, the situation was worse near the Austrian and the Czechoslovak borders, where gunfights were common, with many injuries and deaths. Both Hungarian and foreign authorities were responsible for many casualties.74

**In small amounts: three case studies**

Hungarian authorities found navigating the post-war circumstances more than a little confusing. On the one hand, they did not recognize the new borders and continued to call them 'demarcation lines'. Consequently, free movement across these lines could even have been promoted by them, but most chose not to do so. In the case of small border traffic, which was a legally accepted form of movement, they did indeed support border-crossings. On the other hand, local leaders were 'petty bureaucrats' who insisted on the rigid enforcement of the rules. As a consequence, their approaches to illegal border crossings and contraband activities were completely different. To illustrate this, I will present three post-war case studies. The first case is from Csurgó, a town situated next to the Yugoslav border, which even before 1918 was an internal border between Hungary and Croatia. Croatia then became part of Yugoslavia, and the former internal border became international. The second case is from Makó, a town near the new Romanian border. The third case is from Szombathely, where the Austrian border theoretically moved closer to the city in 1920, but Hungarian rule in Burgenland lasted until the following November.

The high sheriff in Csurgó was enraged by the fact that contraband was widespread even during the war. That this activity went unpunished only added to his rage. This situation serves to explicate the following case. On 3 September 1920, three local men were arrested by gendarmes at 3 a.m. near the Yugoslav border but still in Hungarian territory. They were accused of trying to smuggle out more than two tonnes of wheat on two horse-drawn carriages to 'Croatia' (in fact, Yugoslavia). Their wheat was confiscated and, 17 days later, the men were punished. Two of them, József Lőczi and János Tóth, were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and fined 2000 crowns, while the third man was sentenced to three months in prison and fined 1000 crowns. Even though the men
protested their innocence, telling Kálmán Bóné, the high sheriff of Csurgó district, that they did not want to transport their wheat to Croatia, but to a farm not far away from the border, the verdict stated that all of them 'confessed' they wanted to take the wheat abroad. The defendants appealed against their sentences, but their pleas for clemency were rejected. On 19 November 1920, the deputy lord lieutenant (alispán) of Somogy County, Andor Tallián upheld their sentences (except for the third man whose fine was doubled). An attorney made a further appeal on the grounds that the defendants had been improperly questioned. In their statement, itself a frankly astonishing document, they claimed:

We were not interrogated properly, we could only answer the questions asked […]; no one proved that we 'wanted' to transport the wheat to Croatia […]; we were halted by gendarmes on Hungarian territory [emphasis in the original] […]; our coach and horses (worth 200,000 crowns) would have been at stake, the Serbs could have confiscated everything […]; we woke up at 3 a.m. every day in order to do our jobs, and not just that morning in order to commit something illegal.

Its conclusion suggests their attorney must have been something of a socialist: 'The poor are always punished, while all the big speculators escape.' Based on the complaints mentioned in the appeal, new hearings were held in Csurgó, where defendants and witnesses were questioned, most of them for the first time. The second appeal was decided on 10 June 1922 by a deputy state secretary. The fines originally imposed were upheld, but the prison sentences were reduced to a sixth of the original verdict (one month and 15 days).

However, Lőčzi and Tóth strongly believed in their own innocence and asked for a retrial. New witnesses were heard again, and the original charge was dropped. It transpired that innocent people were being accused of contraband in 1920. This time, under a new sheriff, Dezso Jeszenszky, the defendants were charged with 'transporting wheat without permission'. Both were sentenced to three days in custody and fined 1000 crowns. The justification for the reduced sentence was that 'it is proven that the defendants did not want to transport the wheat to Croatia but to a farm in Hungary, and they did so only after fulfilling their compulsory delivery'.

The protagonist in the second case is Imre Spergely, the provisional high sheriff of the Central (or Makó) district in Csanád county, who treated infraction charges another way. Makó was under Romanian occupation until the end of March 1920. Spergely remained in office only until Kálmán Urbanics, the previous high sheriff, returned to the city. The Makó area became a border district, and the new 'demarcation line' (in fact, borderline) with Romania was very close to Makó. Many people crossed the border carrying mostly food (flour, onions, beans, potatoes, paprika, lard, smoked meat and so on) but also tobacco and cigarette paper. They did so without any permission, which was strictly forbidden. It was illicit transport or simply contraband, regardless of whether it took place across the 'demarcation line' or elsewhere. While most cases were more than clear, Spergely was reluctant to pass sentences on smugglers. Although gendarmes confiscated all contraband in question, he stopped criminal proceedings and acquitted the accused. His decision was justified by the following: 'My office has not received any orders that would classify smuggling out anything across the demarcation line as an infraction.' Even he realized perhaps that this solution would not work, so he chose to treat cases as illegal
border crossing instead of contraband. At the beginning, he refused to sentence even these 'illegal crossers' because there is no 'such kind of legal regulation that would classify the crossing of the demarcation line as an infraction and in which my office would be a judging authority'. He was wrong, however, because illegal crossing was an infraction, and as such should have been tried by (high) sheriffs since as early as 1903. After being told to enforce the rules of the Passport Law, he made several excuses: 'the criminal act was committed in a period when the regulations of the peace treaty were not commonly known to local people'; or 'although they violated the law, they are simple and uneducated'; or 'because the rules of border crossing have not yet been set up by an international agreement, and the inhabitants of the divided villages have to arrange their businesses, they are forced to violate the law'. Hence, he concluded, 'they cannot be sentenced'. In some cases, when contraband was much too obvious, he made the excuse that 'contraband offences have to be tried by customs authorities and not by my office'.

Szombathely is again different because there were several sheriffs in the district and all of them issued verdicts on infraction cases. Kálmán Hertelendy was the most active among them. Like Spergely, he acquitted as many people as he could. He convicted almost only those who pleaded guilty. He also had several excuses: 'he was not smuggling - he only traded some goods for his own needs'; 'she was transporting the flour to her sisters'; or 'they did not know that transportation is subject to authorization'. By contrast, György Turchányi was much more rigorous. In early 1920, Antal Fixl, an ethnic German living in a village that later became part of Austria, was detained for 'smuggling', i.e. for transporting wheat from a neighbouring village (still in Hungarian territory) without any licence. However, he only smuggled the wheat because the authorities of his village had ordered him to do so to prevent famine. Fixl was convicted of two charges and sentenced to five days in custody and fined 300 crowns. Fixl's attorney appealed the verdict, writing that 'here, in the German-speaking borderland, threatened by disengagement, where Austrian agents are agitating people to join Austria, Hungarian authorities are unable to organize even public supply'. Moreover, wrote the lawyer, the infraction was committed in an exigent circumstance, and under criminal law no one can be convicted for that. At the same time, the state commissioner for cereal production also made an appeal, clamouring for a stricter sentence because Fixl 'broke the regulation which is intended to solve the chief and most severe problem of the country, the public supply'. The first-instance judgment was annulled in 1922. Unfortunately, the end of this story is missing from the sources. Fixl had probably already become an Austrian citizen by 1922, rendering a retrial of the case pointless.

Comparing the three case studies, it is interesting to see how contraband was treated by local authorities. The Csurgo case is similar to the show trials of the 1950s, when numerous peasants were sentenced on false charges. The Mako cases, however, show a radically different picture. It is also clear that similar cases were adjudicated in different ways, depending on the personality of the given sheriff, even within the same district.

**Smuggling in large amounts**

There were two different types of contraband in the 1920s. While the poor smuggled mostly in small amounts in order to make ends meet, there were some wealthier people who did so in large amounts in the hope of further enriching themselves. Most of them
succeeded in this, but we only know about their cases if they were exposed, tried and sentenced. I now turn to cases in which there was large-scale profiteering (or, as it was called, 'chain trading'). Although this was also widespread inside the country, here I only deal with illicit trade across the border.

State officials also took part in contraband activities. In spring 1920, even the leaders of a local branch of the public food supply office were involved, under the leadership of Jenő Szalay, a wealthy clerk of the royal court in Sopron. The group transported huge amounts of wheat to Austria with 'valid' permissions on their own account and speculated with cattle confiscated from smugglers. Half a million crowns were lost to the treasury as a result of their actions.81

A 'gentry gang' (as it was first reported) in Sátoraljaujhely made 30 million crowns from smuggling in the second half of 1920. The city itself was split in two by the border, with a smaller part and the railway station belonging to Czechoslovakia. The waterworks of the city supplied both parts, so workers could regularly cross the border to transport oil in barrels for the maintenance of machines. However, their carriage crossed the border suspiciously often, which drew the attention of financial guards. It turned out that the barrels were full of alcohol. Some members of the gang (from high society) also transported horses. Contrary to their social status, members of the 'gentry gang' were portrayed in a surprisingly negative light from the very beginning, even in the right-wing press.82 Less than a week later it became publicly known that besides members of the gentry and smuggling gang included alcohol traders of Jewish origin, 'immigrating from Galicia'.83 This kind of antisemitic tone was regrettably common in the right-wing press in the early 1920s.

Another case took place in Szeged in 1921. It was an 'unprecedented affair in the history of Hungarian contraband'. Ernő Lusztig, a millionaire tradesman was unmasked; his warehouse was full of goods for which he had no permission to sell. It turned out that he bought a huge amount of goods abroad, of which there were shortages in the 'occupied territory'. Lusztig sent them through Hungary as transit goods (i.e. duty-free). These wares were transported on trains to Szeged. Since there were no direct railway connections between Szeged and Yugoslavia, everything was transported on horse-drawn carriages. Before reaching the border, the goods were unloaded and transported to Romania by hired smugglers. As a result, the state lost several million crowns. Lusztig was immediately fined (1.5 million crowns), accused of committing a misdemeanour and a few weeks later sentenced to six months' imprisonment (plus a fine of 40,000 crowns, convertible to 200 days in custody).84 Bigger cases usually meant smuggling out. Tobacco shortages in Hungary were caused by large-scale contraband in the first half of the 1920s. In particular, the lack of better-quality tobacco and cigars was a constant complaint.85 Later on, however, it was the smuggling of cigarettes into the country that was the problem.86

The biggest Hungarian contraband scandal in the first half of the 1920s broke out in November 1923 in Szombathely. The financial guard planted two detectives as workers in a storehouse to unmask a professional textile-smuggling operation. Within a few months, it turned out that some tradesmen imported different types of textiles illegally, causing a 600-million-crown loss.87 To understand this case, it is important to add that virtually no textile industry existed in the country before the First World War. Later, some textile factories were founded, but their products were expensive and of low quality. Meanwhile,
owing to protectionism, the import of textiles was limited and heavily taxed, with the result that the lower and even middle classes were not properly clothed. It was a desire to address this problem, as well as to enrich themselves, that motivated the textile tradesmen of Szombathely. In the first months of 1924, local policemen and customs officials were arrested in Szombathely. The smuggling affair was accompanied by widespread accusations of bribery and forgery, involving some national leaders of the customs guard in Budapest. Interestingly, only one textile trader was sentenced to prison (and not for smuggling, but bribery); all others were acquitted. However, police and customs officials were found guilty, with sentences as high as seven and a half years in prison being handed out.

From these cases it is obvious that smuggling caused huge losses to the state treasury and, consequently, the national economy as a whole. The black economy and organized crime can inflict serious damage on a nation’s financial health, and while we cannot compare the effects of the Prohibition and bootlegging (not to mention the other Mafia activities) in the United States with these much smaller-scale Hungarian cases, without customs revenue, the state had less money to invest in infrastructure, education and the economy itself. However, certain people’s standard of living improved. Many smugglers became extremely rich and later employed several poor people to continue their operations. This was also the case in Czechoslovakia, where the Paschkönige (smuggler-kings), as they were known in the Sudetenland, formed a single organized network. At the other end of the country, the situation was similar but there were separate networks of Jewish, Ruthenian and Hungarian gangs.

Conclusions and outlook

The new borders caused serious economic problems for Hungary, at least for a short time and especially in local agrarian communities. However, it is important to underline that these hardships also arose from the war losses and the changing international situation. Strict measures were taken by Hungary to overcome these problems, including a rationing system and anti-contraband rules. In addition, the Budapest government was successful in re-establishing small border traffic in all directions. For a country with 60% of its workforce in agriculture, it was crucial that landowners could cross the border to cultivate their lands even without a full passport. This kind of traffic significantly helped to revitalize the nation’s agriculture, which had been hit hard by the war. The worst privations seem to have been overcome by 1922 at the latest. Contraband was a new phenomenon in post-Trianon Hungary, and it was considered to be a temporary one. However, smuggling became permanent owing to the price differences among neighbouring countries. In the first years, most vital foodstuffs (cereals, livestock, eggs) were smuggled out of Hungary because the country was then one of the cheapest in Europe. Later, basic food prices on both sides of the border came more closely into alignment. Excise duties and tariffs, however, rose to exorbitant heights in Hungary to protect newly founded industries, changing completely the direction and composition of contraband. In the mid-1920s most goods (including cigarettes, textiles, sugar and saccharine) were now being smuggled in. Therefore, even contraband serves to highlight the main features of Hungarian post-war economic development. Another important lesson to be drawn concerns the obvious similarities between the agrarian restrictions imposed during and
after the First World War and the controlled economy of the Second World War – and even some of the methods of communist forced collectivization in the 1950s. Peasants thus learned to accustom themselves to these limitations in the early 1920s, with the result that what followed – the planned economy, the compulsory delivery of crops, graded taxation and even ’show trials’ – did not constitute a novelty for them when the communists came to power. In sum, Trianon triggered a territorialization process that was reinforced partly by domestic factors. Hence, the consequences of the new borders were much more far-reaching than has traditionally been indicated by the usual picture of national trauma and the political instrumentalization of victimhood.

Contraband operations continued throughout the whole interwar period, causing serious economic losses. It should not be a surprise that authorities fought (or tried to fight) against it. Still, it flourished again during and after the Second World War. The situation completely changed in 1948–49 when the borders were almost completely sealed by the communist dictatorships. Iron curtains were built not only on the Austrian and Yugoslav borders but also in the East. Indeed, the Soviets created a fence, while the Romanian border patrols opened fire without warning on all illegal crossers. Even small border traffic was halted in order to stop smuggling. In Hungary, there were plans to ‘relocate’ notorious smugglers from the border zone.93 In the first half of the 1950s, virtually no smuggling existed over Hungarian borders, except at the Czechoslovak–Hungarian border, which was strictly guarded but was not ‘fortified’.94

Notes

1. The best source for the claims of the neighbours is the presentations of their delegations in front of the Council of Ten. See United States Department of State, Papers, vol. III. 822–34 (Problem of the Banat); vol. III. 845–7 (Transylvania); vol. III. 883–6 (Slovakia and Subcarpathia); vol. IV. 47–53 (Yugoslav claims). On the role of the railways in drawing the borderline see Majdán, “A vasút szerepe,” 100–15.


3. This view originated from John Maynard Keynes, whose book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, argued similarly in the case of the Versailles peace treaty signed with Germany. For a historiographic analysis of this topic, see Tomka, “Az első világháború és a trianoni béke,” 47–54.


5. Janos, East Central Europe, 127–8. The density of population and urbanization was also higher after Trianon.


8. Bódy, “Elelmiszer-ellátás,” 151–94. A kilogramme of flour cost 2 crowns in Hungary while in Yugoslavia it was 47 crowns and 10 to 60 crowns in Austria (depending on the social status of the customer), ibid., 187.


12. For more details, see Bencsik, “(Re)establishment of Small Border Traffic.”
24. Due to high prices in Austria, this wheat transport started in the summer of 1919. Bády, “Élelmiszer-ellátás,” 176.
32. These include several works on tobacco smuggling, which was common even in the nineteenth century and most often had nothing to do with border crossing. So, it was not contraband but only trafficking. See Takács, *A dohánytermesztés,* 398–402; Dobrossy, *Dohánytermesztés a Nyírségben,* 65–8; Kiss, *A szegény emberek élete,* 332–45. (See also later notes for other ethnographic works on smuggling across the borders.)
33. These newspapers are scanned and fully searchable; see https://adtplus.arcanum.hu/hu/ (accessed December 28, 2018).
34. The situation was different in the Czech provinces, where saccharine was also smuggled (together with tobacco) even before the First World War. Marek, *Smrt v celním pásmu*, 42–4.
35. CSML, IV.B.1407.b, no. 1642/1920.
41. Marek, *Smrt v celním pásmu*, 39; Toungoussov, “Fenomén pašeráctví,” 14–5, 55, 59, 62–4. For example, a cow cost 2200 crowns in Czechoslovakia and 600 crowns in Romania. The price of pure alcohol was five times higher (45 and 9 crowns per litre). See also Dohnalová, “Pašeráctvi na československo–polských hranicích,” 34–44.
43. This analysis is based on my calculations from approximately 250 newspaper articles. For the list of newspapers used, see Bibliography.
47. CSML, IV.B.455.c, box 1. nos. 156/1924, 184/1924, 355/1924; CSML, IV.B.463.b, several cases in boxes 17–8; BéML, IV.B.434.d, box 387. nos. 105/1922, 126/1922, 183/1922, 191/1922.
52. The situation was similar at the Czechoslovak border; see Viga, *Árucsere és migráció*, 162.
54. Order of the government no. 1210/1920. ME. r. (February 8), *Budapesti Közlöny* 54 no. 32 February 10, 1920.
55. There is another, albeit indirect, proof in archival sources. Infraction papers make up two piles both in Szombathely and Szentgotthárd counties in 1919, and there are several contra-band cases among them. The number of all infraction cases in the archives is much less in the following years and smuggling is very rare among them. See *VaML*, IV.428.g, pile 6 (1919), pile 7 (1919), pile 8 (1920–24) and *VaML*, IV.430.g, pile 2 (1919), pile 3 (1919) and pile 4 (1920–22).
60. "Óriási arányú csempészés folyik a szobi határon," Az Est, August 20, 1924.
64. Even a police captain wrote that 'smuggling is the most sympathetic crime in the eyes of the public'. Dánél Schreiber: "A nemzetközi csempések triikkje," Pesti Napló, June 28, 1925.
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70. "Oriasi aranyu csempeszes folyik a szobi hataron," Az Est, August 20, 1924.
71. "Oriasi aranyu csempeszes folyik a szobi hataron," Az Est, August 20, 1924.
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75. "Veres kuzdelem a cseh csendorokkal," Egri Nepujsag, February 25, 1922 (Czechoslovak border); "Csempoeszek fegyveres összeiitkozese a Vamorseggel," Bekés, May 16, 1923 (Romanian border). At the Yugoslav border I also found such incidents (but no one died): "Izgalmas csempészükközés," Szeged, April 13, 1924.
79. "Veres kuzdelem a cseh csendorokkal," Egri Nepujsag, February 25, 1922 (Czechoslovak border); "Csempészeg ehelyezése a Vámoszéggel," Békés, May 16, 1923 (Romanian border). At the Yugoslav border I also found such incidents (but no one died): "Izgalmas csempészükközés," Szeged, April 13, 1924.
84. "Melyek a csempések?", "Drotakadalyokkal és spanyol lovasokkal akarják megvénedi a határi a csempészeektől," Pesti Napló, December 25, 1924.
85. "Veres kuzdelem a cseh csendorokkal," Egri Nepujsag, February 25, 1922 (Czechoslovak border); "Csempészeg ehelyezése a Vámoszéggel," Bekés, May 16, 1923 (Romanian border). At the Yugoslav border I also found such incidents (but no one died): "Izgalmas csempészükközés," Szeged, April 13, 1924.
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91. "Veres kuzdelem a cseh csendorokkal," Egri Nepujsag, February 25, 1922 (Czechoslovak border); "Csempészeg ehelyezése a Vámoszéggel," Bekés, May 16, 1923 (Romanian border). At the Yugoslav border I also found such incidents (but no one died): "Izgalmas csempészükközés," Szeged, April 13, 1924.
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90. “Ma délelőtt hirdették ki az ítéletet a szombathelyi textilcsempészék és vámcslók bűnpórében,” Nyírvidék, October 22, 1924.
91. See, inter alia, Blumenthal, Bootleg.

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The role of history and geography teaching in the building of national identity in interwar Vojvodina

Dragica Koljanin, Biljana Šimunović-Bešlin and Paulina Čović

ABSTRACT
This article addresses how the redrawing of borders after the First World War affected the everyday lives of the inhabitants of today's Vojvodina as a part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It discusses theories and methods of constructing the new national identity within the schoolchildren aged between seven and ten in this borderland. This is done by means of in-depth analyses of school legislation, curricula and narrative analysis of a sample of textbooks. The research reveals not only that the teaching of history and geography represented the core of the national curriculum, but also that these school subjects were fully aligned with the official national ideology of the Yugoslav Kingdom. It also indicates that textbooks had a prominent role in shaping a child's cultural experience within the new state.

1918: new states, new borders, new identities

At the end of the First World War, with the dissolution of four multinational empires (the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman), many new states emerged. Among them was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes founded in December 1918.1 With the territorial changes that followed, the southern parts of the former Austria-Hungary became integral parts of the Yugoslav Kingdom. Consequently, their political, social and cultural order was permanently altered. These events transformed today's Vojvodina region from a peripheral province into the northern borderland territory of great importance for the new state authorities. Owing to the heterogeneous national composition of the population, the new state authorities paid special attention to nation-building strategies in this border area.2

The events of autumn 1918 – the collapse of the Central Powers on the Western Front and the breakthrough at the Salonica Front – were followed by disintegrative processes in Austria-Hungary. In the territory of the once powerful empire, national councils were emerging rapidly. Their aim was to proclaim secession from the monarchy and to form their own states. In Vojvodina, on 25 November 1918, the Serbs, Bunjevci and other Slavic people of Banat, Bačka and Baranja declared their independence from Hungary and united with Serbia.3 This outcome relied on military action in the borderland region. There was significant discontent with the entrance of the Serbian Army in 1918 among
the non-South Slavs. The Banat Republic that was proclaimed in Timisoara a few days after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary provides an interesting case. The entity did not last long because it was ultimately rejected by the Romanian representatives. However, they later claimed the multi-ethnic territory of Banat. The Banat Republic that was proclaimed in Timisoara a few days after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary provides an interesting case. The entity did not last long because it was ultimately rejected by the Romanian representatives. However, they later claimed the multi-ethnic territory of Banat.4 Banat was divided between Romania and the Yugoslav Kingdom in 1920.5

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed with the consent of the legitimate representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia (previously united with Vojvodina and Montenegro) and the representatives of the provisional State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The union was proclaimed by Regent Aleksandar on 1 December 1918. After signing a peace treaty with Germany in June 1919, the state received international recognition. Borderland problems in the north remained unresolved until the signing of the peace treaty with Hungary at Trianon in June 1920.6

The Paris Peace Conference completely changed the political map of the Pannonian Plain. Three countries emerged in the Pannonian territories of the former Habsburg Empire based on the legitimist principle: Hungary; Romania; and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. While regulating borderland issues they adhered to the principles of nationality and self-determination. Because of the mixed population and the inherent rivalries this entailed, it was difficult to draw clear lines of ethnic demarcation. The Great Powers were able to control diplomatic negotiations. They had a significant impact on decisions about the redrawing of borders, regardless of what was happening in the field.7

The territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes spread over the Central Western Balkans and part of Central Europe. People who lived within its borders had been ethnically similar. Since they had lived within different states, they experienced different economic circumstances, traditions and historical legacies.8 With such provincial diversity within its borders, one of the most important tasks of the newly founded state was a consolidation of national unity. The new government had to forge a common collective identity. The principle of ethnic unity of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was an ideological fundament for the new state. The overarching Yugoslav identity took a prominent place and was accepted by the three constituent peoples.9 In daily life, the ethnic identities and divisions were far more complicated, especially when taking into consideration the ideological positions of Serbs and Croats. Recent research by Pieter Troch suggests that one should be careful not to let evaluations of Serbian dominance in the political life of the new state determine our assessment of how Yugoslav nationhood was institutionalised culturally. It concurs with the broader discussion concerning the place of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene collective identities within the Yugoslav national identity.10

This paper is a contribution to the so-called ‘dynamic’ approach to the topic of national identity: one that is changed and redefined throughout time. It does not imply that Yugoslav identity superseded or excluded, but rather interacted with various levels of Serbian, Croatian and Slovene national identities.11 This article aims to show a wide range of difficult tasks which the new national state confronted to achieve national and state unity, especially in the multi-ethnic borderland area. While providing a brief overview of circumstances and methods which the government employed in order to gain the population’s loyalty towards the state, nation and society, it could raise new questions and initiate further research.
The task of reshaping the national consciousness of the population presented many obstacles. The First World War ended with devastating consequences: enormous material destruction and irreplaceable human losses, mostly in the territory of Serbia. The Yugoslav state was predominantly agrarian and suffered from a scarcity of resources. Simultaneously, the national, legal, political, economic, religious and cultural disparities that existed in certain parts of the country had to be reduced or eliminated. With the unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes within one common state, their historical heritage could not easily be overcome.

The incorporation of the territory of Vojvodina into the newly formed Yugoslav state depended on a variety of factors. Before anything else, the Habsburg cultural legacy had to be overcome in order to adapt all the provincial differences to the core of the national state. This was very difficult to manage given the fact that Vojvodina was a multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-confessional province.

For centuries Vojvodina was a borderland territory between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Since the Serbian population settled in South Hungary provided military support to the Habsburg Monarchy in preventing an Ottoman breakthrough into Central Europe, the Austrian emperors granted them privileges whereby they were protected from the persistent attempts of Hungarian nobility to subordinate them and make them affiliate to the Roman Catholic Church. The beginning of the national revival of the Serbian people in South Hungary is marked by their claims for an autonomous territory within the Habsburg Empire in 1790. They were never given full political-territorial autonomy, and were only granted the right to religious and educational self-governance. They achieved it partially, after the Revolution of 1848, when they were given the status of an administrative unit, but these minor jurisdictions were soon abolished. Furthermore, after the Compromise of 1867 and the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, the situation of the Serbian people deteriorated. With a series of measures, Hungary pursued a policy of consistent Magyarization: the 'Law of Nationalities' of 1868 recognized only Hungarians as a political nation; the 'Lex Apponyi' of 1907 proclaimed Hungarian as the official language in schools. Ultimately, Serbian educational and religious autonomy was withdrawn as well. There is a growing body of work on the role of Austro-Hungarian schools in nation-building. In Hungarian historiography it is considered that these measures were more spontaneous and that forced Magyarization started in the last two decades before the First World War; the whole process, however, is considered somewhat ineffective owing to the resistance of the other nationalities. Recent studies have shown that institutional mechanisms used to inspire state loyalty in Hungary differed from those used in the Austrian part of the Empire. This paper does not try to compare the pre-1918 Hungarian system with the post-1918 Yugoslav system because the policies of the two states come from different periods. One thing is certain: the importance of education coincides with the rise of national consciousness in most European nations.

When after the First World War the territory of today's Vojvodina was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, its officials prioritized the task of consolidation in the northern borderland parts of the country. Unlike in the Kingdom of Serbia, the population of Vojvodina had a heterogeneous ethnic structure. Although the official numbers of minorities were often disputed, the first population census of the new state conducted in 1921 is used as an illustration. While making the census, the
criteria of religious affiliation and mother tongue were used. Those were the elements that differentiated the minorities from the majority of the population. In the territory of today's Vojvodina, Serbians or Croats made up 44.4% of the total population of 1,554,471, Hungarians 23.8%, Germans 20.8%, Romanians 4.6%, Czechs or Slovaks 3.9%, Ruthenians 0.9%, Jews 1.3% and the rest 1.5%.¹⁹

Although they became a significant international-legal and political issue in the period between the two world wars, the concept of national minorities was not clearly defined. In this particular case, the working definition was based on general settings adopted at the Paris Peace Conference and the specifics of the Yugoslav Kingdom as a multinational state. According to the Polish Minorities Treaty, which provided a model for a whole series of minority-rights treaties, national minorities were citizens of a nation-state who did not share the language, religion or race of the majority.²⁰ In the legal and political context of interwar Yugoslavia, this concept is limited to members of ethnic and linguistic communities recognized by the state as minorities. The Yugoslav Kingdom signed the Minority Treaties at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and accepted their guarantee by the League of Nations, but it was not strictly enforced. Therefore, the legal status of national minorities in the Yugoslav Kingdom was regulated by intergovernmental conventions, but also by domestic laws and directives.²¹ The scope of provisions on minorities in the state's laws was small and mostly referred to their education. Minorities living mostly in the border regions were considered to be a destabilizing factor. Even though the state's policy towards the minorities was sometimes restrictive, it was not enough to gain their loyalty towards the new state.²²

In order to affirm the new state in an area inhabited by an ethnically and religiously diverse population, a 'nationalization' policy was carried out in Vojvodina. It was a comprehensive and long-term policy designed to eliminate the consequences of the previous administration and to enable the population of Slavic origin to take over from non-Slavic minorities in all areas of state life: political; economic; and cultural. The new state authorities based their 'nationalization' policy on the tradition that these parts inherited as the cultural centre of the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy.²³ In pursuing national aims, state cultural and educational policies were of great importance.

The new government relied on West European nation-building experiences. In accordance with their interpretation, the precondition for nation-building was the creation of a nation-state. Consequently, national identity is defined as a complex construct composed of many interrelated components: ethnic; territorial; economic; cultural; and legal-political.²⁴ In all the countries that emerged, national ideology was intended to provide social cohesion. This was achieved by creating ethnic myths and values that emphasized the sense of belonging to the collective. These ideas were most effectively deployed through the school system.²⁵ The shared belief throughout the nation was that 'citizens were not simply there but had to be made'.²⁶ Nation-states developed educational systems through which future citizens were to be constructed. Educational policy and curricular reform were thus shaped by 'political entities and cultural path dependencies'.²⁷ The authorities paid most attention to elementary education, since most of the population would be enrolled in it, because it was compulsory, and the majority of children left school afterwards.²⁸

Researchers of social phenomena agree that the case of the Yugoslav state shows that cultural and educational policies played a crucial role in attempts to integrate Yugoslav
society. The Yugoslav Kingdom was envisaged as a centralized and unitary state. The political and cultural elites that formed the new state anticipated that provincial differences would be overcome in the near future and that eventually the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would be amalgamated into one and indivisible Yugoslav nation by means of culture. They also believed that ‘reality is socially constructed’ and that ‘teaching the masses could bring social transformation.’ Furthermore, some authors refer to culture as a set of state activities, especially in the domain of national ideology, directed towards the creation and preservation of Yugoslav society. Thus, national unity by means of culture is accomplished in several ways: by introducing an official language; a new artistic canon; literature; and education, especially the teaching of literature and history which reflect the state ideology. During the 1920s, multiculturalism (the combination of elements from the cultures of the three constituent peoples) prevailed. In the 1930s it was replaced with a supra-national model of culture. In terms of inventing traditions, it was a model that established or legitimized institutions and identity relations. Emphasizing the cultural aspect of identity, Yugoslav state authorities accorded most of their attention to identity-building through the educational system, which is evident from the increase in state spending on education. An essential prerequisite for achieving these goals was a uniform education. Two central characteristics of the school system in interwar Yugoslavia were centralization and national upbringing. As far as teaching was concerned, that meant that the contents of the integrative ideology had priority over general education. National upbringing was carried out through the teaching of history, geography, language and literature.

**Initial changes in the school system**

The school system notably exemplified all diversities that existed in the provinces that were included within the borders of the new state. Educational policy was governed by regulations. In the territory of Serbia, there were three educational systems: the school system of the Kingdom of Serbia; the Hungarian school system in Banat, Bačka and Baranja; and the educational legislation of Croatia and Slavonia in Srem.

Plurality in terms of the national and religious structure of the population in Vojvodina also influenced the school system. There were several types of schools (state, private, confessional), classes were conducted in several languages and the school-leaving age differed from the rest of the country. All this was the result of school-system developments from the eighteenth century, according to the general principles of the educational policy of the Habsburg Monarchy. To be more specific, in Vojvodina within Austria-Hungary, the Hungarian school system was in effect, which meant that children were educated in the spirit of loyalty to the Hungarian state.

The educational policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the territory of Vojvodina was therefore aimed at overcoming the Habsburg cultural and educational legacy and adapting it to new circumstances. It was necessary to change the Hungarian school system in order to diminish the consequences of Magyarization, and ‘nationalize’ this region in the spirit of the new national and state ideology. An effective policy of ‘nationalization’ required radical changes in the school system in Vojvodina. A series of measures led to alignment with the educational practice in Serbia, which was taken as the common ground for the whole country’s education system. The desired outcome was to
achieve nation-building in a rather divided society. The education of both Serbian children and the children of national minorities was organized in line with the national policy.

Immediately after the unification of Vojvodina with Serbia, a special section for educational issues was established within the National Council. The Department of Education within the National Council for Banat, Bačka and Baranja was given the task of changing the teaching set-up in schools in the territory of Vojvodina in accordance with the new reality. In early 1919, it was replaced by the Department of the Ministry of Education of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. These two departments worked intensively for the first two years, while at the same time the state sought international recognition, state-formation processes were underway, and state borders were being established. A number of decisions were adopted and implemented: the official language was changed; schools became state institutions; and the syllabi were adapted to the new political circumstances. The very first changes involved the teaching of language and literature, history and geography.

One of the first measures implemented in schools in the area of present-day Vojvodina was the introduction of the official language as a language of instruction. Until then, classes were conducted mostly in Hungarian. Only rarely were they conducted in German or Serbian, and only in a small number of secondary schools. In December 1918, it was decided that the mother tongue of children who made up the majority of pupils would be introduced in all schools. The implementation started with a memorandum sent to local authorities in February 1919. In practice, this meant the gradual abolition of Hungarian as a teaching language and the introduction of Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian, or, more precisely, the official language.

There then followed, in March 1919, an order from the Department of the Ministry of Education in Novi Sad which made fundamental changes to the teaching of history and geography. In all schools, the history of Serbia had to be taught. Primarily, it was cultural history related to the history of a nationality to which the children belonged. In geography classes, pupils were taught first about their homeland and its immediate surroundings, and then about the geography of the whole kingdom. In practice, this meant that in schools in Vojvodina, instead of learning about the geography and history of the Hungarian Kingdom, children learned about the history of the Serbian people and the state. These urgent changes in the curricula for schools in Vojvodina were supposed to have been a temporary solution until the Ministry of Education prescribed a uniform curriculum for the whole kingdom.

The great difficulty in implementing these orders was the lack of teachers with knowledge of the Serbian language. At the same time, there was strong resistance from the Hungarian teaching staff. For most of them it was still difficult to accept the new state and that they could no longer teach in Hungarian. The Hungarian government urged teachers not to take an oath to the new state, which resulted in their dismissal. In response to these problems, the impact of the changes was alleviated in May 1919. The state also implemented certain measures to support these changes in the school system. Summer-school courses were organized for teachers of non-Slavic nationalities. They were taught Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian, history and geography, pedagogical terminology in the official language, school legislation and administration, singing and children's games. The Ministry of Education evaluated these seminars as successful.
Since the children of national minorities were still allowed to be taught in their mother tongue (in those schools where children holding the Hungarian mother tongue were in the majority), state authorities tried to limit the number of classes. One such measure was the 'name analysis' done when children enrolled in school. The registration of children in schools was based on the analysis of the names of parents, grandfathers and grandmothers. It was conducted by a special controller, a person delegated by local authorities. The intention was to remove the decision on the language of education from parents to the state. It was carried out in order to prevent children of Slavic origin from attending classes that were held in German and Hungarian. The 'name analysis' was also conducted in Romania and Czechoslovakia.

In June 1920 the Minister of Education, Svetozar Pribićević, decided to extend the school legislation of Serbia (enacted in 1904 and amended in 1919) to Vojvodina and Montenegro, those parts of the state that had united with Serbia in 1918 and formed the Yugoslav state. This decision was the first major step towards the unification of the school system. Schools were proclaimed state institutions, and the duration of compulsory education and the school-leaving age, as well as teaching, were standardized. This ended the need for the Department of the Ministry of Education for Vojvodina. In future, the decisions of the Ministry were carried out by school inspectors.

In order to achieve its education policy objectives, the government sought not only the unification of primary schools, but also the gradual abolition of private schools. At the beginning of 1921, the Education Minister sent instructions to school inspectors not to allow the opening of new private schools. Private primary schools were not abolished immediately, but their functioning was significantly impeded. Those private schools that still existed were put under the strict supervision of the state in accordance with its educational policy.

The importance of elementary schools in the state's identity-building programme was confirmed in Paragraph 16 of the Constitution in June 1921. Article 16 called for uniform teaching throughout the country, to be adapted to the environment in which it was conducted. Primary education was proclaimed public and compulsory. Schools were assigned the task of providing children with moral education and building up the national spirit in a sense of national unity and religious tolerance. The children of national minorities could be taught in their mother tongue under the conditions prescribed by law.

Towards the national curriculum

The process of introducing uniform school legislation was lengthy and difficult. Discussions on the drafts of the new law for primary schools were a frequent occurrence. Almost every two years a new project was proposed (in 1919, 1921, 1925, 1927 and 1928), but not a single one was accepted. The reason was the frequent changes of governments and ministers of education, which inhibited the continuous and efficient implementation of educational policy. Educational programmes were introduced by the government but were never concretized because of political instability. The aims proclaimed by the Constitution could not be achieved in spite of all the efforts of the Ministry of Education and the educators involved in those debates. However, during this period, significant regulations were adopted and the curricula were changed.
In 1919, preparations had already been made for the adoption of a uniform curriculum. The Minister of Education sent a proposal to the Department of the Ministry of Education in Novi Sad to study and amend it according to the local circumstances. This did not produce the desired results. Instead, the Minister of Education, Svetozar Pribićević, decided in June 1920 to extend the reach of the Serbian educational legislation to Banat, Bačka and Baranja, and a month later stipulated that classes in schools in the territory of Vojvodina were to be conducted according to the curriculum and syllabus for schools in Serbia. Certain changes were introduced into the curriculum for schools in Serbia, in order to give students a basic knowledge of their new homeland. The history syllabus contained the histories of Croats and Slovenes, especially when they had their own independent states, and brief reviews of the history of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Zeta (today Montenegro) and 'coastal areas' (the Adriatic coastline) were added. The geography syllabus included lessons on all parts of the kingdom; again, it was mostly the geography of Serbia. Updates were made in accordance with the new state borders. Lessons were added about the Tisa river basin, that is, in the northern part of the country. In the third-grade geography syllabus, a new unit was introduced called 'Administration, Coat of Arms and Flag of the Kingdom', and in the fourth grade, students were to be introduced to an overall review of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

One of the major obstacles to the implementation of such a curriculum was the duration of compulsory education. In Serbia, primary education lasted for four years, whereas in the former Hungarian Kingdom children were enrolled in primary education for six. The problem was partially solved by a decree from the Ministry of Education, which determined that classes were to be held in the fifth and sixth grades until the new law on primary schools came into force. In those cases, there were no changes in the teaching language. History and geography were taught in the same way as in the fourth grade but with a slightly wider scope.

Additional measures were needed to define more precisely the teaching in the languages of national minorities. In August 1920, the Ministry of Education issued an order which turned all schools into state institutions. The order permitted separate classes in which teaching was carried out in the languages of national minorities, but only if the number of pupils enrolled reached the number prescribed by law. In those classes, the official language, that is, Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian, along with history and geography, had to be taught as compulsory subjects. New instructions regarding the teaching in the classes of national minorities were made in October 1920. They were aimed at facilitating the teaching of the official language, history and geography by allowing them to be taught in a reduced form and in the children's mother tongue. Nevertheless, the official language was mandatory from the third grade upwards.

The first national curriculum for all primary schools in the kingdom was enacted in 1926, but it was replaced even before it began to be applied in practice. A new one was adopted in 1927, which was supposed to be in use only temporarily, but remained in effect until 1934. History and geography were taught in primary schools in the third and fourth grades. Language and literature, history and geography formed a group of so-called national subjects. In the third grade they made up 42.3% and in the fourth grade 46.5% of weekly classes. The main goal of history and geography teaching was to instil patriotic feelings in children, which clearly indicated their role in the state's programmes.
of national integration. In support of this aim, history and geography were now taught separately, whereas in the previous curriculum they were taught as one subject. Uniform school legislation was not carried out until King Aleksandar abolished the Constitution and introduced a personal dictatorship in 1929. His regime put every single aspect of social life under the supreme control of the state, education included. Finally, a law on public schools was adopted. Everything was now in the hands of state authorities: the opening of new schools and their financing; the position of teachers and their salaries; classes and textbooks. Primary school was compulsory and free of charge. The role of elementary education was to educate pupils in the spirit of the state, national unity and religious tolerance, and make them into moral, faithful and active members of the nation and society. By adopting such a law, the state was trying to unify elementary schools in the kingdom in terms of the duration of compulsory education and syllabi. In Vojvodina, this meant a break with the educational tradition of both the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Hungary.

Teaching in the languages of national minorities was also regulated. In those places with a large population that spoke a language other than Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian, the formation of separate classes in elementary schools was allowed. The number of pupils enrolled was set to a minimum of 30, or in exceptional cases 25, but only with the additional approval of the Ministry of Education. Whenever there were not enough children to reach that number, they had to attend classes in the official language. In both cases, the curriculum was the same, with the exception of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian language being taught as a compulsory subject in schools where classes were conducted in another language. It was prohibited to open private schools, unless they were regulated by international agreements, such as the Yugoslav-Romanian agreement. However, there were cases of minorities opening schools secretly, without prior notice given to the government.

The state's educational policy towards minorities during the interwar period was not explicit but rather ambivalent. In many cases it was restrictive: attempts to reduce the number of classes held in languages of the national minorities and prevention of the opening of new private schools. On the other hand, there were attempts at facilitating the teaching of children of national minorities. The Ministry of Education confirmed this by permitting the printing of textbooks written in the languages of nationalities and by prescribing educational methods which supported their teaching. In our opinion – 'there was much less room for manoeuvre for language groups whose main centre of gravity lay outside the borders' of the Yugoslav state.

After the proclamation of the dictatorship of King Aleksandar in 1929 and the passing of the uniform school legislation, the Ministry of Education issued a new national curriculum in 1933. History and geography were again taught in the third and fourth grades. Along with language and literature, they made up 34.1% of the total number of classes in the third grade and 40.74% in the fourth. The role of history and geography teaching was thereafter even more pronounced. However, a full assessment cannot be made without consideration of the textbook narratives and teaching aims prescribed by the curricula. Only when examined together do the curricula and textbooks reveal the full alignment of history and geography teaching with the state ideology, namely 'integral Yugoslavism', which was a concept of complete national unity. That was also evident in the terminology used in teaching, owing to the change of the name of the state to the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, for administrative purposes, the state was divided into nine banovinas and the City of Belgrade administration. The new geographical partition, made mostly without regard for historic or ethnic boundaries, had a clear ideological purpose. Schools taught that Vojvodina was part of the Danubian banovina. That could explain why the new fourth-grade curriculum had one more class per week of geography added to it. To balance things out, history was taught only once per week in the third grade. As far as the children of national minorities were concerned, the same curriculum as in state schools was used.

In their efforts to preserve peace and to establish cooperation and understanding among nations, numerous activities of the League of Nations were focused on the revision of school textbooks, primarily history ones. National history was considered to be the most delicate issue in international understanding for fostering national sentiment at the expense of international tolerance. This led to the demand to revise history textbooks and to remove all those elements that develop hatred towards other nations. These issues were dealt with by a special body of the League of Nations: the International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation. National education policies were introduced so that the countries’ school systems could conform using internationally accepted standards; pedagogical practice in interwar Europe also offered different solutions for organizing classes. However, recommendations for the revision of textbooks could not easily be accomplished owing to strained international relations and differences in the political systems and educational opportunities of members of the League of Nations. As in the case of Poland and Yugoslavia, national history continued to be studied in schools. The Yugoslav Ministry of Education provided special regulations regarding the contents and means of teaching history and geography. Both teachers and eminent educators of that time were publishing papers and textbooks which offered solutions for the best didactic approach regarding these subjects.

Still, it is very difficult to determine to what extent children aged between seven and ten managed to internalize national education according to the teaching aims, considering that most of them opted to enrol only in compulsory education. Moreover, not all of those children who were enrolled in primary education attended classes regularly. For instance, during the school year 1919/20, it was recorded that only 56% of pupils in Vojvodina actually went to school. There were numerous reasons: poverty; infectious diseases among young children; child labour; and poor facilities in school buildings, which previously served as army buildings. This situation was later improved by introducing penalties for parents who did not send their children to school. Nevertheless, the teaching and learning of history and geography were mostly carried out by means of textbooks. This paper addresses them as primary sources while reconstructing how the new national identity was built up among schoolchildren.

History and geography textbooks and identity-building

Alongside attempts to bring legislative regulations and curricula into line, state and educational authorities encouraged the development of uniform textbooks for primary schools. Printing new textbooks was particularly necessary in Vojvodina, where the school system differed greatly from the rest of the country. This initiative already existed in 1919, with new textbooks being developed, but the results were unsatisfactory. During
the examination of approved textbooks in Vojvodina for the school year 1919–20, it was established that they were written in Serbian, Hungarian, German, Slovak, Ruthenian and Romanian. They were predominantly spelling books, readers and textbooks for mathematics. However, there were no textbooks for the majority of other subjects. The most notable shortage was that of geography and history textbooks, which were essential if the proclaimed goals of school policy were to be fulfilled. The fact that textbooks from the Austro-Hungarian period were still used in some schools, especially in areas along the border, was also a problem. And it was in the areas of Bačka, Baranja and Banat where the Ministry of Education insisted that only those textbooks inspected by the Chief Educational Council (Glavni prosvetni savet), as the advisory body of the ministry, should be used. The Ministry of Education considered that the ideal solution to the textbook issue was the use of uniform textbooks throughout the whole territory of the kingdom. However, the monopolization of the publication of textbooks was not achieved throughout the interwar period.

At the beginning of the 1920s, certain changes were made to the syllabuses of history and geography in accordance with which the first textbooks were printed. The plan was to replace these textbooks with new ones and the announcement of a competition for their creation was expected. However, the delayed adoption of the law on education, including the law on textbooks in 1929, significantly slowed down the entire procedure. An open competition for the creation of new textbooks was not announced until 1935. After a two-year discussion, it was decided to keep the textbooks already in use. Throughout the interwar period, the educational authorities, teachers and authors sought the best solution for the textbooks of history and geography through numerous alterations and new editions. Consequently, this topic opens many possibilities for historical analysis.

Historians also analyse these books' social, historical and cultural aspects because they preserve the historical memory of a generation, play a significant role in confirming the legitimacy of state authorities, stabilize social relations, and build a system of values and identity. Moreover, textbooks actively build and shape citizens of a particular culture. Textbooks are a vital source for exploring the building of national identity during the formative childhood period. In the contexts of the Yugoslav state the textbooks were the bearers of state ideology and the way through which the educational authorities specified the goals set for the schools.

History and geography textbooks, as well as editions adapted for teaching in the languages of national minorities, were used for the purpose of the analysis. Those textbooks were approved by the Ministry of Education on the proposal of the Chief Educational Council. The textbooks are preserved in libraries in Novi Sad (Library of Matica srpska) and Belgrade (National Library of Serbia, University Library 'Svetozar Marković'), while some of the textbooks are kept in the collections of the Pedagogical Museum in Belgrade. A historiographical analysis or content analysis aims to show that political developments, conditioned primarily by the change in the borders after the end of the First World War, manifested themselves in history and geography textbooks. Emphasis was placed on the contents that the state educational authorities introduced for the achievement of the goals of national education. This is especially evident from the results of the didactic-methodical analysis of textbooks, namely, how this content was presented.
History teaching had the greatest potential for achieving the national education policy.\textsuperscript{96} It was similar in other European countries.\textsuperscript{97} History teaching focused on 'the memory of the golden age', 'the glorious past', 'our brave ancestors', and so on.\textsuperscript{98} The main goal was to strengthen patriotic feelings, which was to be achieved by presenting content filled with pathos and emotion. The Norwegian historian Knut Kjeldstadli called such a historical narrative – the so-called moralizing history, history written in the romantic spirit, highlighting positive examples of personality, events and values that emphasize the importance of one nation – the 'classical theory of history teaching'.\textsuperscript{99}

In the textbooks published in Belgrade during the 1920s history was reduced to national history, primarily the history of the Serbian people, with additional lessons about the past of the two other constituent nations – the Croats and the Slovenes.\textsuperscript{100} Since the common past was part of the narrative which served as a base for the national identity, educational authorities insisted upon the presentations of the parallels and interrelated historical developments of the three constituent nations. The aim was to demonstrate the early origins and long-term continuation of Yugoslavism. For example, the idea of a common state of the South Slavs was dated back to the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{101} The entire past of the Yugoslav people was represented as a struggle against their external enemies (Ottomans, Austria-Hungary) in order to realize the formation of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{102} The struggle was carried out by national heroes, figures from both political and cultural history, such as Saint Sava, King Tomislav, Duke Liudevit, Lazar Hrebeljanović, Saints Cyril and Methodius, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Ljudevit Gaj, Karadorde Petrović, King Petar I Karadordević (ruled 1903–21), King Aleksandar and many others. The unification of 1918 was promoted as the most important event in the national history.\textsuperscript{103} In both history and geography textbooks the First World War was depicted as the final phase in a long-term struggle for the liberation and unification of the Yugoslav people.

The geography textbooks published in the 1920s presented the geography of Serbia along with a description of the attached regions.\textsuperscript{104} Because of its historical heritage as a cultural centre for the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy, in the Yugoslav Kingdom, Vojvodina was regarded as the realization of the idea of an autonomous territory. This concept is also visible in the geography textbooks, some of which stated that, at the end of the First World War, the northern parts of the country 'were once ruled by Hungarians'.\textsuperscript{105} A small number of textbooks say that 'the borders of Serbia were once on the Sava and Danube' and that they were now wider.\textsuperscript{106} In topological descriptions, a part of the 'Pannonian Plain', which became a part of the state after 1918, was called 'Vojvodina Plain'.\textsuperscript{107} The presentation of borderland regions proposed in these textbooks did not differ greatly from the pre-war historical regions. They were either excluded from the textbook narrative, or the textbook refrained from using their previous names. In the presentation of the composition of the population, it was stated that the Serbs were in the majority, even though, according to the census of 1921, the Slavic population was in fact a minority compared to the non-Slavic population.\textsuperscript{108} The geography textbooks did not contain many didactic materials and illustrations; in addition to one or two maps, there were only a few images of the state symbols and pictures of the monarchs.\textsuperscript{109} This was due to the limited budget for printing textbooks and the poor quality of the press. Geography textbooks were diverse in terms of concept, content and didactic material.

During the 1920s, the primary schools for the national minorities were deficient in textbooks, which was a matter discussed among the highest representatives of education,
primarily at the sessions of the Chief Educational Council. The problem was solved by publishing customized translations of the textbooks used in public schools. During the 1920s, textbooks for the children of minorities were published in German, Romanian and Hungarian. Since elementary school in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire lasted for six years, the adapted Serbian textbooks for the fourth grade of primary school were used in the minority schools for three years in the fourth, fifth and sixth grades. These textbooks had notably fewer pages than the original ones. Nevertheless, the text on the same page was written bilingually, meaning that the content of the textbook was reduced to one quarter of the original. In accordance with the concept of writing textbooks at that time, the history textbooks for the minorities provided Serbian history with a very brief overview of the history of Croats and Slovenes. Neighbouring nations were mentioned only in passing. Specific content that would relate to the history of the minorities for whom the textbooks were intended was not provided. Because of the historical circumstances, if their nationalities and countries were in fact mentioned, it was mainly in a negative context. For example, according to textbook narratives, one of the factors that led to the First World War was that ‘Austria-Hungary did not like the fact that Serbian territories expanded [as a result of Balkan wars (1912–13)], so she looked for ways to declare war on her.’ The reason for the conflict was the struggle for freedom and the threat to the state; for example, ‘the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes then saw the opportunity for their liberation’. Still, there were no prejudices in the textbooks that would show a hostile attitude towards other nations. For minorities, texts relying on the historical tradition of their own people could only be found in the readers written in their own language. They were expected to accept the Yugoslav national ideology and patriotism projected in the textbooks. The textbooks adapted for the schools of minorities taught the geography of ‘Vojvodina and Serbia’. They ended with a lecture entitled ‘Citizens’ Duties’, which reminded them, among other things, that the obligation of every citizen of the state is to attend school and be ‘faithful to the state and the crown [ruler]’.

Following the proclamation of King Aleksandar’s dictatorship in 1929, the ideology of a compromised unitary Yugoslavism was replaced by integral Yugoslavism: the concept of a complete state and national unity. A greater integrative role was given to schools and teaching, with this concept, and its concomitant narratives, being presented in history and geography textbooks so that they fully reflected the national ideology. The textbooks composed in this manner were used in schools until the end of the interwar period.

The main concept prevailing in these textbooks was the historical content that points to the closeness, connection and cooperation of the Yugoslavs. These changes could also be recognized at the terminological level; therefore, the Yugoslav name replaced the national names. This historical argumentation of the national state policy was to be incorporated into the consciousness of primary school students. Particular attention was paid to those historical events that were considered to have had a major impact on national history, such as the First Serbian Uprising (1804–13), the Revolution of 1848, the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the First World War, and the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918. Events of European history and relations with neighbouring nations and states were embedded in national history textbooks. In order to adapt the contents of textbooks to the age of the students, the authors also used artistic poetry, folk proverbs, quotations from historical works, and various illustrations. The statements were often in the form of a dialogue, the descriptions were picturesque, metaphorical and with a
dramatic effect. Although it was largely portrayed through the acts of significant historical figures, the personalization of history was limited and more space was devoted to phenomena in social history.\(^{118}\) The focus on the figures from the ruling dynasty, especially King Aleksandar Karadordević, attempted to emphasize the importance of the monarchy and by implication, the Yugoslav Kingdom as a whole. It did not strive to advocate a form of autocratic government. Recent studies on authoritarian style of government in interwar Europe have shown that the Yugoslav dictatorship was 'markedly softer and more traditionalist then many of its western and central European counterparts. It shared the integral nationalist longing for the regeneration and revitalisation of the nation through the collective patriotic action.'\(^{119}\)

Geography textbooks usually began with the presentation of the school, hometown, homeland and neighbouring states, followed by the presentation of the European continent and the world. Within this part, the students were introduced to the basic geographical concepts. Then came a review of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by its regions (banovinas), because the country was 'divided for easier government', according to the textbooks. These textbooks had more illustrative materials.\(^{120}\) A connection with history syllabuses was accomplished in the context of the presentation of 'significant places' of the common state, as well as the birthplaces of 'heroes' and 'authors who wrote books for the people'.\(^{121}\) The geography textbooks localized 'places of memory' that were singled out by the state ideology, and which served to build the new 'Yugoslav' identity: Šumadija, famous for the uprisings that freed the Serbian people from Ottoman rule,\(^{122}\) and Vojvodina, where many victories against Hungarians were won during the Revolution of 1848.\(^{123}\) The geography textbooks ended with a short summary, a review of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in which, apart from the state organization and symbols, pupils were once again reminded of how the common state was formed and of which provinces it consisted.\(^{124}\)

The history and geography textbooks also included annexes relating to the state regulation (Constitution, state symbols - a coat of arms, the flag). By using the Constitution of 1931 as an example, it defined how the state was organized. By listing the most important provisions of the Constitution of 1931, the history textbooks acquired another important function. These annexes provided students with the information about the structure of the state, the role of its citizens and its most important institutions.\(^{125}\) It certainly had a very specific political function which further led to affirmation of the new state and building the new national identity among its citizens. In accordance with this concept, increasing space would be given to the contents related to contemporary history, followed by the history of the Yugoslav state.

Unlike the textbooks published during the previous decade, the new generation of textbooks for the national minorities published in the 1930s did not differ significantly from the textbooks used in state schools, on which these translations were based. They were still bilingual, but their volume was doubled. The concept of Yugoslav unity was consistently implemented.\(^{126}\) Apart from the three constituent peoples, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, there were no significant attempts to include the history and tradition of non-South Slav minorities in the textbook narratives. The presentation of their peoples in the textbooks could lead to further alienation but such a conclusion requires much deeper research into the daily lives of the minorities.

Emphasizing that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were one nation with three names, also called the Yugoslavs, the textbooks articulated the principle of national self-
determination on which the Yugoslav state was created. By emphasizing the values of equality and freedom of all citizens of the new state, they affirmed the liberal principles on which the Yugoslav state was built. As the newly formed state was multi-confessional, the religious freedom and tolerance advocated by the textbook narratives were of particular importance. National minorities were considered to be citizens of the Yugoslav Kingdom and their education did not differ. They learnt about the neighbouring countries only in addition to the national curriculum.

Conclusion

When considering the case of interwar Vojvodina, one can observe how the shifting of identity affects various aspects of the lives of the local inhabitants. In order to gain a stronger position in the politics of the borderlands, the new government initiated ‘nationalization’ processes, which in this case are emphasized in all their complexity, because the population of Vojvodina was diverse in its ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural composition. It was believed that a more homogeneous population within the borders of the new state would be most effectively achieved by disseminating the state ideology. Prioritizing the cultural unification of society over the other (dis)integrative political, economic and religious factors, Yugoslavism failed to provide a cohesive society. Nevertheless, the school system played a crucial role in the attempt to realize a homogeneous nation-state, according to the prevailing opinion of that time that the proper education of new generations of children would lead to the production of nationally aware citizens in the near future.

A historiographical analysis of the textbooks demonstrates how the state authorities put their aims of national education into practice. Fully aligned with the state and national ideology, these textbook narratives reveal how the idea of a nation was constructed among schoolchildren. It points out that history and geography teaching not only had great potential for achieving the goals of national integration, but also in reshaping the cultural experience of children.

Notes

1. Dimić, Srbija u Jugoslaviji, 9, 32–4, 35.
2. Ibid., 48, 63; Bjelica, Politički razvoj Novog Sada, 57–68.
3. Srem was included indirectly, along with the territory which was under the control of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb. Dimić, Srbija u Jugoslaviji, 21, 25–7, 31–2. See also: Bjelica, Oslobodjenje Novog Sada 1918. godine.
8. Dimić, Srbija u Jugoslaviji, 39–44.
15. Ibid. See also: Njegov, Prisajedinjenje Štromova, Banata, Bačke i Baranje Srbiji 1918.
25. Ibid., 71–9, 110–16; Šnaper, Zajednica građana, 107; and Asman, Rad na nacionalnom pamćenju, 43–4.
26. Tröhler and Lenz, Between the National and Global, 6.
27. Ibid.
29. Dimić, Škola i crkva; Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation.
31. Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation, 5.
32. Ibid., 67–127.
34. This was the case in other European countries such as Poland. Venken, “Narrating the Time of Troubles.”
35. Ibid.; Dimić, Škola i crkva, 143.
36. History and literature were seen as key disciplines in the process of creating national myths. See also: Weber, Peasants Into Frenchmen.
37. Dimić, Škola i crkva, 117–18.
38. Ognjanović, Novosadske narodne osnovne škole, 19–42.
40. Ibid., 275.
42. AV, MP, BBB, 42/1919.
44. Zbornik zakona i vaznijih raspisa, odluka i naredaba odeljenja za osnovnu nastavu, 271–4.
46. AV, MP, BBB, Naredba br. 945, 11. III 1919.
47. Ibid.
48. It was just the official name of the language. In daily practice Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian were distinct languages. Slovenian was employed and taught in Slovenia. In other regions pupils learned Serbo-Croatian.
49. AV, MP, BBB, Naredba br. 945, 11. III 1919.
50. See also: Blagojević, Opšti zemljiopis za najstarije razrede narodne škole; Terzin, Zemljiopis za srpske pravoslavne veroispovedne osnovne škole; and Tonić, Zemljiopis opis Ugarske u pitanjima i odgovorima.
51. Šajić, Madari u Vojvodini, 94.
52. Zbornik zakona i važnijih raspisa, odluka i naredaba odeljenja za osnovnu nastavu, 279–80.
53. Ibid., 275.
Political and cultural elites differed in interpreting and defining Yugoslav national unity, especially the relationship between the Yugoslav and other levels of collective identities: Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian. Troch, *Nationalism and Yugoslavia*, 17–42.


64. Zbornik zakona i važnijih raspisa, odluka i naredaba odeljenja za osnovnu nastavu, 267.

65. Ibid., 123–4.

66. Ibid., 122–3.

67. Ibid., 267.

68. Ibid., 268, 271–4.

69. Ibid., 279–80.

70. Dimić, *Škola i crkva*, 120–1.

71. “Nastavni plan za I, II, III i IV razred osnovnih škola,” 266.

72. Privremeni nastavni program za I., II., III. i IV. razred osnovnih škola.

73. Zakon o narodnim školama, 7–10.

74. Dimić, *Politika i stvaralaštvo*, 130.

75. Zakon o narodnim školama, 109.


77. Zbornik zakona i važnijih raspisa, odluka i naredaba odeljenja za osnovnu nastavu, 279–80.


80. Ibid.


83. Ibid., 14.

84. Pingel, *UNESCO Guidebook*, 10–11; See also: Venken, “Narrating the Time of Troubles.”


87. Ibid., 86–8.

88. Ibid., 88.

89. AV, 81, 21261/1920.

90. Ibid., 81, 16256/1920.


96. See also: Ćelstali, *Prošlost nije više što je nekad bila*.

97. Venken, “Narrating the Time of Troubles.”


100. Ilić, *Narodna istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za III razred*; Jović, *Narodna istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za učenike III razreda; Srpska istorija sa kratkom istorijom Hrvata i*
Slovenaca za IV razred; Stanojević, Narodna istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za IV. razred; Rabrenović, Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za III razred; and Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za dake IV razreda.


102. Jović, Narodna istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za učenike III razreda, 49–60; Srpska istorija sa kratkom istorijom Hrvata i Slovenaca za IV razred, 72–5, 111; Jović, Srpska istorija za IV razred osnovne škole, 57–9, 65–95, 111–17; and Stanojević, Narodna istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za IV. razred, 65–88.


104. Sokolović, Zemljopis Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za IV razred, 40–8; Stanojević, Zemljopis Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za IV razred, 29–50.


106. Disalović, Zemljopis za IV., V. i VI. r. mađarske osnovne škole, 8.

107. Ibid., 17.

108. Disalović, Zemljopis za IV., V. i VI. r. mađarske osnovne škole, 2, 8, 16.

109. Ibid., 37.


111. Rabrenović, Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za dake IV, V i VI razreda sa mađarskim nastavnim jezikom; Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za dake IV, V i VI razreda sa nemačkim nastavnim jezikom; and Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za dake IV, V i VI razreda sa rumunskim nastavnim jezikom.

112. Rabrenović, Istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za dake IV, V i VI razreda sa mađarskim nastavnim jezikom, 53.

113. Stanojević, Istorija srpskoga naroda sa pregledom hrvatske i slovenačke istorije, 56.

114. Rabrenović, Zemljopis Vojvodine i Srbije za dake III razreda.

115. Disalović, Zemljopis za IV., V. i VI. r. mađarske osnovne škole, 60–1.


117. Vujanac, Istorija za IV razred.

118. Marković and Marković, Istorija Jugoslovena za III razred; Dragović and Pavičević, Istorija Jugoslovena za IV razred; Matović, Istorija Jugoslovena za III razred; Josimović and Malezanović, Istorija za III razred; Stefanović, Istorija za IV razred; Đorđević and Stranjaković, Istorija za III razred; Rakočević and Lazarević, Istorija Jugoslovena za III razred; Đorđević and Lazarević, Istorija Jugoslovena za III razred; and Ilić, Istorija Jugoslovena (Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca) za III razred, 32, 44, 49, 52.


120. Ivanović, Zemljopis za III razred; Zemljopis za IV razred; Popović, Zemljopis Kraljevine Jugoslavije za treći razred; and Popović, Zemljopis Kraljevine Jugoslavije za učenike-ce IV razreda.

121. Ivković, Zemljopis sa atlasom Kraljevine Jugoslavije po banovinama za učenike IV. razreda, 16–17; Rabrenović and Simić, Zemljopis Kraljevine Jugoslavije sa zasebnim besplatnim atlasom po najnovijoj upravnoj podeli na banovine za učenike-ce IV razreda, 10–11.

122. Ivković, Zemljopis sa atlasom Kraljevine Jugoslavije po banovinama za učenike IV. razreda, 25; Zemljopis sa atlasom Dunavske, Drinske, Moravske, Vardarske i Zetske banovine za
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Bohemia by the sea: establishing a Czechoslovak port in Hamburg in the interwar period
Sarah Lemmen

ABSTRACT
After the First World War, the newly founded Czechoslovak Republic received the right to lease property at the German ports of Hamburg and Stettin, as guaranteed by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. However, the form, location and legal provisions of these properties were left to be negotiated at a later date. It took 10 years of legal and strategic deliberations before areas at the Hamburg free port were finally leased to the Czechoslovak Republic in 1929 for a period of 99 years. By focusing on the negotiation process for a Czechoslovak port zone in Hamburg, this article traces issues of territoriality, most especially the debates on the cession of sovereign rights in the context of the dominant geopolitical order of nation-states in the interwar period.

'Bohemia. A desert country near the sea.'
—William Shakespeare, The Winter's Tale (1623)

1. Introduction
In a sense, Bohemia was indeed by the sea. In the aftermath of the First World War, the newly founded Czechoslovak Republic received the right to lease property at the German ports of Hamburg and Stettin, as established in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The treaty, however, left essential aspects open for further negotiations. It took 10 years of legal and strategic deliberations before an area at the Hamburg free port was finally leased to the Czechoslovak Republic in 1929 for a period of 99 years, while what became known as the ‘Czechoslovak zone at the port of Stettin’ would come into existence after the Second World War. With this, the status of Hamburg was confirmed as a central hub for Czechoslovak world trade for decades to come: the contract was upheld during the Second World War, during the British Occupation of Hamburg in the post-war years, and even throughout the Cold War that threatened to cut off Hamburg from its East German and Eastern European hinterland along the Elbe and Oder rivers. It is still in effect today.
This article focuses on the negotiations and eventual realization of the Czechoslovak port zone in Hamburg during the interwar period. For 10 years, elected representatives, legal experts, economists and administrative personnel of the Czechoslovak Republic, Germany and the city of Hamburg discussed various locations and economic strategies for the port. Yet throughout all those negotiations, the most contested aspect of the Czechoslovak zone in Hamburg was not of a financial or economic nature (such as the cost of the lease or the extent of capacity utilization, which was of great importance for efficient turnover in the limited area of ports), but was related to questions of territoriality: throughout the negotiations, the legal form of the port zone remained the most controversial issue and with it, questions of territorial sovereignty and the cession of individual sovereign rights. Various concepts were discussed with all their benefits and challenges, ranging from Czechoslovak extraterritoriality to a private lease term, while comparable cases were consulted, ranging from colonial settlements to international trading posts.

These negotiations were conducted under the premise of the exclusivity of the concept of nation-states characteristic of the age. Based on President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', large parts of Central Europe had been reorganized along national criteria, creating sovereign entities that were with more or less substance considered nation-states. However, far from being a 'natural' given, many national borders remained contested even during the postwar era. Some borderlines were determined by a plebiscite, such as the German–Polish border in Upper Silesia or those regions that were to remain territorially German in East Prussia. Other than national criteria, some decisions on the course of national borders were based on politico-economic reasons: the 'Polish Corridor', as implemented in the Treaty of Versailles, was established to assure the newly founded Polish Republic 'a free and secure access to the sea', as President Wilson had demanded in his 'Fourteen Points'. Other territorial decisions did not fully adhere to the concept of nation-states either. Danzig became a 'free city' under the protection of the League of Nations and largely independent from both Germany and Poland. Further to the south, the city of Fiume and its hinterland was declared a free state, which existed from 1920–24 under the protection of the League of Nations and independently from both Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The internationalization of rivers – of parts of the Elbe and Vltava, the Oder and the Danube, among others – was another form of territorialization that did not subscribe to the concept of the sovereignty of the nation-state.

This post-war territorial reorganization of Central Europe provided the context for territorial negotiations concerning the Czechoslovak port in Hamburg (and – to a lesser extent – Stettin), which oscillated between national sovereignty as the highest territorial principle and the internationally recognized Czechoslovak right to unhindered access to the sea for economic purposes. In this case, the discussions of the spatial and territorial dimensions of the Czechoslovak port-to-be from the late 1910s to the late 1920s, and even continuing after its establishment in 1929, not only convey the importance given to spatial and territorial questions at the time, but also serve as an example of the broad range of interpretation of what constituted a sovereign territory.

2. Negotiating the Peace Treaty of Versailles

At the time the peace talks began in Paris in early 1919, the Czechoslovak Republic was only a couple of months old. Since its founding on 28 October 1918, the republic had
quickly gained international benevolence and respect. The president, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, and the foreign minister, Edvard Beneš, who would lead the country for decades to come, were internationally acclaimed politicians who had both built their reputations abroad in negotiations during the war; the latter would secure the international renown of Czechoslovakia with his ambitious work at the League of Nations. This positive international reputation, together with very favourable initial economic, geographical and political positions, allowed for great success during the Paris Peace Conference. In addition to advantageous territorial decisions, the Treaty of Versailles granted Czechoslovakia – as a landlocked Central European country – access to the sea on two accounts. Article 363 of the Treaty stated:

In the ports of Hamburg and Stettin Germany shall lease to the Czechoslovak State, for a period of 99 years, areas which shall be placed under the general régime of free zones and shall be used for the direct transit of goods coming from or going to that State.

This clause was unique and granted to no other beneficiary but the Czechoslovak Republic. At the same time, it was also very imprecise. The treaty left most aspects for later consideration, as explicitly stated in paragraph 364:

The delimitation of these areas, and their equipment, their exploitation, and in general all conditions for their utilization, including the amount of the rental, shall be decided by a Commission consisting of one delegate of Germany, one delegate of the Czechoslovak State and one delegate of Great Britain. These conditions shall be susceptible of revision every ten years in the same manner.

This article 364 ended with a note that stressed the new post-war hierarchy, stating: ‘Germany declares in advance that she will adhere to the decision so taken.’

These articles, part of section II (‘Navigation’), chapter V (‘Clauses giving to the Czechoslovak state the use of northern ports’), were to trigger an argument between Germany and the Czechoslovak Republic on the location, layout, infrastructure and concrete provisions of the port zone. The main issue of dispute, however, remained throughout all 10 years of negotiations the interpretations of the legal form of what in Czech was sometimes termed ‘Československé svobodné pásmo v hamburském přístavu’ (‘the Czechoslovak free zone at the Port of Hamburg’) and sometimes simply (and disputed by German representatives) ‘Československý přístav v Hamburku’ (‘the Czechoslovak port in Hamburg’).

3. What was at stake? Czechoslovak hopes and aims for a Free Zone in Hamburg

As a highly industrialized country, the Czechoslovak Republic was dependent on its trade and export and was therefore reliant on open access to the sea. In geographical terms, the republic had viable connections to three large ports, all situated on different seas: to Hamburg and the North Sea along the Elbe; to Stettin and the Baltic Sea along the Oder; and to Trieste – the port of choice of the former Habsburg Empire – and the Mediterranean by rail. Already before the First World War, the Czech lands with their strongly export-oriented industries had preferred Hamburg as the geographically more accessible port by a ratio of three to one over Trieste, although their exports to
Trieste nonetheless made up almost a third of goods from all Habsburg regions to this main port of the monarchy. After the war, the newly minted Czechoslovak Republic seemed to adhere belatedly to Habsburg traditions, as the port of Trieste was briefly favoured over its strong competitor Hamburg. This was further strengthened by the important role of Trieste during the complicated operation of bringing the tens of thousands of Czechoslovak legionnaires home from the East of Russia in 1920. But generally easy access, shorter transport time and lower cost would all speak for Hamburg so that the route via Trieste eventually lost its primacy to Hamburg.

From a Czechoslovak perspective, the port zone in Hamburg was of importance for various reasons. First, it was deemed to be of economic importance, as Hamburg was soon considered the major ‘gate to the world’ for the land-locked country, directly connected by the river Elbe. Second, it was a political project seeking to raise international prestige. And third, it became an object of legal contention, as the Czechoslovak representatives laid a legal claim to sovereign rights for the founding of this Czechoslovak port. This claim became the largest stumbling block during negotiations and contributed strongly to the deferral of the treaty’s execution.

The first years of the new post-war order were dominated by an internal debate among various Czechoslovak officials about the shape and form of the port zone in Hamburg and the practical implications of implementing the Treaty of Versailles. Some voices argued with an eye on financial issues, questioning whether a Czechoslovak port in Hamburg would be able to financially sustain itself, especially if plans for a Czechoslovak ocean company did not materialize. Others argued for the implementation of a Czechoslovak port regardless of its financial costs, as a territory at the port of Hamburg would symbolize the final step towards independence from controlled transit of goods through Germany to and from locations overseas. This measure was also seen as a necessary precaution to prevent a future Germany with regained political and economic strength from implementing obstacles to the transit of Czechoslovak products in competition with German goods.

These debates not only encompassed the issue of whether the port zone should be claimed at all, but also what the Treaty actually entailed. Some referred to other port zone leases - such as in China - and asserted that a lease for 99 years was a ‘shrouded cession of land’ (‘zahalená cese území’) which by definition would entail the transfer of all or certain sovereign rights. Others argued that the Peace Treaty referred only to a private-law lease without any cession of sovereign rights.

After the founding of the Czechoslovak consulate general in Hamburg in June 1920, much of the deliberations and negotiations regarding the port took place there. The first consul general in Hamburg, Hugo Vavrečka, an expert in maritime matters, was also appointed commissioner for the Czechoslovak free port zones in Hamburg and Stettin. He energetically supported the building of Czechoslovak port zones, as he considered them to be very important - albeit more from a legal than a transport perspective. He therefore aimed to resolve all legal issues before even starting to debate any practical aspects such as the exact location of the port or the cost of the lease. At the same time, he was hesitant to support the construction of the port unconditionally and warned that initiating the port zone without first estimating possible costs and actual needs, and without founding national shipping companies to guarantee a steady flow of goods through Hamburg, would only lead to ‘damage to economic and political prestige’. Such a move, Vavrečka
warned, might be seen abroad as simple ‘flag patriotism’ and as a useless endeavou‘defying serious economic principles’. This argument for avoiding any rushed decisions was disputed by other government officials such as Antonín Hobza, a lawyer who briefly served as head of the legal section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the first years of the republic. In this function, Hobza argued from a legal standpoint for a quick implementation of the Peace Treaty articles even if it entailed an economic disadvantage, as he worried that if this opportunity granted by the Treaty were neglected in the early years, it might ‘become inaccessible for us later on’.

In the following years, both economic and legal arguments were put aside as negotiations began to concentrate on concrete port locations and their infrastructure. Other prerequisites at the port were discussed and determined only in the following years: the demand for a basin for ocean shipping, which had been deemed essential during early negotiations to ensure the profitability of the port zone, was finally ceded after a survey among Czechoslovak companies in 1925 ascertained that the private sector had neither the demand nor the necessary means to fund a Czechoslovak ocean shipping company. This realization considerably diminished the demands and expectations concerning the port’s size, location and productivity, but it did not affect its economic or political importance per se. The focus now lay on the acquisition of a basin for river barges, which connected Czechoslovakia with Hamburg along the Elbe River.

4. Czechoslovak–German negotiations during the mid-1920s

Czechoslovak–German negotiations picked up in earnest in the mid-1920s. The main issues remained the exact location of the Czechoslovak port zone and, surprisingly independent of that discussion, its legal form. These two issues were in discussion throughout most of the 1920s, and both the German and the Czechoslovak delegations employed legal experts on these topics to argue for a suitable outcome.

Regarding the legal form of the contract, the Czechoslovak delegation argued for the complete or at least partial transfer of sovereign rights, while Germany was adamantly opposed to ceding any rights at all. This issue came to the fore in June 1925, when the Czechoslovak government produced a memorandum on the ‘Design of the Czechoslovak Ports in Hamburg and Stettin’. The document’s main argument stressed that the lease contract as mentioned in article 363 of the Treaty of Versailles was international in nature and therefore would have to be considered under public law rather than private law. Such an international lease contract, it was argued, implicitly included the transfer of all or at least some sovereign rights to the tenant. Regarding the transfer of sovereign rights to the port zone, the Czechoslovak memorandum called for the deployment of Czechoslovak officials to the port, the use of Czech as the official language, and the establishment of Czechoslovak air and rail traffic. Furthermore, independent postal, telegraph and telephone services were demanded as well as the integration of the leased object into Czechoslovak customs territory.

This standpoint met with strong resistance in both official and unofficial form from the German delegation, especially after it had been publicly discussed and vocally expressed in Czechoslovak newspapers, which portrayed the question of full sovereign rights at the port as a matter of national concern. The German delegation countered with an official response in October 1925 in the form of a ‘Memorandum of the German
Government on the Legal Nature of the Lease of Land at the Ports of Hamburg and Stettin to Czechoslovakia as Required by Article 363 of the Treaty of Versailles (in Response to the Czechoslovak Memorandum of June 1925). This document, with its accurate but somewhat verbose title, strongly repudiated the idea of the transfer of sovereign rights and refused to see any argument for it in the Treaty of Versailles. The first counterargument was a legal case: the German document refuted the understanding of international law as pronounced in the Czechoslovak memorandum and rejected the idea that a contract between two states would necessarily be connected to the transfer of sovereign rights. Rather, following the German logic, the treaty may well also have referred to the transfer of legal powers in the realm of private law. This memorandum was not limited to discussion of the nature of international law on an abstract level, but also offered concrete examples of international contracts and their wide range of rules of sovereignty. For instance, while the Chinese–German lease-contract of Kiautschou Bay or the Russian–Chinese lease-contract of Port Arthur (both of 1898) did indeed include a transfer of sovereignty, other examples did not entail any transfer of sovereign rights, such as the English–French contract concerning the spheres of interest east of the Niger, also of 1898, or the English–Italian contract of 1905 concerning the lease of land to Italy by the British East Africa Protectorate. The memorandum presumed that the circumstances most similar to the projected Czechoslovak port zone were those governed by the Greek–Serbian contract of 1914 concerning the Serbian lease of a port zone in Thessaloniki, which did not include the transfer of any sovereign rights either. It went on to argue that these latter examples were all contracts specifically for economic purposes and were performed on a private-lease basis. In these cases, the memorandum stressed, the shifting of sovereign rights to the tenant was not even considered. Therefore, in contrast to the Czechoslovak argument that focused on the international nature of the contract as the deciding factor for legal interpretation, the German argument insisted on the underlying purpose as the sole determinant of its legal character. For Germany, the purely economic purpose, defined in the Treaty of Versailles as granting Czechoslovakia the direct transfer of its goods, defined the contract as a private lease with no transfer of rights, concluding that there can be no doubt that Germany holds the sovereignty at the free zones of the port. This argument stated explicitly that 'not only private law and criminal law, but the entire legislation of the German Empire' had to be implemented at the entirety of the port and that 'not only the German judiciary and police, but also all other government agencies shall retain their jurisdiction'.

To support their respective legal claims, both sides drew on legal expertise. In support of the Czechoslovak argument, Antonín Hobza wrote an assessment of the German memorandum in December 1925 in which he supported the Czechoslovak argument about 'an international lease clearly under public law, which per se involves sovereign rights for the tenant'. Based on this argument, Hobza expected the transfer to Czechoslovakia of at least some sovereign rights which – in his assessment – were necessary for the independent administration of a port zone, such as postal, telegraph and telephone services or a customs office. As a concession, the Czechoslovak tenant would agree to uphold German civil and criminal law as well as the authority of the German judiciary and police. To back up the German claims, on the other hand, a legal appraisal was obtained by the Institute of Foreign Affairs in Hamburg and published in the September of 1925. Extending to no fewer than 26 pages and drawing on contracts
from the 1890s onwards, this legal study concluded that the wording of the Treaty of Versailles allowed solely for the right to a lease contract under private law and thus without any transfer of sovereign rights.\textsuperscript{26} Both arguments were integrated into the respective delegations' negotiation strategies.

In 1926, seven years after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the basic legal dispute of the Czechoslovak zone of the free port of Hamburg remained unsolved. However, negotiations went on. The German representatives were eager to find a solution, as Germany was bound by the Treaty of Versailles, and a failure of these binational negotiations might have resulted in a decision by an international commission in which the German delegation feared it would have little say. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, was willing to compromise, since it realized that in the long run, as Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš put it in 1926, receiving less than expected but in an amicable relationship with Germany would be more profitable for the port zone than receiving more without German consent.\textsuperscript{27} To an extent, then, both sides tried to accommodate each other's wishes, hoping for good relations between the two countries. This mirrored the existing relationship between the two countries. While Czechoslovakia arguably held the upper hand in regard to the legal base of the negotiations, at the same time it was economically dependent on good relations with its neighbour to the West as its by far most important trading partner, with Germany being responsible for up to 40% of all of Czechoslovak imports in the interwar period.\textsuperscript{28} However, the main stumbling block still remained the question of sovereign rights, as the German representatives were worried about the creation of a 'state inside the state'. This – as a German representative was quoted – would feel like 'a thorn in one's side, and it would always feel that way until it was removed'.\textsuperscript{29}

Once more, proposals and counterproposals were exchanged. The Czechoslovak delegation insisted on officially naming the port zones the 'Czechoslovak port in Hamburg/in Stettin', and argued again that:

The lease of parts of the ports in Hamburg and Stettin based on article 363 of Versailles is an international lease and therefore purely a matter of public law, strictly to be separated from private law. [...] An international lease always includes the transfer of the exercise of all or single sovereign rights to the acquiring state (tenant).

In order to find a compromise, the representatives from Prague offered the concession that the 'Czechoslovak government refrains from demanding the cession of parts of the ports in Hamburg and Stettin. But due to practical needs, it is essential under every circumstance that certain sovereign rights be conceded to the Czechoslovak Republic.' Among these rights, the Czechoslovak side claimed for itself the implementation of 'port facilities necessary for river, rail and air transport', the installation of independent postal telegraph and telephone offices, and an independent customs regime inside those ports.\textsuperscript{31} At the same time, Prague guaranteed that these laws were 'not an integral part of the Czechoslovak Republic and Czechoslovak law would not be effective in these areas'.\textsuperscript{32}

This was the official notion. In a strictly confidential letter, the German envoy Arthur Seeliger reported back to Berlin concerning talks with Kamil Krofta, head of the Czechoslovak delegation and representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

T[...].he Czechoslovak government will pro forma maintain its standpoint regarding the granting of sovereign rights – if only not to alienate [the more radical and quite public
DEBORDERING AND REBORDERING

figures] Hobza, [member of the Ministry of Trade Václav] Partl and their supporters – but this will happen in a way that will not hinder our negotiations about the practical proposals in any way. Krofta suggested that the discussion on the principle would eventually be dropped and agreement would be found in [another] area.33

However, as late as 1928, the question of territorial sovereignty remained as relevant as ever. In January of that year, the German local newspaper *Hamburger Anzeiger* published an article on the on-going negotiations and asked in a subheading: '[Will there be] Czech sovereign rights or not?’, when reporting on a meeting of both national delegations in Berlin, who were working ‘day in, day out from morning to night’ to solve the territorial dispute. Yet this meeting remained equally unsuccessful. The reason for this stalemate, the newspaper concluded, was once again the issue of sovereignty and the cession of sovereign rights:

The Czechs believe they can lay claims to sovereign rights from the Treaty of Versailles for the free zone in Hamburg. By contrast, the German government unanimously and resolutely argues its standpoint that there are no Czech [!] sovereign rights to speak of.

Nine years after the end of the war, the article went to lengths to cite both relevant articles 363 and 364 of the Treaty of Versailles verbatim as proof for the following argument:

Neither meaning nor wording enable Czechs to draw claims for sovereignty in the zone that they will lease. During the most recent negotiations, they were not to be convinced. Both sides will continue their efforts to solve this controversial issue around which the entire problem of the free zone revolves.34

Behind the scenes, however, things started to move. Relating to the same work meeting in Berlin, a confidential report of the German news agency *Telegraphen-Union*, entitled ‘About the Czechoslovak Port Zone’, reported that the Prague-based, German-language newspaper *Prager Presse*, even though loyal to the Czechoslovak government, stated that ‘Czechoslovakia has refrained from demanding any sovereign rights at the port of Hamburg’, which suggested an opening in the lengthy negotiations. However, the *Telegraphen-Union* remained sceptical as to whether such a port would be of any economic advantage to Czechoslovakia. Rather, it suggested, it was solely for reasons of prestige, as ‘for national reasons the government in Prague seems to have an interest in being able to fly the Czechoslovak flag at the port of Hamburg on holidays’.35 For economic or status gains, the talks continued.

5. The successful end of negotiations

Ten months later, the successful conclusion to the negotiations could finally be conveyed to the public.36 At a press conference on 5 November 1928, the German envoy Arthur Seeliger publicly stated that an agreement had been reached and that Czechoslovakia had been granted a lease of land at the port of Hamburg for 99 years. In accordance with Germany’s arguments, the lease contract was concluded under private law, with essentially no transfer of sovereign rights. These plots of land were to allow the direct transit of goods from Czechoslovakia to regions overseas and vice versa. In diplomatic language and possibly to forego any criticism from the German public regarding anything related to what was often termed the ‘shame of Versailles’, Seeliger stressed the economic benefits of the deal not only for Czechoslovakia, but also for Germany.
This press conference, however, consisted of a second part with confidential background information for journalists that imparted a more national viewpoint. Clearly pandering to nationalistic worries and prejudices, Seeliger painted a much darker picture of the dangers that had been averted. He argued that the Treaty of Versailles could have allowed a model based on the German colony of Kiautschou, effectively treating Germany like the country’s own former colony. This might have resulted in a fully fledged ‘Czechoslovak port in Hamburg’, with ‘(Czechoslovak) officials and flying the (Czechoslovak) flag. Such a concept has completely disappeared.’ Thus behind closed doors this outcome of a private lease with no transfer of sovereign rights was considered a ‘small victory’ over the Treaty of Versailles.

The Czechoslovak delegation also largely considered the outcome a success. It is true that the demand for full sovereign rights was eventually rejected, and that the great expectations of the early years of the interwar period, with a basin for ocean-going ships serving a national fleet, did not materialize. However, as the ambitions and needs for a port zone became more moderate during the 1920s, so did the expectations concerning the project’s realization. The delegation had successfully negotiated for the two plots of land that had seemed most favourable for the needs of the Czechoslovak river barges. With the concession that Czechoslovak officials could circumvent German customs by receiving the right to seal the cargo in transit between Prague and Hamburg without having to declare its content, certain sovereign rights were effectively transferred to Czechoslovakia.

6. Realizing the Czechoslovak Free Zone in Hamburg

From its conception, it was almost a decade until the Czechoslovak zone at the free port of Hamburg was eventually founded. The lease contracts were signed in 1929 for two plots of land at the port basins ‘Moldauhafen’ and ‘Saalehafen’, which were equipped with a storehouse and cranes, and provided access to the port rail system. These areas totalled around 30,000 square metres – a fraction of the Port of Hamburg. Both basins were solely for the use of river barges, and wide enough to anchor various boats deep into the basin. These private lease contracts were set for 99 years. To adhere to German terms, the official denomination was eventually termed the ‘Czechoslovak River Zone at the Free Port of Hamburg’ (Československé říční pásma ve svobodném přístavu hamburském), after the German delegation insisted on eliminating the term ‘free zone’ altogether so as not to evoke the impression of a lease under public law. At the same time, a property outside the Hamburg free port was acquired by the Czechoslovak state at the ‘Peutehafen’ basin, mainly for management purposes and the repair of river barges.

In the same year, these port zones were sublet by the Czechoslovak state to the Czechoslovak Elbe shipping company to operate both the river transport and the port. Soon thereafter, the Czechoslovak consul general to Hamburg could state: ‘The first ships have docked at the port.’

7. Further development of the Czechoslovak Free Zone in Hamburg

The Czechoslovak port zone in Hamburg was, overall, deemed an economic success, with Hamburg remaining the central hub for Czechoslovak imports and exports overseas.
However, only shortly after the opening of the Czechoslovak port zone, economic and geopolitical challenges threatened the set-up and the rules of the port that had just been painstakingly negotiated. The Great Depression from 1929 on strongly impacted the quantity of goods and labour at the port of Hamburg, resulting in high unemployment among dockworkers. The political radicalization in Germany and the subsequent political takeover by Adolf Hitler and his national socialist party NSDAP further affected the Czechoslovak port zone in various ways. In territorial terms, the internationalization of rivers as defined by the Paris Peace Treaty (including the Elbe) was opposed by the new regime, and the eventual German revocation of the international status of German rivers in 1936 increased Czechoslovak dependency on Germany and compounded those very fears that had been the trigger for negotiations for an independent Czechoslovak port in Hamburg in the first place.

Just a couple of years later, however, these issues seemed rather trivial. Only a few months after the Munich Agreement in 1938, which embodied the first step towards dismantling the territorial unity of Czechoslovakia, the German invasion and the establishment of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 signified the end of the existence of the Czechoslovak state. Immediately, on 21 March, the consulate general in Hamburg, which until then had held responsibility for the port, was shut down, and the German Reich protector took over the management of the port.

The port zone remained an administrative unit, the lease for which was paid by the headquarters in Prague to Hamburg throughout the war. The end of the war saw Hamburg and its port almost completely destroyed, and the Czechoslovak port zone was no exception. In the entire Port of Hamburg, more than 70% of all warehouses, 90% of all depots, 80% of the cranes and 70% of the railways were destroyed, while 3000 shipwrecks and damaged bridges blocked both the port and the Elbe waterway.

The port had to be rebuilt almost from scratch despite scarce manpower and almost no building material. The end of the war also brought the end of the pre-war world order, and with it came doubts as to whether the lease-contract, based as it was on the Paris Peace Treaty, was still valid. Eventually, however, both sides – the city of Hamburg and the Czechoslovak Republic as signatories – agreed that a continuation would be profitable for all involved. The Hamburg Senate valued economic relations with Czechoslovakia highly, and was reliant on the reconstruction of economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe. It thus issued a statement in 1947 that read: "The Czech free zone in Hamburg was the last link in this chain [of successful economic relations, S.L.] which, far from being a political liability for Germany and Hamburg, had evolved into mutual dependency and trust." Interestingly, even the question of national sovereignty for the Czechoslovak port zone was revitalized, and by way of precaution, Hamburg representatives vehemently opposed it:

It is not yet known if the Czechs will demand a declaration of [their port] zone as their own sovereign territory as they did after the First World War. If necessary, we will have to take a stand against this.

The Czechoslovak representatives, by contrast, worried less about sovereign rights than about practical issues: the only storehouse on the premises had been partly destroyed during the war before it was rendered completely inoperable in 1947 after being struck by lightning. For several years, the main objective remained the repair of port facilities and the revival of port activities to pre-war levels.
In contrast to the difficult initial infrastructure situation, the immediate post-war years proved to be favourable in political terms: the British occupation forces, as the new rulers of Hamburg, were favourably inclined towards new investments by Czechoslovakia, as they had a strong interest in reviving the port as soon as possible. With the 'February coup' initiated by the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia in 1948, however, this preferential treatment came to an end. From then on, it became more difficult to administer the Czechoslovak port zone and sometimes even to access it. During the Cold War, the question of territorial sovereignty was never raised again. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak port zone remained a fixture in the port of Hamburg.

8. Instead of a conclusion: the ambiguity of territorial concepts in the interwar period

With the notion of two port zones in Hamburg and Stettin, the Peace Treaty of Versailles provided the Czechoslovak Republic with direct access to the sea. This was of central importance to the Central European state. It took 10 years of negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Germany for the port zones to be finally realized, during which both sides adjusted their demands and their expectations. The Czechoslovak delegation refrained from its original claims for an ocean basin, while the German delegation eventually agreed to a more central location with general infrastructure already in place.

Throughout the long period of negotiations, the main issue of contention remained the legal question of sovereign rights. During the debates, this issue was conveyed as a matter of national prestige, economic efficiency or administrative practicability. In the end, the German delegation could argue publicly that no sovereign rights had been handed to Prague, while the Czechoslovak delegation was satisfied with the right to circumvent customs control, which allowed unhindered and uncontrolled transit of goods through Germany.

The discussions about sovereignty and sovereign rights throughout the negotiations only rarely touched upon the prospect of full secession of the port from Germany, which would have altered the territorial map of both countries, although the Czechoslovak representatives asserted that it was absolutely within their right to demand it. For the most part, the sovereign rights in question were individual ones and entailed claims for rights to air, rail and river transportation as well as national postal or telephone services, the deployment of Czechoslovak officials at the port, and the implementation of Czech as its official language.

These debates about the Czechoslovak port zone in Hamburg did not question the nation-state as the prevailing concept of territoriality in the interwar period. At the same time, however, they show the flexibility and the permeability of the concept. The concept of the nation-state as a spatial ‘container’ (Peter J. Taylor), with confined borders and full control of the territory within, was renegotiated. This was no isolated case. Other territorial concepts, such as the internationalization of rivers, confirm the same tendency.

Notes

1. The Czechoslovak port in Stettin was of a much shorter existence. After its founding in the post-war years, now with Poland as the new contracting party, the Czechoslovak port zone in Stettin was dissolved again in 1956.
2. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Delivered in Joint Session, January 8, 1918.
3. As stated in Article 331 of the Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919). Regarding the Czechoslovak stance toward the internationalization of these rivers, see Jakubec, Eisenbahn und Elbenschifffahrt, 18–22.


7. Ibid., Article 364.

8. Ibid.


13. Jan Šeba, Memorandum o stavu otázky přístavního zařízení pro československou plavbu k 1. březnu 1923, Hamburg, March 1, 1923. Box 131, fonds IV. Sekce národnospodářská 1918–1939, Archives MZV.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 8.

16. Ibid., 11.

17. On the enquiry, see the archival documentation in box 134, fonds IV. Sekce – národnospodářská 1918–1939, Archives MZV. On discussions about a Czechoslovak ocean shipping company, see Kratčá, A History of the Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping Company, especially 11–18.


19. From the German rebuttal Denkschrift der Deutschen Regierung (1925).

20. See the serial publication by Pártl, "Československá pásma" (1925), 5–6, and in the following issues.


22. Ibid., 2.

23. Ibid., 5.

24. Hobza, Posudek o pamětním spisu německé vlády ze dne 10.X.1925 (November 30, 1925). Box 181, reference no. 58, fonds Ministerstvo veřejných prací, National Archives of the Czech Republic.

25. As summarized in Vojtěch Krbc, Zpráva o stavu jednání o zřízení čsl. přístavních pásmech v Hamburku a Stettině. Přehled dosavadního jednání s německou vládou (February 5, 1928), 5. Box 136, folder 4, fonds IV. Sekce – národnospodářská 1918–1939, Archives MZV.


27. As Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš was cited during a meeting, Zápis o poradě mezinárodního výboru pro svobodná pásma v Hamburku a Stettině (February 2, 1926), 2. Box 136, fonds IV. Sekce – národnospodářská 1918–1939, Archives MZV.


29. Letter from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Berlin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Czechoslovak port zone in Hamburg and Stettin (December 31, 1925), 3. Box 181, fonds Ministerstvo veřejných prací, National Archives of the Czech Republic.

30. Decision of the Commission for the Czechoslovak Ports in Hamburg and Stettin as implemented with Article 364 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles (draft, June 1926), 3. Box 135, folder 1, fonds IV. sekce národnospodářská 1918–1939, Archives MZV.

31. Attachment to the 'Decision': Organization of the Czech ports in Hamburg and Stettin (no date), 2–3. Box 135, folder 1, fonds IV. sekce národnospodářská 1918–1939, Archives MZV.

32. Ibid., 4.


37. Ibid.


42. Geffken, Arbeit und Arbeitskampf im Hafen, 72.


44. Niederschrift über die Sitzung am 12.5.1947, 10 Uhr, betreffend die tschechoslowakische Freizone (May 13, 1947). Reference no. 131-1 II_9759 (Freihafenzone für die Tschechoslowakei), fonds Senatskommission für die Reichs- und auswärtigen Angelegenheiten II, Hamburg State Archives.

45. A detailed look at British rule at the port of Hamburg is provided by Kähler, Zwischen Wirtschaftsförderung und Wirtschaftsbetrieb, 198–234.


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The traitorous national periphery: the legacy of identity politics of imperial Hungary in a new eastern metropolis of Czechoslovakia – Košice/Kassa

Ondrej Ficeri©

ABSTRACT
The city of Košice/Kassa played (and continues to play) a role in the Hungarian national narrative as one of the most prominent places of memory. Nevertheless, over the course of the First World War, Czech and Slovak political elites assumed the Slovak origin of the majority of local inhabitants. Although the Czechoslovak censuses in 1921 and 1930 already accounted for 60% of local inhabitants identifying as ‘Czechoslovaks’, the ethnic praxis of indigenous autochthonous Slovak speakers continuously featured signs of imperial-era assimilationist identity politics. The main objective of this paper is to situate the local Slovak community within phantom geographies of post-First World War East-Central Europe and to explain the centre-periphery position of Košice/Kassa in the national politics of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak political and intellectual elites. It will also answer the key question of whether Trianon transformed the national landscape of the city as was originally assumed and desired by Czechoslovak authorities.

The author concludes that the indifferent attitudes of a majority of local autochthonous Slovak speakers towards the attempts at (Czecho)Slovak nationalization reflects a centuries-long transmitted linguistic-cultural heterogeneity of the local urban milieu, the closeness of the Hungarian border, and a preference for Budapest over Prague and Bratislava. Thus, when speaking about the centre-periphery position of Košice/Kassa, its central position in Hungarian politics and culture made it advantageous for Hungarian national elites to nationalize the ethnic identities of locals and to legitimize claims for a territorial tenure of the city. Pro-Hungarian behavioural patterns and electoral results favouring pro-Hungarian political parties subverted the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak seizure of Košice/Kassa, which was conveniently misused by Hungarian political elites as an argument contributing to the territorial revision of Trianon in 1938.

Introduction
The state ideology of interwar Czechoslovakia was based on two fundamental pillars: liberal democracy and national statehood. To subordinate the political and societal
organization of this successor state to these principles was not an easy task, as Czechoslovakia to a large extent inherited its ethnic heterogeneity, hierarchical institutional framework and homogenization practices from its predecessor - the Austro-Hungarian Empire.\(^1\)

To vindicate the constitutionally anchored dominance of the 'Czechoslovak nation', the state authorities implemented a series of institutional measures with the aim of numerically reducing the statistical figures of domestic ethnic minorities, especially German, Hungarian and Polish ones.\(^2\) Although the implementation of Jewish, Gypsy and Silesian nationalities as classification categories in the Czechoslovak censuses formally helped to reinforce 'Czechoslovakness' in several peripheral and ethnically heterogeneous regions and cities, everyday ethnic praxis and social actions of domiciles - such as voting behaviour - indicated a persistence of previously developed historical spaces, visibly demarcated by non-existent phantom borders.\(^3\) Within these spaces, local autochthonous inhabitants regardless of their ethnicity reproduced behavioural patterns which were often antagonistic to the national mobilization of the dominant ruling majority populace.

In this paper I use the term ethnic identity in accordance with the constructivist definition given by Kanchan Chandra, who defines it as a cluster of individuals in which descent-based attributes are necessary to determine eligibility for membership. These attributes are acquired through either genetic (e.g. skin colour) or cultural inheritance (e.g. the names, languages, places of birth and origin of one's parents and ancestors). Some of the latter attributes can change over time, whereby their visible possession can assign a person to a different ethnic category.\(^4\) When an individual eligible for membership in a certain ethnic group is simultaneously a holder of attributes which qualify her/him for membership in a rival ethnic identity, she/he may manifest behavioural patterns in different socio-spatial contexts that challenge a canonized version of the respective nationalisms. In scholarship, such a phenomenon is subsumed under the umbrella of the wider concept of national indifference, which refers in general to the situational nature and circumstantial contingencies of any ethnic/national identification.\(^5\) Moreover, in ethnically heterogeneous environments, where territorially overlapping nationalizing projects 'fought' for their members, ethnic identities mutated to hybrid forms, which typically combined some attributes of rival ethnic identities and offered people a chance to not confine themselves to one fixed category, or to any at all.\(^6\) Owing to an on-going discussion on the precise conceptualization of 'national indifference', Gábor Egry recently suggested using the concept of everyday ethnicity instead, which he believes more adequately facilitates the operationalization of ethnicity as a performed social construction, rather than as an inherent and stable category.\(^7\)

In scholarship, there are very well known case studies mapping a prevailing pro-German electoral geography on the territory of the Silesian Voivodeship (a part of Upper Silesia annexed by Poland in 1920), where Polish authorities otherwise reckoned a majority of inhabitants identified as being of Polish or Silesian nationality; or on the territory of Czech Silesia, where Czechoslovak authorities otherwise reckoned a majority of inhabitants identified in censuses as being of Czechoslovak or Silesian nationality.\(^8\) Less known is the case of the region of eastern Slovakia, and more specifically its regional capital Košice/Kassa, which before the First World War belonged to Hungary and in the
post-imperial era featured a similar ‘phantom effect’ regarding pro-Hungarian sentiments and its autochthonous Slovak-speaking populace.

The present-day second largest city of Slovakia, Košice/Kassa,9 is situated in the eastern part of the Slovak Republic. Its distance from Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, is 410 km, whereas from Budapest, the capital of Hungary, it is 260 km with more convenient transport connections. Since the Middle Ages, Košice/Kassa lay on a language frontier between territories populated prevalently by Slovak-speakers to the north and Hungarian-speakers to the south of the city. As such, Košice/Kassa turned into a ‘melting pot’, mixing these two local dominant ethnic identities within the linguistically and culturally heterogeneous urban milieu – a feature typical for any major city in the Central European area.10 With Hungary (within the Habsburg Empire) losing the First World War, the previously non-existent territorialization of the Slovak-Hungarian ethnic contact zone left the city 19 km north of the Trianon border (Figure 1). Consequently, its re-annexation with Hungary in 1938 made it for a period of six years a city on the border with the Nazi puppet state of Slovakia (1939–45).

Observing the census data throughout the first half of the twentieth century (1918, annexation by Czechoslovakia →1938, re-annexation by Hungary →1945, re-annexation by Czechoslovakia) and noticing striking switches of ethnic identification (Table 1), one assumes that both national elites12 were successful in nationalizing the ethnic identities of the locals; thus, the main question remains: why? Both Slovak13 and Hungarian14 social scientists have interpreted this phenomenon in line with the state’s nation-defending strategy, blaming national elites of the other state for constrained nationalization of the local ethnic landscape to legitimize their territorial claims. The scholarly dispute, lasting since the late 1930s, has not brought about any fruitful

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Figure 1. Geopolitical location of Košice/Kassa within the Hungarian Kingdom and the Czechoslovak Republic (the simple dashed line is the Trianon border). Source: Vývoj státu Československého. Author Jan Hocke, Státní nakladatelství v Praze, 1922. A school map. Author of the picture: Ondrej Ficeri. The map is more than 90 years old. Licence: all rights waived.
**Table 1.** The most populous ethnic groups in Košice/Kassa according to censuses (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Slovaks</th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>46.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1880</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>59.7(^a)</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>60.2(^a)</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>15.0(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>93.5</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^a\) Data for 1921 and 1930 also include the category of Czech nationality; \(^b\) Data based on religion, not ethnicity/nationality.

outcomes as it failed to explain two questions. Firstly, why did such striking ethno-identification switches not occur in other cities located in the south-Slovakian borderland if assimilation constraints of respective national regimes were applied everywhere analogously? Secondly, why in the interwar period did numerous cohorts of Košice/Kassa’s inhabitants, who identified in censuses as Slovaks, feature continuous identitarian practices, connections and networks persisting from the imperial era and, as a consequence, vote for the pro-Hungarian revisionist Provincial Christian-Socialist Party.

The thesis about the supremacy of ethnic Hungarians in Košice/Kassa, based on electoral results, has been reproduced by Hungarian social scientists until today. And yet, in Slovak historical culture, it has not been sufficiently reflected upon that a considerable number of individuals who could have been classified for membership in an imagined Slovak national community remained indifferent to the Slovak national ideology. It was German historian Frank Henschel who in his 2017 work entitled *The Fluid of the City* pointed out that the majority of Košice/Kassa’s locals developed a hybrid form of identification when formally accepting the imperial identitarian concept of a united ‘Hungarian political nation’, while in their everyday lives preserving their non-Hungarian descent-based attributes, such as a Slovak name, language, cultural habits and so on, as these were not mutually exclusive.

Yet again, it was mainly non-Slovak historians who in the last two decades produced significant works dealing with civic activism among the Slovak-speaking populace, who supported the emerging Czechoslovakia in 1918—19. Their main outcome accentuates that many Slovak-speakers – especially those inhabiting ethnically mixed borderlands and peripheral regions – did not welcome the annexation to Czechoslovakia, but rather desired to remain citizens of the historical Hungary, which has recently been acknowledged by influential Slovak historians as well. Thus, the ethnocentric interpretational framework of the Slovak (as well as the Czech) national narrative, mythically depicting the inception of Czechoslovakia as a national liberation, has been challenged; however, detailed case studies analysing the transformation of ethnic identities in relation to post-war nation-building in specific localities, which would situate local Slovak communities within phantom geographies of East-Central Europe, have not yet been published.

Adhering to the theoretical framework and conceptual contributions of border studies, especially its anthropological branch, the main objective of this paper is to answer these questions: (1) what structural factors, such as the geopolitical location of the city, closeness of the state border, cultural heritage and common religious, cultural and linguistic past, contributed to the continuous affinity of Košice/Kassa’s indigenous
Slovak-speakers with the Hungarian state and culture; (2) which prevailing and persisting discourses and practices hindered the Czechoslovak authorities in eliminating the local power relationships (local political parties, associations, clergy), thereby precluding the process of national integration; and (3) how has this feature affected the role that this border city played in international affairs and, eventually, in the global conflict of the Second World War? Historical studies of the borderlands promote a view which recognizes the active historical role and agency of the borderlands and phantom regions and the ways in which they played a part in either the consolidation of the nation and the state or in its disintegration.21

A centre-periphery position of Košice/Kassa

Košice/Kassa has always been one of the most strategic key cities within the state formations it belonged to. It was a commercial, administrative and cultural hub for the whole surrounding historical region of Upper Hungary,22 a territory roughly located within the present-day eastern Slovakian counties of Košice and Prešov and approximately the size of present-day Slovenia (c.20,000 km²). The topos of the ‘Capital of Upper Hungary’ reproduced in public discourse was not coded exclusively to Kassa’s metropolitan geographical position within the region, but also to the symbolic historical role as a leading urban fortress which the city played during the military pursuits of the Hungarian national heroes István Bocskay, Gábor Gethlen, Imre Tókoly and Ferenc II Rákóczi in order to gain the country’s independence from the Habsburg Empire during the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the context of Hungarian nation-building, the construction of the cult of Ferenc II Rákóczi—the most prominent among the aforementioned heroes—found its spatial dimension directly in Kassa in 1906, when the Hungarian government decided to transfer Rákóczi’s mortal remains from the Ottoman Empire to Kassa’s freshly renovated St Elisabeth Cathedral.

Thus, the governmental politics of history systematically reinforced the central position of Kassa on a mental map of the Hungarian national community in which the city figured as one of the most prominent places of national memory.23 State propaganda and the tourism industry promoted Kassa—presenting an honourable image of ‘Rákóczi’s city’—as a symbol of national pride. As one of the pamphlets put it: ‘Kassa – the most honourable city of Ferenc II Rákóczi, our most eminent prince – became a genuine place of pilgrimage which will be visited at least once by every truthful patriot.’24

The annexation of historical Kassa to the benefit of Czechoslovakia was perceived by the Hungarian political and intellectual elites as one of the hardest territorial losses to overcome. In the materials completed for the Hungarian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, the geographer Jenő Cholnoky articulated the importance of Kassa for Hungarian territoriality using these words: ‘Numerous turning points of our history made this city sacred, more sacred than Strasbourg, Metz or Verdun are for French people.’25 Therefore, in the interwar period, Hungary’s re-annexation of Košice/Kassa was listed as a priority in every revisionist plan produced by the Hungarian secret service.26

By contrast, in the Slovak national discourse Košice was perceived as a city originally richly populated by Slovak-speakers, yet heavily Magyarised in the dualist period. Hence, Košice served as a symbol of national assimilation that needed to be
resisted, which was not the case for the renegade city. At the turn of the century, Košice was considered almost totally culturally appropriated by Hungarian political and intellectual elites. The Slovak intelligentsia even gave up on evolving any national activism in Košice’s urban milieu. However, the Czech intelligentsia, namely the future founder of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, continued to assume the Slovak origin of the majority of the local populace; therefore, after the break-up of the First World War, the city was considered within every plan depicting the new Czechoslovak borders.

After the annexation, the previously iconic image of the city as the Capital of Upper Hungary was easily re-coded in accordance with the transformed geopolitical position of the city within the new republic to the appellative ‘Metropolis of Eastern Czechoslovakia’. However, the second iconic image of ‘Rákóczi’s city’, misappropriated by Hungarian nationalists, was abandoned with no replacement because no relevant Slovak personality was connected to the local history. Thus, although the Czechoslovak Košice continued to retain its quasi-metropolitan status by absorbing economic potential and governmental functions in the region of eastern Slovakia, and by doubling its population between 1918 and 1938 from 42,000 to 80,000, its cultural and symbolic capital in the regional hierarchy within the Czechoslovak state dropped significantly, owing to its lack of any connections to Slovak history and culture, which needed to be built from the ground up.

For example, in polemics about where to site the second Slovak university after the completion of the Comenius University in Bratislava, public opinion polarized over the decision to locate it in Košice, with proponents insisting on the necessity to link the remote ‘East’ to the ‘West’ and opponents expressing their fears over the ‘de-Slovakization of students in the local Magyarizing intellectual milieu’, as lawmaker for the centrist Agrarian Party, Martin Oríšek, put it.

The persistent social representations of Košice as a renegade city, stigmatized for the social status the city enjoyed within the Hungarian Kingdom, placed this second largest city in Slovakia on the ‘aspatial’ periphery within the mental map of the national community. Hence, the ambiguous centre-periphery position of Košice/Kassa mirrored the antagonistic yet entangled histories of both rivalling national communities, whose elites after 1918 entered a race for either inclusion of the peripheral border city into the nationally bounded space (on the part of Czechoslovak elites) or for preserving the previously developed status (on the part of Hungarian elites).

Imperial-era identity politics and its local implications

Scholars of Habsburg studies have recently argued against the traditional perception of the Habsburg Empire as ‘a prison of nations’ and vindicated the standpoint that, by contrast, the imperial structures and bureaucratic practices enhanced the agenda of protagonists of respective nationalisms by means of obligatory classification and categorization of national groups, e.g. in schools, the army or censuses, which helped pigeonhole the inhabitants of the empire into strict national categories along ethno-linguistic lines. The paradigmatic switch in interpretation of the Habsburg Empire as a nationalizing state could be, however, accepted without reservations only partially because it does not sufficiently reflect on the assimilationist ethnic politics in the Hungarian part of the empire in 1867–1918.
Unlike the Austrian case, the ‘Hungarian version’ of ethnic politics, fixed in the December Constitution of 1867 and in the so-called ‘Nationalities Act’ of 1868, converged both imperialistic and nationalistic principles into one identitarian quality, expressed in the idea of the ‘Hungarian political nation’. According to this idea, all indigenous inhabitants of the country, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic affiliations, were supposed to become Hungarians. Other forms of national identification were perceived as competitive threats and were therefore not recognized as being equal national entities (this applied to Slovak, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serb and even German identifications). According to the contemporary ideology, these hierarchically dependent ethnic groups needed to be civilized by ethnic Hungarians, which would inevitably lead to the imposition of Hungarian culture and language upon non-Hungarian-speakers.32

Recent scholarship has shown that Magyarization pursuits had in the time available only limited effects, especially in peripheral rural regions with a compact non-Hungarian populace.33 Within the contemporary political culture, it was in fact urban centres which were regarded as exemplary Magyarization centres for accomplishing the ‘Hungarian civilization mission’ in ethnically non-Hungarian territories.34 Kassa, with the honourable appellative of Rákóczi’s city, was supposed to fulfil this task in the Upper Hungarian region.35

When comparing the census data (Table 1), the significant decrease in the number of people identifying Slovak as their mother tongue (hereafter: individuals with the Slovak mother-tongue attribute) in dualist Kassa can to a large extent be attributed to the peripheral position of the city on the mental map of the Slovak national community and within the Slovak ‘national’ territory. Unlike in many other Upper Hungarian cities, in the urban space of Kassa no ethno-identification process of Slovak-speakers progressed. There was no Slovak sociocultural community created, within which members would be mutually connected by sharable attributes considered by other members as being appropriately ethnically coded. Adhering to the Andersonian concept of imagined community, there was a community, but with no imagination of Slovakness. The fundamental precondition for the inception of an ethnic group – the demarcation of ethnic boundary in a Barthian sense36 by means of an anchored, strongly selective group tradition – was absent at the local scale. Moreover, Magyarization of local Slovak-speakers was facilitated by the attractiveness of the Hungarian national idea, which contrasted with the semicolonial social status of the Slovak ethnic group in the collective awareness of the majority of society.37

Such a development was not exclusive to only Kassa, but local structural preconditions for successful Magyarization were more deeply rooted in history here than anywhere else. For example, in the late eighteenth century Slovak intelligentsia did not even intend to locate in Kassa an affiliate branch of a Slovak cultural society, the Slovak Literary Association, despite the fact the city fulfilled all the necessary criteria to host such a branch. Unlike in Prešov/Eperjes, Levoča/Lőcse or Kežmarok/Kezsmárk, students did not establish in Kassa a Slovak student association at the local college, episcopal seminary or Royal Academy of Law. In the city municipality, there were no members identifying as Slovak, hence nobody hindered the abolishment of Slovak as the language of instruction at local elementary schools in 1873. In the 1910s, according to a special list composed by the Hungarian Home Office, more nationally emancipated Slovaks (19) lived in Budapest than in Kassa or the surrounding county (16).38 The intersubjective sense of mutual
belonging between Slavonic inhabitants of present-day eastern and central-west Slovakia was minimal.

The mainstream and ethnocentric Slovak historiographers in the second half of the twentieth century blamed Hungarian governments and their Magyarization practices for the 'undesired development'. However, a promoter of a separatist conception of the history of eastern Slovakia, Ondrej Halaga, claimed that:

We cannot find any eastern-Slovaks in the west-Slovak national activism, not because of their alleged pro-Hungarian renegade behaviour, but simply because nobody in the west really cared about them and nobody knew anything about them; just like eastern-Slovaks did not know anything about the west-Slovaks.39

According to Halaga's interpretation, a considerably large number of Slavonic inhabitants of the present-day eastern Slovakia adopted an alternative pattern of identification and developed a hybrid group tradition with a specific value system which did not correspond with the canonized Slovak national identity reproduced and spread from the core of the present-day Slovak ethnic territory (central-west Slovakia). It was the alternative concept of Slovjaks – an idea centred around the indigenous inhabitants of the present-day eastern Slovakia – which anticipated that these inhabitants would form an independent ethnic category different from Slovaks.40 As late as 1907, proponents of the Slovjak identitarian concept managed to create a journal, Naša Zastava (Our Flag), which constituted an essential communication channel for fostering the collective identities of Upper Hungarian inhabitants who spoke a Slavonic language considered by Slovak intelligentsia as being an integral part of the Slovak language (the East Slovak dialect). Promoting the use of the local Šariš41 dialect, proponents of the Slovjak identity aimed to delineate an ethnic border between Slovjaks and their significant Other (Slovaks):

The western-Slovak press is full of hatred about Magyars and Magyarons42, oppressing the Slovak speech, and they [western-Slovak agitators] also urge east-Šariš-Slovjaks to do so, to rescue 'our common Slovak speech'. So, we will do it. We will protect our language. But not against Magyars, but against those western-Slovak-nationalists. Because it has never occurred to Magyars to mock our Šariš language; on the contrary, they support it. The Slovak nationalists have never supported our language in their magazines, instead, they are not ashamed to mock our Šariš-Slovjak mother language at every turn, on every occasion, calling it bullshit.43

The fundamental agenda of the Slovjak movement was to promote the idea of the united Hungarian political nation against the claims of Slovak nationalists who opposed it. Thus, the Slovjak identitarian concept emerged as a reaction to the attempts of the Slovak intelligentsia to exert an influence on Šariš-dialect speakers as an integral, yet peripheral part of their own 'imagined community', whose national identities were to be activated.

However, this task was not easy to accomplish, as the Slovak intelligentsia disposed of limited social capacities to do so before 1918, as Alexander Maxwell put it.44 Even though the 'Slovjaks' were not acknowledged as a separate ethnic category in imperial bureaucratic practices, and even though Šariš-dialect speakers continued to be recorded under the category of Slovaks/Slovak language in censuses, Hungarian authorities recognized the potential this hybrid concept conveyed as a political tool for social engineering which could be utilized in the elimination of Slovak nationalism and therewith the connected
thread of possible territorial losses in the future. For this reason, the Šariš dialect was introduced as a language of instruction in several elementary schools across the region and the journal Naša Zastava was awarded grants from the state budget.\(^45\)

But to what degree was this enterprise feasible? Scholar Veronika Szeghy-Gayer emphasizes that the success of the implementation of the Slovjak identitarian concept in the mentalities of Šariš-dialect speakers was dependent on the preferences of local elites in respective municipalities, especially church organizations as the principal mediators of socialization and emancipation processes (mostly Catholic and Evangelical pastors, who usually conveyed the discourse among their believers).\(^46\) However, there wasn’t a priest in every parish who was a proponent of the Slovjak concept. Slovak mainstream historiography (especially Ladislav Tajták) stresses that the Slovjak concept was destined for failure from the very beginning because it had no support among Šariš-dialect speakers. The truth is that in villages where a priest was a proponent of Slovak Catholicism, represented by the Slovak Peoples Party (established in 1906 as an affiliate part of the Catholic Peoples Party, from 1913 an independent, ethnically coded Slovak political party), the Slovak emancipation process was already in progress.\(^47\)

However, this was not the case with Košice/Kassa and surrounding villages, where no priests with developed Slovak national identity were tolerated by the local episcopal clergy.\(^48\) In the city proper, there was no evidence of local Slovak-speakers being influenced by the Slovak national ideology – except in rare notable personalities such as Ján Straka.\(^49\) This educated workman, who managed to maintain connections with the western Slovak intelligentsia, provided evidence of the nationally indifferent behavioural patterns of Košice’s Slovak-speakers in a journal article provocatively titled ‘About Slovak National Life in Košice’, published in a western Slovak journal Slovenský týždenník in 1910. In his text, we can see the hybrid ethnically coded behavioural patterns and mentality of locals fostered by the imperial-era politics of identity:

Maybe some readers will be wondering when reading about Slovak national life in Košice. One would perhaps think: ‘But Košice is indeed a Hungarian [Magyar] city, how could there be any Slovak life?’ Well, to be honest, by now there has not been a lot of Slovak life going on in Košice, really. We, Slovak people from Košice, when we pray in the church in Slovak, we think it is perhaps more than daring to do so. We have not read any Slovak magazines because in schools we were taught that the Slovak speech was some ridiculous Liptov dialect [central Slovakia]. Then, we were told that Rákóczii had also lived in Košice for some time, exactly as we did. That’s why we had to be kuruczok [Hungarian warriors], and if we had ventured to identify as Slovaks, Rakóczi would be turning in his grave.\(^50\)

In fact, the Roman Catholic Church, with which 80\% of local inhabitants with a Slovak mother tongue identified in censuses, was capable of precluding linguistic homogenization within the very private practice of praying.\(^51\) Kassa’s bishop Agoston Fischer-Colbrie (in office between 1905 and 1925), despite being a proponent of imperial identity politics, refused the enforced Magyarization practices and managed to learn the Slovak language. It was his rather tolerant ethnic politics regarding language use and support for Slovak-speaking priests in the diocese which saw him, unlike every other ethnically Hungarian bishop in the newly emerged Czechoslovak territory, not being abandoned by his Slovak clergy to the tender mercies of the Czechoslovak authorities and not being expelled from the republic. The authorities let him continue his office after 1918; however, they soon
realized that, in the liberal republican and secularizing environment, he and his office acted as a Trojan horse for the bygone 'ancient regime'.

**A post-Trianon shift? Not until the early 1950s**

Almost two decades later, in 1936, the officers of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education and National Culture sent an appeal to Fischer-Colbrie’s successor Jozef Čársky, bishop of Košice/Kassa in 1925–39, blaming him for his inability to 'Slovakize' the local episcopate bureau. The officers labelled the local bishopric office as an incubator of Hungarian nationalists who supported the oppositionist anti-republican Provincial Christian-Socialist Party. In archival sources and contemporary press evidence, throughout the whole interwar period, the Czechoslovak authorities were irritated that in Košice, a city with a 60% statistical dominance of Czechoslovaks, the strongest political force winning every election was the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party (Table 2). This indicated that the party was also supported by a large number of local Catholic inhabitants from the suburbs and urban periphery – identified in censuses as Slovaks – who were exposed to the pastoral activities of the local priests, strong supporters of the party, to whom they were obedient.

It was actually the aforementioned bishop Ágoston Fischer-Colbrie who built from Košice/Kassa a stronghold of Hungarian revisionism by grounding the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party in this city in autumn 1919. In scholarship, this political party is somehow ‘automatically’ classified as a Hungarian minority party. However, such categorization is untenable in regard to theories dealing with the influence of ethnic differentiation in the party system. The Provincial Christian-Socialist Party proclaimed the cooperation of all the ‘old settled inhabitants’ of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia – Hungarians, Slovaks, Germans and Ruthenians – in a fight for the autonomy of these lands in the framework of Czechoslovakia, though unofficially and ideally in the

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**Table 2. Results of selected political parties in Košice in 1923–1937 (%).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Czechoslovak</th>
<th>HCS</th>
<th>KKSS</th>
<th>KSC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>31.2*</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>30.4*</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * - in a coalition with the Hungarian National Party (Maďarská národná strana, MNS); in 1936 both parties merged under the name United Hungarian Party (Zjednotená maďarská strana); c. – communal elections; county – county elections; p. – parliamentary elections

**Czechoslovak parties** *(the parties with a political programme of carrying the ideology of Czechoslovakism):* Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants (Republikánska strana zemedelského a malorolnictveho fudu); Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (Československá sociálnodemokratická strana robotnická); Hungarian-German Social Democratic Party (Maďarsko-nemecká sociálnodemokratická strana); Czechoslovak National Democracy (Československá národná demokracia); Czechoslovak National-Socialist Party (Československa strana národnosocialistická); Czechoslovak Traders’ Party (Československá živnostensko-obchodná strana stredostavovská); Maxoň’s Independent Civic Party (Maxoňova nezávislá občianska strana); Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party (Československá strana ľudová); National Labour Party (Národná strana práce); Jewish Party in Czechoslovakia (Židovska strana v ČSR).

**Other parties:*** HCS – Hlinka’s Slovak Peoples’ Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana); KKSS – Provincial Christian-Socialist Party (Krajinská krestánsko-socialistická strana); KSC – Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa).

**Sources:** see n. 54.
framework of Hungary. In 1920, the party leaders protested in the Czechoslovak lower house of parliament against the seizure of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia by the Czechoslovak authorities, and in the long term they also requested autonomy for these historical territories of pre-Trianon Hungary. For this reason, I suggest classifying this political subject not as an ethnic party, but as a multi-ethnic one. This allegation was also recently proven by sociologists Miroslav Barna and Vladimír Krivý, who calculated that 16.3% of the party’s voters in the territory of Slovakia in the 1929 parliamentary election were Slovaks and 8% Germans.

Another point was the organizational structure of the party. Despite ethnic Hungarians prevailing in the party leadership, there were formally three factional sections: Hungarian, Slovak and German. The identity and ethnic politics of the party basically copied the principles of the ethnic politics of the pre-Trianon Hungarian governments, preserving the cultural supremacy of the Hungarian national community, while at the same time tolerating the ethnographic specifics of other numerous ethnic groups, traditionally living on the ex-national territory. For what remains, the continuity of ethnic politics from the imperial era was secured at the personal level as well. The long-term leader of the party, Géza Szüllő (1925–32), was in the dualist-era a member of the House of Representatives (1901–18) for the National Party of Work of István Tisza. The co-founders of the party, Gyula Fleischmann, Gyula Wirth, Lajos Körmeny-Ékes, Barna Tost, Géza Grosschmid, János Tobler, János Jabloniczky János, Dénes Bittó and the first party leader Jenő Lelley, all belonged to the gentry, clergy or middle-class intelligentsia, and at the same time, they were members of the local pre-war social elite as well. Hence, the protagonists of the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party in the new Czechoslovak republican terms acted as agents for securing the continuity of the ethnic politics of imperial Hungary in the territory of one of the successor states.

In the case of the ideological concept of the autochthonous inhabitants of Slovakia, we are concerned with a rather sophisticated modification of the identitarian concept of the united Hungarian political nation, whereas the emphasis was put on the autochthony of the Christian populace in the Carpathian Basin. As such, the party programme had three political functions and at the same time practical implications: (1) to legitimize the territorial integrity of the sacred Hungarian Kingdom; (2) to negate the construction of the rival Czechoslovak and independent Slovak nations; and (3) to provide an opportunity for ethnically non-Hungarian inhabitants of the former Upper Hungary with hybrid identities to express their political or other kinds of loyalties to the still existing Hungarian Kingdom. At the same time, behind the formally neutral concept of multiculturalism and autochthony stood a conscious and politically motivated concern with the deliberate disruption of homogeneity and cohesiveness of the (Czecho) Slovak national community.

The significant support received by the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party in Slovakia in the interwar period proves that the assimilationist politics of Hungarian imperial authorities fell partially on fertile ground. It was mostly the inhabitants of regional urban centres who turned out to be supporters of the party, almost twice as many as in rural areas. In the general election of 1925, when the party did not form a coalition with any other party, it received 90% more votes in the urban environment than in country electoral districts (Table 3). In 1929 and 1935, in a coalition with the Hungarian
Table 3. Electoral results (%) of the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party in selected districts and cities of Slovakia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1935</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td>14.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitra I</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitra II</td>
<td>16.98</td>
<td>33.22</td>
<td>26.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topoľčany</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trnava</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Žmýky</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>45.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Žmýky II</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>48.23</td>
<td>43.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislava I</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>19.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislava II</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>9.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komárno</td>
<td>16.01</td>
<td>38.67</td>
<td>40.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levice</td>
<td>18.82</td>
<td>48.38</td>
<td>45.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malacky</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žilina</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Bystrica</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Štiavnica</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>21.75</td>
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<td>Zvolen</td>
<td>9.45</td>
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<td>17.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kežmarok</td>
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<td>28.84</td>
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<td>Ružomberok</td>
<td>0.69</td>
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<td>2.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Košice I</td>
<td>31.91</td>
<td>26.31</td>
<td>30.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košice II</td>
<td>12.78</td>
<td>10.97</td>
<td>8.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spišská N. Ves I</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>18.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spišská N. Ves II</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>19.16</td>
<td>15.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bardejov</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prešov</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>13.92</td>
<td>32.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 1929 and 1935 in coalition with the Hungarian National Party (in Hungarian: Magyar Nemzeti Párt, in Slovak: Maďarská národná strana) and Spiš German Party (in German: Zipser deutsche Partei, in Slovak: Spišská nemecká strana).

Sources: see n. 63.

National Party (an ethnically Hungarian coded party) and Spiš German Party (an ethnically German coded party), the support of the urban populace was still 50% higher, despite the latter parties also having strong support in rural areas. As we can see from Table 3, Christian Socialists were supported not only in the cities located in the Hungarian-Slovak ethnic contact zone and below the ethnic boundary, but also in up-country cities such as Banska Bystrica, Prešov and Topoľčany.

However, the spatial and temporal dynamics of the distribution of votes for this party throughout the interwar period in the territory of Slovakia indicates a decreasing tendency, especially in northern urban enclaves, which means that the phantom region was gradually shrinking and limited itself mostly to southern parts in the Slovak-Hungarian borderland.

As for Košice, the support for the Christian Socialist Party in the city was not diminishing, even at the end of the 1930s (Figure 2). Therefore a huge agitation campaign in Košice’s periphery was initiated by agents of the Hlinka’s Slovak People Party and the party’s leader, Andrej Hlinka himself. Hlinka’s proponents believed that if they established a parallel political party with an ecclesiastic programme and a name similar to the Christian-Socialist Party, they would succeed in capturing ‘Slovak’ votes. However, when such a sister party, named the Christian-Catholic Citizens Party, ran in
elections 1937, it gained only 686 votes. Disappointed state officials reported: “The periphery is to perfection ruled by united pro-Hungarian parties and communists. By contrast, Czechoslovak socialist parties do not pay enough attention to it, and Slovak parties and associations are – it could be said – lax in this matter.” In fact, even the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, representing with its internationalist Marxist ideology yet another multi-ethnic political party – and actually the second strongest party after the Christian Socialists – attracted a considerably larger proportion of Košice’s electorate (18.8%) in 1937 than the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (8.4%), with her sisterly pro-republican Hungarian-German Social Democratic Party attracting 1.7%.

Referring to the electoral failure of Czechoslovak ethnic and pro-republican political parties, Bishop Jozef Čársky, who succeeded to the bishopric of Košice in 1925 immediately after Fischer-Colbrie’s death, rejected the charges made by central Czechoslovak authorities that he had neglected the Czechoslovak national agenda in his diocese:

As everybody knows, rather than just blame the clergy, there are other powerful reasons why the Hungarian spirit is still being preserved: such as radio broadcast, which three or four times a day enthuses over it; magazines reviving revisionist expectations; an abundance of dismissed officers; the closeness of state borders; family ties and the attendant frequent visits to Hungary; and economic shortage, for which so many agitators hold the Czechs responsible (i.e. because of Slovaks’ liberation). The consequences of all of this cannot be blamed solely on the clergy.

In essence, Bishop Čársky was arguing that de-historicizing and de-locating the original authentic cultural patterns from their temporal, spatial, geographical and linguistic contexts was a long-distance race which, naturally, could not be achieved by a sudden change of power structures. The majority of local indigenous Slovak-speaking
inhabitants of Košice and the other voters of the Provincial Christian-Socialist Party did not identify with Czechoslovak statehood, not only rejecting the state doctrine of Czechoslovakism and the state-promoted secularism, but also Slovak national ideology, which was indifferent and alien to their hybrid traditional cultural repertoire and value system developed in the imperial era. As one unknown analyst put it in the governmental paper Novosti, reflecting on the failure of Czechoslovak parties to attract Slovak voters in the last local election organised in Košice in 1937 before the break-up of Czechoslovakia:

We could name many citizens of Košice who have Slovak names and do not even speak Hungarian, and yet who voted for the Christian Socialist Party of their priest. They vote by habit. Some of them do so because they had difficulties in getting citizenship, tax difficulties and other troubles with authorities which usually occur in everyday life. In Košice we experienced a situation that had occurred elsewhere several decades ago. People at home talk for five minutes in Slovak and another five in Hungarian. When you ask them what they are, the answer is Slovaks, of course. However, the church, sport, business, society and associations keep their Magyarization habit alive. Censuses and elections are two different realms. Each of them has a different background, and mixing them should be avoided.67

The preoccupation of Czechoslovak authorities with unfavourable electoral results proved to be grounded. By contrast, the Hungarian Foreign Office in Budapest received reports about the 'grand electoral results' in Košice/Kassa with satisfaction:

The most convincing evidence that the data collected in the Czech censuses was falsified is the fact that in secret ballots the voters voted by a majority for Hungarian parties - that would not have been possible if the proportion of Hungarians in Košice accounted for only 20%.68

So claimed the Hungarian statistical expert Alajos Kovács when persuading his Hungarian intellectual audience of the legitimacy of Košice/Kassa's seizure by Hungary in 1938. That is, Hungarian political and intellectual elites considered all voters voting for the pro-Hungarian parties to be either automatically Hungarians or other inhabitants who wished to become nationals of the Hungarian state anyway. Thus, the political affiliations of the urban populace served in favour of the Hungarian political representation in the Komárno and Belveder negotiations regarding the border changes in 1938 as one of the main arguments to delegitimize Czechoslovak claims and, hence, worked in favour of the territorial revision of Trianon.69

In the Horthyian period 1938-45, the Slovjak concept was reinvented and advantageously supported by Hungarian authorities as a desirable identification praxis of local Slovak speakers. However, the Hungarian authorities were repeatedly inconsistent in enforcing the concept among the populace because the ethnic politics of the Horthyian era were copied from the imperial era; thus the classification category of Slovjaks in censuses was not introduced.70

During the third Czechoslovak Republic (1945-48), the Slovjak concept was further sophisticatedly modified as a regional movement of the eastern Slovak intelligentsia, yet as such was perceived as 'dangerously' separatist by mainstream Slovak national elites. In 1951, during the era of state socialism, all 'Slovjak activities' were already strictly prohibited. The identitarian praxis was homogenized across the whole national territory and the use of eastern Slovak dialects was suppressed in all state administrative, educational and cultural institutions, including elementary schools.71
As a consequence of an extreme ethnic conflict, the Second World War, the post-Second World War Czechoslovak authorities commenced an extensive brachial programme called Re-Slovakization, aimed at reorientation and definite homogenization of any possible hybrid forms of ethnic identification. To distinguish between ‘pure’ Hungarians and individuals who were eligible for Re-Slovakization, state officials serving in Košice even developed a terminus technicus which they used in administrative reports to label such a nationally indifferent cohort of local inhabitants ‘Košice’s Slovaks’. The main features of everyday ethnic practices of Košice’s Slovaks were: a constant use of Hungarian language in public spaces and working places; ‘suspiciously’ good relations with Hungarians; membership in Hungarian associations; preferring Hungarian church masses to the Slovak ones; and situational opportunism.

Consider this extract from the report entitled National Reliability Inquiry – the Case of Ján Kožiarsky from 1947. Kožiarsky, born in Košice in 1925, was a Roman Catholic who during the first Czechoslovak Republic attended Slovak schools:

Regarding his national affiliation, as an inhabitant of Košice, it is necessary to consider him as nationally less sensitive, being able to adjust to any existing regime. Despite this – regarding political matters – nothing objectionable has been found against him or his family.

Unlike in the liberal parliamentary regime of the first Czechoslovak Republic, this time there was no provision made for any minority rights in post-Second World War Czechoslovakia. By means of the consistent Re-Slovakization programme, which ran between 1946 and 1949, the Czechoslovak national elites prevented the city from re-emerging as a transcultural hub in which rival political elites and nationalist activities could arise. The undoubted aim of the post-Second World War Czechoslovak elites was to instil an indisputably national character in a city previously disputed and with a nationally indifferent Slovak community.

Conclusion

National historiographies and official politics in the history of post-First World War successor states and defeated states alike only make a few provisions for nuances and deviations in the historical development of national communities which do not correspond with the canonized national narrative. The hybridity of ethnic identities and the phenomenon of national indifference in potential co-members of Central European national communities are still taboo subjects in national historiographies for two significant reasons. Firstly, these characteristics were widespread among whole rural and urban communities, and not just limited to a few individuals. Secondly, their persistence significantly endangered the notion of an ideal, ethnically homogeneous national territory; hence they had the potential to subvert the geopolitical status quo developed as a consequence of the world wars.

The case study of the second largest city of present-day Slovakia, Košice/Kassa, demonstrates that the ethnic homogenization of a culturally heterogeneous and hybrid urban centre was a far more complex process than merely achieving an advantageous 60% majority of Czechoslovaks on census sheets by external identification. In fact, Czechoslovak authorities underestimated the significance the city played in Hungarian
culture and history, as well as the connections, networks and power structures built up by local elites in the imperial era. The indifferent attitudes of a majority of local autochthonous Slovak speakers towards attempts at (Czecho)Slovak nationalization reflected a centuries-long transmitted cultural heterogeneity of the local urban milieu, as well as the geopolitical closeness of the Hungarian border and a preference for traditional Budapest over the newly emerged yet distant centres of Prague and Bratislava.

Despite the re-territorialization of the Slovak-Hungarian borderland to the benefit of Czechoslovakia after 1918, the disputed city remained a part of the Hungarian cultural area and, as such, it constituted a revisionist stronghold for the adjacent phantom region. This feature was also to a large extent enabled by the liberal regulations of the minority policies of interwar Czechoslovakia.

Thus, when speaking about the centre-periphery position of Košice/Kassa, its central position in Hungarian politics and culture made it advantageous for the Hungarian national elites to nationalize the ethnic identities of locals and to legitimize claims for a territorial tenure of the city. Pro-Hungarian behavioural patterns and electoral results favouring pro-Hungarian political parties subverted the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak seizure of Košice/Kassa, which was conveniently misused by Hungarian political elites as an argument contributing to the territorial revision of Trianon in 1938.

Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that Hungarian elites, by employing brachial forceful measures to assimilate Slovak-speakers and other ethnic groups in the imperial era (as well as in the period of 1938–45), disqualified themselves as decision-makers regarding the future shape of their own historical country. As a consequence of upholding a repeated role as aggressors in domestic (Magyarization) as well as international politics (both the First and Second World Wars), Hungarian elites – as was the case with Germany – were deprived by the international community of the right to rule over vast territories previously populated by ethnic Hungarians, including such cities as Košice/Kassa, Cluj Napoca/Kolozsvár, Oradea/Nagyvárad or Bratislava/Pozsony, the ethnic composition of which is today irreversibly predominantly non-Hungarian.

Notes
1. Opinions on the progressiveness of Czechoslovak democracy, able to effectively canalize the social conflicts of an ethnically differentiated society, varies among domestic (Czech and Slovak) and foreign scholars, see: Koeltzsch and Ota, “From Islands of Democracy,” 285–327.
3. Theorists of phantom borders define them as political borders, which politically or legally do not exist at a certain time, but seem to appear in different forms and modes of social action and practices. See: Hirschhausen, “The Heuristic Interest,” 106–25.
6. Bhabha, Location of Culture, 159. Bhabha perceives hybridity not merely as a mixture, but as a complex concept of postcolonial studies. It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination.
9. In Slovak Košice, in Hungarian Kassa, in German Kaschau, in Latin Cassovia. For the sake of convenience, I use the Slovak and Hungarian appellative synchronically depending on the context of sentences.


11. Table 1 contains aggregated data from censuses which constituted an institutionalized form of demographic data acquisition, including ethnic identities. Assigning an ethnic identity was not based on the same criteria in all censuses; the criteria were objective or subjective (1850 – nationality; 1880, 1890, 1900 – mother tongue; 1910 – language used most commonly; 1921, 1930 – nationality based on language use). The data is therefore only illustrative. In principle, the criteria for assigning an ethnic category to an individual were set up in every national regime in such a way as to achieve the lowest possible number of ethnic minorities. See Göderle, *Zensus und Ethnizität*; Kövér, "Statisztikai asszimiláció."

12. In this text I use the term 'national elites' as a collective appellative for all persons involved in any aspects of the organizational and ideological construction of national statehood. For more on theory and definition of the term 'elites', see Wasner, *Eliten in Europa."


16. Henchel, *Das Fluidum der Stadt."


19. The case study of Košice/Kassa has been analysed with respect to the ethnonational transformation of ethnic identities of the local populace at the turn of the imperial and post-imperial era (see Ficeri, "Etnické Identity"; in regard to the local Jewish populace see Kovács, *Felemás asszimiláció*), as well as with respect to the attempts of interwar Czechoslovak authorities to nationalize local urban space and the overall image of the city, see Ficeri, "Czechoslovakism in Mentalities."


22. Not to be confused with the geographical meaning of the appellative Upper Hungary, which refers to the whole territory to the north of the Danube, approximately present-day Slovakia.

23. Henchel, *Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur."


29. Quotation from: Suláček, *Zápas o slovenskú techniku*, 63. The university was eventually located in Košice in the autumn of 1938; however, owing to the First Vienna Award it opened its doors in Bratislava.

30. Copus, “From Core-periphery to Polycentric,” 539–52. The author contextualizes 'aspatial peripherality' for cases different to the traditionally perceived periphery based on physical distance.


34. Szarka, “Magyarosodás és magyarosítás,” 35–46; Szarka, Szlovák nemzeti fejlődés.
35. Bekscs, Magyarosodás és magyarosítás, 62.
36. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 10–19.
40. Halaga, Memorabilia z Europy a vlasti, 331–87.
41. Šariš (in Slovak) or Šáros (in Hungarian) is the core region of present-day eastern Slovakia. The other present-day east Slovak historical regions are Abov, Zemplin and Spiš with their own local dialects, which are similar to the Šariš one. In Slovak linguistics they are jointly considered forming the East Slovak dialect group within the Slovak language.
42. In the Slovak public discourse, a Magyaron is an appellative for a person of Slovak ethnicity who complied with the Hungarian-Magyar identitarian concept.
44. Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia, 141–65.
47. Ibid.
48. Čizmár, Dejiny Košického arcibiskupstva, 504.
50. [Ján Straka], “O slovenskom živote v Košiciach,” Slovenský týždeník, May 1, 1910, no. 18, 5.
52. Mihoková, Košický biskup.
53. Diecézny úrad v Košiciach [The Episcopal Bureau in Košice], December 17, 1936. Carton 23, 5376, fund Kancelária Krajského prezidenta v Košiciach 193638 [Chancery of the Provincial President in Košice 1936–1938], Slovenský národný archív [Slovak National Archive, Bratislava], hereafter abbreviated SNA.
55. Angyal, Őrdekvédelem és önszerveződés; Olejnik, Politické a spoločenské aktivity, 8–31.
56. Birnik, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics.
60. There was no such analogy e.g. in interwar Romania, see: Egry, “Minority Elite,” 186–215.
61. On Czech-Slovak relations and the perception of Czechoslovakism in the Czech and Slovak societies, see: Bakke, *Doomed to Failure*; Rychlik, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. Století*. On the ethno-emancipatory process of Slovaks and the role of the education system in reproducing a distinctive Slovak national identity in the interwar period, see: Johnson, *Slovakia 1918–1938*.


70. Tilkovszky, *Južné Slovensko*; Vietor, *Dejiny okupácie*.


72. Štúj, *Reslovakizácia*.


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Reinforcing the border, reconfiguring identities: Polish initiatives in the Carpathians in the interwar period

Patrice M. Dabrowski

ABSTRACT
Established in the wake of the First World War, the multiethnic Polish Second Republic was determined to secure its long southern border, formed by the Carpathian Mountains, which prior to the war had been the internal (porous) Habsburg frontier separating the province of Galicia from Hungary. The article presents a series of initiatives essentially emanating from the state (here, primarily the military authorities) in the 1930s. The initiatives were designed to turn the Carpathian highlanders across the breadth of the interwar Polish frontier into loyal Polish citizens while encouraging them both to retain their own local identity (as Hutsuls, Górale, Lemkos and others) and to consider themselves part of a larger Carpathian brotherhood (the latter defined within the borders of the Polish state). In other words, the authorities sought to capitalize on what they perceived to be national indifference on the part of many highlanders by making room for their local identities within a more broadly conceived heterogeneous state of regions, one that would win the allegiance of the highlanders, in that sense reinforcing the border.

It is not possible to write a coherent history of the hills that is not in constant dialogue with lowland centers; nor is it possible to write a coherent history of lowland centers that ignores its hilly periphery.

-James C. Scott

This article begins with a paradox. The Poles and Poland are an undeniably lowland nation and state, with the very etymology of the name of both people and country deriving from the word for ‘field’ (pole). Yet historically (at least from the last third of the nineteenth century), Poles have taken an inordinate interest in mountains – especially in their borderland mountains, the Carpathians. Indeed, the sole naturally defensible frontier of this flatland of farmers has been the country’s mountainous southern border. Perhaps it was a longing for the independent, defensible statehood that the noble nation had experienced for centuries prior to the dismantlement of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the eighteenth century that led to the Carpathians – certainly the highest segment thereof, known as the Tatra Mountains – being explored by Polish scientist Stanisław Staszic in the first decade of the nineteenth century. He
would be followed by other explorers. The fascination with the Tatras truly blossomed in the second half of that century, a period in which the mountains were declared as ‘discovered’ – to the extent that they and the village of Zakopane were transformed into first the summer, then winter capital of a Poland extant only in the minds of the nation.² There was also some interest in the Carpathians further to the east of what was then the Habsburg province of Galicia and Lodomeria (where the northern slopes lay), in particular the remote southeastern region of Czarnohora/Chornohora.³

Yet the Carpathians are paradoxical in their own right. For all their physical centrality and geological importance for East-Central Europe – they are its most prominent physical feature, bisecting the region as a whole and serving as the watershed between the Baltic and Black seas – politically the Carpathians hardly figure. As with James C. Scott’s southeast Asian region of Zomia, the mountains ‘lie at the periphery of states and at the center of none’.⁴ This makes them a highland borderland par excellence, if one that also attracted at least sporadic interest from the lowland centres. To be sure, during the long nineteenth century the Carpathians lay fully within the Habsburg Empire, their border nature rather of intrastate significance: they made up the internal Habsburg frontier separating Hungary from Galicia. Yet for the most part this border was a line easily crossed: for example, Polish hikers in the Tatra Mountains summited both Galician and Hungarian peaks with impunity, while the various indigenous mountain peoples of the Carpathians traversed the region to trade, marry or seek seasonal employment. The Carpathian Mountain region’s only strategic significance was as the glacis of the monarchy in the face of what was seen as an imminent threat from Russia.⁵ Ultimately, the mountains and Galician piedmont became a major battlefield of the First World War on the eastern front.

The role played by the Carpathians changed drastically in the period following 1918. After over a century of only marginal significance, the mountains once again became strategic borderlands. They lost their softness and permeability as an intrastate, internal Habsburg frontier and became – or at least were to become – a hard, impermeable international border, separating the new and/or newly expanded states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. According to the four-pronged categorization of US–Mexico borderlands scholar Oscar J. Martinez, they went from being an integrated borderland to an alienated one.⁶

The northern slopes of the Carpathians as well as their inhabitants found themselves in the state to be known as the Second Polish Republic. At odds with their neighbours, the Polish authorities as well as those of the other new aspiring nation-states of East-Central Europe –as Florian Miühlfried noted in a similar case of highland reorientation – ‘demarcated the national territory as an exclusive space and forced the citizens to spatially focus their lives onto the body of the state’.⁷ This had repercussions for the indigenous highlanders of the borderlands, be they the Górale of the western Carpathians, the Lemkos and Boikos of the Central Carpathians, or the Hutsuls of the Eastern Carpathians – the last three (in contrast to the Roman Catholic Górale) being groups of East Slavs professing Greek Catholicism or Orthodoxy and speaking languages or dialects closer to standard Ukrainian than to Polish. To one degree or another, these highland ‘tribes’ were distinct from lowland Poles and Ukrainians and, given that they had been part of the multiethnic Habsburg Empire, they had not been forced to identify themselves in national terms. After the First World War, the situation changed
dramatically. In the new post-1918 states, these borderlanders were to eschew the previously fuzzy borderland, abandon their no longer relevant Kaisertreue (loyalty to the Habsburg emperor), and opt for allegiance to the new powers-that-be, located in the new national capitals. This raises the question: How would the indigenous borderlanders react to a reorienting of their lives in the direction of Warsaw, not Vienna? They were being asked to accept, even defend, the strategic border that their beloved mountains had become—or at least not object to this remote and isolated highland space being within the body of the interwar Polish state.

The border was strategic in more ways than one. The matter of reorientation was further complicated by the messy multiethnicity of the highland region. Many of the region’s inhabitants—especially in the Central and Eastern Carpathians, with their indigenous population of Lemkos, Boikos and Hutsuls—might (if pressed in this matter, for these populations were for the most part focused primarily on their own little highland homelands) prefer to orient themselves differently: towards a population ethnically closer to them than the masses of ethnic Poles in the country’s heartland. This would be the lowland East Slavic population known as Ukrainians (over 4 million strong, out of a total tally of 32 million residents counted in the 1931 census). In the Second Polish Republic this population was generally termed as Ruthenes, as they had been historically known; by contrast, the designation Ukrainian—preferred by many lowlanders—carried with it a sense of conscious national identification and even activism. Recall that a war had been fought in 1918–19 over the control of Lwów/Lviv and the region of Eastern Galicia, which Ukrainians—being in the majority in that region—claimed as their own. Yet the nascent West Ukrainian People’s Republic was short-lived (November 1918–July 1919), Poles proving victorious in their aim to incorporate all of the former Habsburg province of Galicia into their own new state. Still, for cultural if not for other reasons, might not the East Slavic highlanders prefer to ally themselves with the Ukrainians of the lowlands, even if the latter had not managed to attain national independence in the wake of the Great War?

What was clear to the Polish authorities of the centre during the 1930s was that the by definition peripheral border needed to be shored up, reinforced—as in the title of this article. This does not mean that interwar Poland was building a wall. Nor was the government putting a wall’s worth of border guards into place, although of course the latter were posted to the Carpathian Mountains. Instead, the reinforcement of the border was to take place more organically—by being sure of the allegiance of the diverse highland populations that dwelled along the length of the Carpathian frontier, from the Olza to the Czeremosz/Cheremosh. Whereas into the 1920s Poles had still been engaged in border conflicts around the country’s periphery and as a result focused primarily on the physicality of the frontier, in the 1930s a new and creative approach to the highland borderlands would emerge.

This article explores aspects of what appears to have been a conscious attempt, on the part of the state, to reach the hearts and minds of the highland folk, to win them over to Polish statehood—to turn them into loyal citizens of the Second Polish Republic, ready to defend her. In sum, what was desired was to create ‘a wall of highlanders’ chests, behind which the Fatherland peacefully will last forever’. Plans were sketched out in the early 1930s, that is, in the period after the coup d’état of Józef Piłsudski. Yet, rather than speak of a single coordinated or overarching plan from the very outset, it is best to see these
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developments as something that started modestly, but which with time evolved into a bolder and more comprehensive programme for the entire highland borderland. Think of it as a reorienting of highland localness and what ostensibly was perceived as the national indifference of the highlander towards a greater, regional, highland identity, with implications for Polish state-building and security. While elsewhere in Europe during this period one could find states with regional concerns striving to shore up a central national identity, the Polish approach in the Carpathian borderland differed in that loyalty to the state was to trump any national (ethnolinguistic) identity, hard-won Polish statehood (páństwowość—as opposed to ethnolinguistic nationalism) being seen as the supreme value in Piłsudski’s Poland.13

Surfacing only in the 1930s, initial moves were directed toward the easternmost population of the Carpathian Mountains of interwar Poland, a territory known colloquially as the Hutsul region, after the highland population called the Hutsuls. The Hutsul region was made up of the southeasternmost corner of Southeastern Poland, lying in the voivodeship (województwo) of Stanisławów (today’s Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine). In the annus horribilis that was 1930 in southeastern Poland, somehow Hutsuls had not joined in the Ukrainian attacks on Polish farms and sabotaging of infrastructure that ran rampant through the lowland parts of the three voivodeships of Lwów, Tarnopol (Ternopil) and Stanisławów that comprised Małopolska Wschodnia (Eastern Lesser Poland). With the exception of the westernmost part, this was essentially the territory to which Ukrainians had pretentions—a region that previously had been labelled Eastern Galicia.14 Indeed, the ‘Council of Four’ at the Paris Peace Conference had earlier sought to turn Eastern Galicia into a mandate territory of the League of Nations, with an allowance for Poland to control it for 25 years before ultimately deciding its fate. Ukrainian dissatisfaction with Polish rule simmered, only to boil over in 1930. Yet the Hutsuls remained passive and did not join in the unrest. This quietude inspired introspection on the part of the Polish authorities. Could it be that the isolated highlanders were indifferent to the Ukrainian national cause or, better still, even inclined towards accepting Polish statehood, which was such a thorn in the side of the country’s Ukrainians?15

Such assumptions likely informed the composition of a secret document, preserved amid the papers of the Department of the General Command of the Ministry of Military Affairs, entitled ‘Plan pracy na Huculszczyźnie’ (‘Plan of work in the Hutsul region’). Unsigned, undated and unpublished, the document surely was written in the early 1930s (most likely mid-1933). The plan seemed to have been inspired by the thought that, with a little outreach and investment in the region, especially in the realm of tourism, the highland population of the Hutsul region could be won over to Polish statehood. (The Polish authorities considered tourism to be a growth industry that needed only minimal investment to get it rolling—a good thing in the cash-strapped years following the Great Depression; it was primarily the well-to-do upper classes, officialdom and bourgeoisie who vacationed in spas or mountain resorts such as Zakopane, which became hugely popular in these years.) The anonymous author of the document averred: ‘The state will achieve vis-à-vis the Hutsuls a quick and dazzling effect, and in improving their lives via this easiest of roads would connect them indissolubly with Polish statehood.’16 Increased tourism in the region, thus, might buy allegiance from the Hutsuls, who could profit from it.

The document was likely written in the wake of an only slightly earlier, state-sponsored attempt at making inroads into the Hutsul region. At the prompting of the voivodeship
authorities, the relevant regional districts of Kosów, Kolomyja and Nadwórna, where the Hutsul population was to be found, organized a ‘Hutsul Holiday’ (‘Święto huculskie’), a several-day-long festival celebrating both people and place. Scheduled for 15–17 June 1933, the Hutsul Holiday was devised as a way to acquaint broad swaths of the population with the beauty of the Eastern Carpathians, and the Hutsul region in particular, as well as to help the indigenous highlanders. It was to be an event that would attract regular tourists as well as hikers, providing both with excursions, exhibitions and opportunities to reach the heart of Czarnohora. Each of the five ‘tourist routes’ formulated by the regional and local authorities boasted its own schedule of events, the goal apparently being for guests to experience every possible corner of the still relatively inaccessible Hutsul region – a rather ambitious goal for this first-ever such event.17

To give but one example of a remote locality with big plans: the commune of Jablonica produced an extensive programme designed to attract visitors to this more remote destination. Not on the railway line, Jablonica lay on the old Kratter Road, adjacent to the Czechoslovak–Polish border. Historically Jablonica was considered one of the more attractive destinations in the Hutsul region, with particularly good climatic conditions as well as skiing terrain. Yet, compared to the resorts along the Prut River Valley, it was relatively inaccessible. The Jablonica commune, thus, was likely more desperate for guests, given its distance from the railway.

This agricultural-pastoral commune came up with the slogan ‘How the Hutsul Lives’ as a unifying theme for its contribution to the Hutsul Holiday. Three days of festivities, plus a day for return travel, were envisaged in great detail. On day one, guests would travel via train to Tatarów, where they would be met by festively garlanded wagons and welcomed by a delegate from the Jablonica commune. Together the wagons would all set off for Jablonica, where they would be greeted by a banderya (feste mounted escort) of Hutsuls on horseback. Waiting beneath a triumphal arch on the edge of the village, the Hutsul head of the commune, Mikołaj Liczkowski, would greet the guests, who subsequently would be fed before being able to admire a display of traditional handicrafts: Hutsul women, dressed in their Sunday best, would weave linen and woolens as well as decorate the traditional Easter eggs known as pysanky.18 Guests could visit a traditional Hutsul homestead (grazhda), where they could view both its interior and exterior. The evening would close with bonfires and the playing of the trembita (alpine horn).19 The following two days would be devoted to hiking (with some 11 excursions planned) and a festival on the Czechoslovak border before the guests would be just as ceremoniously dispatched to the train ride home.20 This was the programme for but a single, remote, Hutsul locality; nonetheless, hundreds of guests were anticipated in little Jablonica (which might conceivably earn as much as 4500 zloty, a princely sum for the impoverished mountain village), while the region as a whole was expecting 20,000 guests to come.21

Its tremendously ambitious goals notwithstanding, that inaugural Hutsul Holiday proved a learning experience. It was in part a lesson in how not to organize such an event, for insufficient advertising (newspaper articles provided no particulars) and faulty mass transportation undermined the otherwise good planning on the ground. While the region evidently saw great support for the event on the part of Hutsuls (as reflected in the example of Jablonica) as well as the district authorities, efforts at the centre of the state were, at best, less than effective. To give but the most egregious example: the bulk of the expected guests, travelling from Warsaw and central Poland on special excursion trains,
did not arrive until two days into the festival – and even then they could be counted in the hundreds, not tens of thousands.

This experience taught the government – certainly the anonymous author of the plan – that it was dangerous for the authorities to be seen as organizing what on some fronts could be considered a disaster. What was needed was a new, social, organization (what today we would call a non-governmental organization [NGO]) to take an interest in things Hutsul and ensure the success of future endeavours. Yet, according to the secret document, while the organization was to represent the ‘unofficial, social work of extra-governmental circles’, it was also to be ‘strictly inspired by the government’.22

That organization – named outright in the document – was the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region (Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Huculszczyzny). This was the second alpine club in the Polish lands, behind the Polish Tatra Society (Polskie Towarzystwo Tatrzańskie), founded in 1873. While some sections of the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region – most notably, a hygiene section and scout club – were reportedly active in the region during the summer of 1933, the organization was officially sanctioned only in mid-December of that year. The early activities apparently suggested – or perhaps were intended to suggest – that the organization had arisen in organic fashion, with needs in the field dictating the concerns of the Society. This point made its way into an early description of the Society:

The character and life of the Hutsul region advanced needs and tasks; these found specialists; the specialists and lovers of this region have organized sections, which have taken up the course of life and which give it methodically direction and strength.23

Other concerns led to the establishment of a full eight sections and clubs. Six sections were thematically organized – economic, hygiene, tourist-health resort, propaganda, the preservation of nativeness (swojczyzny) and cultural-educational – with two clubs run by scouts and legionnaires also connected to the organization.24

Although ostensibly non-governmental, the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region was headed by one of the deputy ministers of military affairs, General Tadeusz Kasprzycki.25 In this it was quite different from the Polish Tatra Society, which could not brag of friends in such high places. It is altogether quite likely that the general, or someone close to him, was the author of the secret plan. It could also have been Kasprzycki’s ‘spy’ in the field at the inaugural Hutsul Holiday, Captain Adam Kowalski, who compiled a secret report on the festivities for the general that was quite frank about its flaws.26 However, Kowalski’s report concluded that, while efforts to popularize the Hutsul region should continue, interests would be better served if the Polish Tatra Society and not the local authorities were responsible for the events.27 In other words, he did not seem to advocate the creation of a new organization such as the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region.

In the Poland of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, it should come as no surprise that the military would take an interest in various matters of state, so many of his ‘colonels’ occupying posts in his Sanacja government. Yet the military connection to the Hutsul region long predated Piłsudski’s return to power in the 1926 coup d’état and Kasprzycki’s appointment within the Ministry of Defence in July 1934.28 The latter had played an instrumental role in the Polish fight for independence, appointed by Piłsudski to head the first military incursion into Russia of the Great War. The cadre company led by
Kasprzycki in August 1914 became the core of the First Brigade of the Polish Legions, fighting under Austrian auspices. But there was more to the military connection than that, as other events during the Great War demonstrate. Indeed, who but a military man was better placed to interact with a population that, during the first year of the Great War, had actually collaborated with the Polish Legions when they came to the Hutsul region? As it turns out, in late 1914/early 1915 a company composed of Hutsul volunteers had been established within the Second Brigade of the Polish Legions. The recruiting had gone on in secret, as the Austrian authorities had forbidden the Legions to recruit from the local population. These Hutsuls trained and fought alongside the Poles quite contentedly until Ukrainian politicians caught wind of the development and insisted that the Hutsuls be transferred to the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters (the Ukrainian counterpart to the Polish Legions within the Austro-Hungarian Army).

While all three groups – Poles, Ukrainians and Hutsuls – were ostensibly fighting to defend the Habsburg Empire and/or their homeland from Russian incursion, the Polish and Ukrainian military units also fought with an eye to a potential post-imperial future in which they might gain independence. Yet this independence was bound to be problematic, given both Polish and Ukrainian pretensions to Eastern Galicia. As noted earlier, they fought a war over the region – a war in which at least some Hutsuls fought for the West Ukrainian People’s Republic. This participation (as well as the establishment across the Hungarian border of a short-lived Hutsul Republic, with ties to the West Ukrainian People’s Republic) doubtless emboldened Ukrainians to consider the Hutsul highlanders conscious members of the Ukrainian nation. In the interwar period, some Ukrainians sought to keep Hutsuls and Poles apart: for example, in response to plans for the Hutsul Holiday, members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) distributed leaflets at several localities in the Prut River Valley inciting the Hutsuls to sabotage the event.

Ernest Renan famously quipped that forgetting and even historical error are essential components of nation-building. One might argue that this can hold true for state-building as well. That Hutsuls had fought alongside Ukrainians for Ukrainian independence was a subject forgotten – conveniently or otherwise – by many Poles. They chose to remember and/or bring into the public memory (for this wartime experience was not well known outside of the ranks of the soldiers involved) the wartime brotherhood of Hutsuls and Poles. The Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region sought to foster this (clearly selective) memory.

Indeed, this short-lived brotherhood of arms would come to figure prominently in the Society’s approach to the Hutsuls and their region. One of the first events organized by the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region proved to be a three-day ski competition in the Hutsul region in 1934. This so-called ‘March along the Hutsul Route of the Second Legionnaire Brigade’ commemorated that Polish–Hutsul wartime cooperation while preparing new generations of Polish citizens – Hutsuls included – to defend the Fatherland in the strategic mountain borderland. A sign of the high profile of this event: Marshal Józef Piłsudski himself sponsored the Hutsul Route March, with one of the trophies being named after him. Over 300 competitors – military men, civilians and even two patrols’ worth of Hutsuls (although the latter were not accustomed to skiing) – took part that first year, the patrols demonstrating marksmanship as well as skiing skills. Beginning in Rafajlowa and ending in Worochta, the competitors essentially
traced the route taken by the Second Brigade of the Polish Legions during the war. During the festivities, in addition to Polish dignitaries, several Hutsuls – a Hutsul veteran of the Second Brigade as well as the Hutsul mayor of Žabie – addressed the assembled crowd. Yet, in another bout of forgetting (this time, that Hutsuls had fought for their little homeland and/or Austria-Hungary), Poles concluded that the presence of Hutsuls in the Second Brigade meant that Hutsuls had been part of the fight for Polish independence. In this way, room was made for the Hutsuls in the master narrative of the Second Polish Republic (in its Sanacja idiom, in contradistinction to the previous governments dominated by the rabidly nationalistic National Democrats), which emphasized the extensive freedom-fighting pedigree of the Poles. The Hutsuls of the Second Brigade, thus, were veterans of the war for Polish independence and should be treated as such.

The Hutsul Route March, as well as a second incarnation of the Hutsul Holiday held later that year, proved a success. The Hutsul Holiday of summer 1934 was more focused and limited in scope – with only two locales, Worochta and Žabie, serving as the main sites and points of departures for hiking excursions – as well as better advertised. Instead of organizing special trains, tickets on existing trains were highly discounted (they cost a quarter of their usual price) by the Ministry of Communications. Some 10,000 guests reportedly came this time around, although numbers were estimated to be as high as 14,000. Putting these events into the hands of the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region, and the hands of the military, seemed to be the right move.

The Hutsul Holiday was also planned with the indigenous highlanders in mind. Two issues of the Hutsul paper Nowiny (written partly in Hutsul dialect, partly in Polish) were published prior to the holiday in order to help prepare the population for guests. They explained that guests were coming expressly to see the Hutsuls and their region and exhorted them to maintain their folk customs and dress and keep clean houses. In addition to the hiking and cultural events that were part of the Hutsul Holiday, the Society also strove to organize events that would appeal to the Hutsul hosts, such as shooting competitions in various villages. Kasprzycki himself was keen on seeing a Hutsul win one of the events – after all, they were good shots – thinking it would have a positive influence on their becoming loyal citizens of Poland.

While both the Hutsul Route March and the Hutsul Holiday became annual events, that was hardly the extent of interest of the Polish authorities and the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region. Inspired by Kasprzycki, over the next years the Polish authorities committed to a series of high-profile, new investments in the region, including the construction of a Hutsul Museum, a high-altitude agricultural school (both located in the largest of the Hutsul villages, Žabie), and an astronomical-meteorological observatory atop the mountain known as Pop Iwan/Pip Ivan. The previously impoverished region was seeing a degree of development, the likes of which it had never experienced before – and this during the Great Depression. Certainly no state had ever demonstrated as much interest in this remote periphery as did both the Piłsudski regime and that of the colonels following his death in May 1935. No less importantly, Hutsuls were actively participating in events organized by the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region and nurturing their unique culture while at the same time benefiting financially from the influx of lowland Poles into the region – all developments that might incline Hutsuls to be loyal to the Polish state, which apparently took an interest in their well-being. This was precisely what the Sanacja government was after: it sought the loyalty of all citizens to the
state, not an identification with a narrowly defined (ethnolinguistic) Polish culture. Piłsudski’s understanding of what it meant to be Polish was civic, not ethnic.

Emboldened by these successes in the Hutsul region, the authorities found it expedient to endorse another large public event that was held mid-decade: a Highland Holiday (Święto gór) in the Tatra mountain resort of Zakopane, which, already fashionable prior to the First World War, skyrocketed in popularity in the interwar period.45 Although the idea for such festivities emanated from the Polish Tatra Society, which wanted to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of its founding, that non-governmental organization was in no shape to put its plans into motion. However, in 1934 it found support – organizational as well as financial – for its idea in governmental circles. The latter – certainly whoever was behind the ‘Plan of Work in the Hutsul Region’ – doubtless saw the Highland Holiday as a way to expand outward from the doings in the Hutsul region. After all, the secret document had posited that the positive experience anticipated in the Hutsul region would serve as an example for other parts of the multiethnic Polish state. The Highland Holiday, thus, can be construed as the Hutsul Holiday writ large. The link between the events was even clearer for those who knew who was behind the festivities: the organizational committee of the new Highland Holiday was headed by none other than Kasprzycki, by that time Minister of Military Affairs.46

An innovation of the Highland Holiday, which was held in the summer of 1935, was a folk song-and-dance competition. The competition was designed to encourage the highlanders from across the Polish Carpathians to maintain their colourful manner of dress and their highland traditions: those who did this best would be singled out for praise and awards. (Here hoary folkways were singled out not as backwards and inferior, but as beautiful and inspiring.47) However, apparently some regional groups were even encouraged to resurrect or reconstruct the old ways if they had fallen out of style (which by this time was true of some regions, where highlanders, encountering a modernizing world, had sought rather to assimilate to it and downplay their folk origins).48

Whether this was sensed by the tens of thousands of visitors who travelled to Zakopane for the festivities that summer is not known. They were reportedly thrilled by the performances, the first such highland folk festival in the Polish lands. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the Hutsuls won that first competition, exciting audiences with their lively, swirling, colourful dances.49 Yet many prizes were awarded, if only for what was deemed ‘authentic’. For example, out of 50 dances performed by the various groups of highlanders, only 32 truly qualified as ‘traditional dances’, with 18 representing a mix of contemporary and folk dancing (tańce mieszańskie nowoczesne).50 Performers of the latter would have been disqualified from winning prizes. Here one could certainly speak of the commodification of tradition postulated by Hermann Bausinger.51 The organizers – as well as audiences – were seeking what they considered to be primeval, authentic, folkways, not folkways corrupted by contact with lowland civilization. The fashion for things highland in Polish society – whether of the Góral or Hutsul ilk – escalated further.52

The Highland Holiday also provided all the performers – the various groups of Górale, Lemkos, Boikos and of course Hutsuls – with a chance to interact, to come to know each other and see that life in the mountains was an experience they all shared. Could it be that these highlanders had more in common with each other than with their lowland brethren? That appears to have been the hope of the organizers. By bringing representatives of the various highland peoples together at one event, the organizers wished to foster a sense of
brotherhood across the Carpathian region – in essence, creating a new, broader, regionalism for the highlands as a whole.\textsuperscript{53} This new regionalism transcended administrative borders – indeed, trumped them. Think of it too as a centripetal, not centrifugal, force. For the organizers also sought to strengthen the highlanders’ sense of belonging to the Polish state, essentially folding this newly created highland identity into a larger, state one; all highlanders participating in the Highland Holiday were rewarded with an excursion to Cracow, Gdynia and Warsaw after the event. One could think of Cracow as representing the Polish past and historic greatness, the modern port of Gdynia its progress and potential, with Warsaw being the county’s modern seat of power. The message conveyed to the potentially awe-struck highlanders, thus, was potentially powerful.

In these various regards, the Highland Holiday seemed to have been a success. The highlanders were duly impressed.\textsuperscript{54} One wonders whether they were in some way prompted; but while still present in Zakopane, leaders of the regional groups resolved to create a common organization that would work to unify and develop all the highland areas of Poland. This was precisely what the organizers sought: the goal of the Highland Holiday had been to bring together the inhabitants of all the highland regions; to come to know the shared characteristics of their folklore and cultural achievements; to achieve a common platform of cooperation that would strengthen the state; and to lift the highlands economically and culturally.\textsuperscript{55}

The organization to emerge out of this was the Union of Mountain Lands (Związek Ziem Górskich). Although its founding was prefigured at the Zakopane festivities, the union was not established until the next highland event – the Highland Congress – in Sanok the following year.\textsuperscript{56} Once again the cast of characters was predictable. Kasprzycki stood at the head of the Union of Mountain Lands, assisted by specialists in animal husbandry, nature preservation and tourism, in addition to his military men.\textsuperscript{57} Notably, there were no highlanders serving as officers of the board, although those present at the Sanok event had rubber-stamped the new highland organization. The Union of Mountain Lands thus seemed to be more for the highlanders rather than of them. In this way the new highland union was different from the earlier vision of Władysław Orkan, writer, activist and son of the highlands, who in the early 1920s had advocated for a union of highlanders that would infuse positive highland traits and energy into the larger Polish body national.\textsuperscript{58}

The Union of Mountain Lands nonetheless underscored what for the organizers was a fact worth emphasizing: diversity characterized the very nature of interwar Poland. The country was to be no regular homogeneous nation-state but rather a state of regions, each with its own distinct profile making unique contributions to the whole. According to those present at a Union of Mountain Lands conference in April 1937, the southern borderlands held promise as a producer of waterpower, which would contribute to the country’s electrification. Likewise the vivifying climate, curative mineral springs, and the beauty of the landscape would contribute to the regeneration of the citizenry.\textsuperscript{59} The vast swath of frontier territory between the already popular Tatras and Hutsul region – the Sącz Beskids, Low Beskids, Bieszczady, even the Gorgany, that is, the lands inhabited by the previously ignored Lemkos and Boikos –needed to be integrated into this touristic whole. This explains the decision to hold the Highland Congress of 1936 in the town of Sanok in the Low Beskids. It was envisaged that workers from the Central Industrial Region (Centralny Okręg Przemysłowy, COP), already under construction, would be able to vacation in Sanok
and its highland environs that were the Low Beskids and western Bieszczady Mountains, up to this point hardly on the map of tourist destinations. It was no less important that the integration of these parts of the Carpathians was to have ‘a great significance from a nationalities point of view’ – implied but not stated – that meant keeping the local highlanders from becoming nationally conscious Ukrainians. It was hoped that Poland’s Carpathian Mountain borderland would become a unified entity, its inhabitants uniformly loyal to the Polish state that did so much to promote it. The Union of Mountain Lands, thus, concretized the creation –invention – of a new (dare I say even modern?) highland regionalism, one furthermore that was to advance in rational and effective fashion the needs of the state as a whole as well as those of the highlanders.

In the interwar period, Poles thus addressed the question of the highlanders’ allegiance to the state. Building on the work done in the Hutsul region, various Polish organizations strove to turn the highlanders across the length of the Carpathians (whether Gorale, Lemkos, Boikos or Hutsuls) into loyal Polish citizens while at the same time making room for continued or even increased distinctiveness on a local and regional level. In other words, these state-focused activists allowed for multiple loyalties, whereas nationalist activists (those advocating for a Poland for the Poles, defined ethnolinguistically) would find such loyalties incongruous, seeing identity as something that had to be fixed or even set in stone. This move toward a Poland of regions, with a slogan of ‘unity in diversity’, gives the lie to views of the young Polish state as striving above all to become a pure nation-state, although the push for a civic understanding of Polishness was doubtless less benign than it may seem at first glance.

These moves also seem to demonstrate an interesting approach to the problem of national indifference among the peasantry at large. When the interwar Polish state was created, most of the country’s peasants did not conceive of themselves as being part of something larger than their village or region. The approach of Kasprzycki et al. suggests that it made more sense to begin with a strengthening of local identity – whether Hutsul or other – and then to fold these local identities into a more broadly conceived state one. Putting state before nation was a way of getting the heterogeneous highlanders to cooperate.

Or so it appeared in theory. The idea of a ‘Poland of regions’ is intriguing: but was the strategy working? Privileging local identities could also backfire. Witness the case of Silesia, a region with its own peculiar blended culture that during the interwar period was claimed and fought over by Poles and Germans. Peter Polak-Springer has written of the ‘slippery slope of promoting regionalism’: ‘by endorsing [their] identity and reviving old and promoting new regional traditions’, the balance might swing ‘too far in the direction of regional consciousness’, which indeed, he argues, continued to hold the greatest appeal for the Silesians.

So it was for the region of Silesia, where the population in question spoke a dialect of Polish. The case of the heterogeneous highland borderland of the Second Polish Republic was further complicated, as seen from the reactions of the Hutsuls. Recall that their loyalty was essentially being bought: with the influx of tourists; with trips around Poland; with pocket money on those trips; with the proximity to power in its military incarnation. If the Polish writer Jalu Kurek is correct, this treatment touched only the top layer of the highland population: the most prominent or well-connected individuals who could afford to outfit themselves and/or their relatives in proper traditional folk style (a form of dress much more expensive than store-bought clothes) – folk costume being the synecdoche of the highlander. It was these individuals, he maintained, who travelled to the various holidays and about the
country representing their region. Any signs of loyalty, thus, emanated at most from a narrow top layer, the masses of highlanders—still impoverished and untouched by developments—remaining oblivious.

Still, all this attention reportedly went to the head of some Hutsul participants, who assumed they could act with impunity, as they had protectors in high places; the latter could unfortunately be complacent, having assumed they had already won the Hutsuls—who after all were cooperating with the authorities—for Polish statehood. Yet it was one thing to line Hutsuls’ pockets, and another to win over their hearts and minds. The veneer of Hutsul loyalty to the Polish state was painfully thin. It was doubtless of an instrumental and rational nature, as Brendan Karch—who rightly chooses to speak of (more fluid, even multiple) loyalties rather than (set in stone) identities—has demonstrated for the Upper Silesians. After all, there were other reasons why they might acquiesce and/or cooperate. For example, could not all the investment in the Hutsul region be viewed as an investment in a Hutsul future, with or without the Poles? Faring better financially than they had circa 1930, Hutsuls in turn could feel more empowered to act, and act in ways that the authorities had not anticipated.

Recall that the military wanted to do more than simply buttress local highland identities. A new highland consciousness of sorts was to be created that would embrace all the highland folk. Yet this too could backfire. For example, it put Hutsuls into contact not only with the west Carpathian Górale, but also with the east Carpathian Lemkos and Boikos, whose dialects as well as religious beliefs were akin to those of the Hutsuls. That the various events might serve as a conduit for the spreading of Ukrainian consciousness may not have occurred to the generals. Astute observers of Hutsul Route Marches in ensuing years noted that certain Hutsuls fought to house the competing patrols of Lemkos and Boikos, possibly for Ukrainian agitation. They were likewise concerned by the demonstrative ‘defection’ of several Hutsul patrols during the 1936 march right at the outset of the event. Utilizing the weapons of the weak, these patrols voted with their feet. Had they been compelled to sign up for the march? Or was this simply a way of signalling to those present—if not to the seemingly clueless military authorities—who really was in charge?

A full appraisal of highlanders’ loyalties lies beyond the scope of this article. What can be said for certain is that these efforts on the part of the military and their civilian allies in the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region and the Union of Mountain Lands were intended to inspire the highlanders to place stock in Polish statehood, to be ready to defend it. This is witnessed by the plans for a highland holiday in September 1939 (they had been held annually to date). The event in Zakopane was to be a “great patriotic demonstration of the highland people” of the Polish Carpathians, one in which they showed that they were ready to serve as a “highland Maginot Line.” This was what the organizers behind the Society of Friends of the Hutsul Region, the various Hutsul and Highland Holidays, and the Union of Mountain Lands really wanted: to reinforce the border with a wall of patriotic highlanders. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Second World War prevented this last annual highland event from taking place and put an end to the experimentation of the Second Polish Republic in the region.

As concerns the ultimate results of these highland experiments, perhaps but one example should suffice. All this attention appears to have gone to the head of more than just some Hutsuls. And indeed, the Second World War ruined the national reputation of highlanders coming from a more unexpected quarter: the Górale. While some Górale did support the
Polish underground in its cross-border liaising, if not by standing chest-to-chest as a human Maginot Line, a not insignificant number found it expedient to embrace the Nazi German vision of the highlanders as the Goralenvolk, in this way embracing not only Górals distinctiveness but also Nazi rule. Those who paid tribute to Hitler were led by highlander Waclaw Krzeptowski, one of those individuals who, dressed in his finest folk garb, had countless times represented the Górals at various events and hobnobbed with state bigwigs; he was aided and abetted by an admirer of German might who just happened to be the head of the Polish tourism office in Warsaw. It thus becomes harder to judge as efficacious the interwar vision of Polish regionalism as well as increased Polish domestic tourism in the strategic highland borderland.

Notes

2. The words of Polish writer, artist and activist Stanislaw Witkiewicz in his Na przelęczy, 38, 122. For more on this "discovery," see Dabrowski, "Constructing a Polish Landscape," 45–65.
3. It and its fascinating inhabitants were put on the mental map of Austria-Hungary in 1880, when Emperor Franz Joseph visited the region. On this, see Bujak, "Towarzystwo Tatrzanskie," 91–9; Dabrowski, ""Discovering' the Galician Borderlands," 380–402.
5. Maner, "Zwischen 'Kompensationsobjekt', 'Musterland' und 'Glacis'".
7. Mühlfried, Being a State and States of Being, 16.
8. This was not the only war Poles fought to determine the ultimate contours of their state. Much of the frontier was contested, with conflicts also in the west (with Germany), south (Czechoslovakia) and east (Lithuania and Bolshevik Russia). More details as well as context can be found in Böhler, Civil War, esp. 70–145.
10. Some Hutsuls certainly had supported the fight for independence. For one prominent example, see the writings of a rare, literate Hutsul: Shekeryk Donykiv, "Hutsul'shchyna v pol'skomu iarmi," 217–56.
11. This is not to say that there were no proponents of regionalism prior to 1926, the coup d'etat of Józef Pilsudski and beginning of his Sanacja government. On this, see the survey of the history of Polish regionalism by Patkowski, "Regionalism," 781–8. On the creative approach to Volhynian regionalism of the Sanacja period, see Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War.
12. The words of Tadeusz Kasprzycki, who in turn was paraphrasing a Silesian highlander, in Rocznik Ziem Górskich, 1939, 3. More on Kasprzycki later in this article.
14. Interwar-period Ukrainians – and, indeed, Ukrainians since then – considered this relabeling of what previously had been known as Eastern Galicia as an affront.
15. There is a large and growing literature on national indifference in East Central Europe, including works by scholars such as James E. Bjork (Neither German nor Pole), Pieter Judson (Guardians of the Nation), Jeremy King (Budweisers into Czechs and Germans) and Tara Zahra (“Imagined Noncommunities,” Kidnapped Souls). Other approaches to the subject have been advanced by Egry, "Beyond Politics," and Karch, Nation and Loyalty (the latter an approach I find especially congenial).
17. “Zebranie w sprawie Święta Huculszczyzny”; Orbis brochure “Święto Huculszczyzny”; letter of 9 June 1933 of Teodor Caïs, Chair of the Communications-Excursion Section of the District Committee of the Hutsul Holiday in Nadwórna, to the administration of the Stanisławów Branch of the Polish Tatra Society, in the State Archive of the Ivano-Frankivs'k Oblast (Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Ivano-Frankivs'koi Oblasti, henceforth DAIFO), 368/1/40: 32.

18. I have given the commune head's name in its Polish (as opposed to Hutsul) form, just as I found it in the sources.

19. DAIFO 368/1/40: 35.

20. DAIFO 368/1/40: 36.

21. “Wszyscy na Huculszczyznę 15, 16, 17 i 18 czerwca b.r.” of June 14, 1933, newspaper clipping found in the Piotr Kontny archive, The Central State Historical Archive in L'viv (Tsентральнi Державний Історичний Архів у Львові – henceforth TsDIAL), fond 869. The cost for room, board, and entertainment was not to exceed three zloty per person per day (DAIFO 368/1/40: 36.)

22. Indeed, there was also a conspiratorial dimension to the government front organization, one that lies outside the parameters of this article.

23. DAIFO 370/1/42:23-23b.


25. Komunikat Nr. 1, September 27, 1933, DAIFO 370/1/42:17.

26. See the secret report on the Hutsul Holiday prepared for General Tadeusz Kasprzycki by Captain Adam Kowalski, Sprawozdanie ze “Święta Huculszczyzny,” typescript, CAW 1.300.1.644, 517–22. It is likely that Kowalski was from the Eleventh Infantry Division stationed in nearby Stanisławów.

27. Sprawozdanie ze “Święta Huculszczyzny,” 520.


29. Ibid.

30. On this, see Dabrowski, “Poles, Hutsuls, and Identity Politics,” 19–34.

31. It should be noted that Hutsuls lived on both sides of what had been the Galician-Hungarian border. On the Hutsul Republic, see Nechayeva-Yuriychuk, “National Identity and its Role in State Building.” The Ukrainian history of interest in the Hutsuls nonetheless dates back to the Habsburg period. For more examples, see Val'o, Podorozhi v Ukraïns'ki Karpaty.

32. On the OUN, see the secret government reports in DAIFO 2/1/959, ark. 156–7, 270. Still, not all Ukrainians were opposed. DAIFO 2/1/958, ark. 30–1.

33. Renan, “What is a Nation?,” 45.

34. For an exception to the rule, see [Piotr Kontny], “Stosunki gospodarcze na poloninach wschodnio-karpackich (Beskidy Huculskie),” DAIFO 869/1/68: 42, ark. 44.

35. General Kazimierz Łukosi of the Eleventh Infantry Division, stationed in nearby Stanisławów, was in charge of organizing the march.

36. TsDIAL, 204/2/279: 1.

37. Each patrol was composed of four competitors. Forty pairs of skis were handed out to Hutsul children, doubtless with the hope that they, too, would one day participate in the event. Jotemski, “Sladami legionistow Żelaznej Brygady,” 131–3.

38. Ibid., 132.

39. The Legionnaires’ Association in Żabie organized a Christmas party with other former legionnaires from outside the region, according to a secret situational report to the provincial government in 1934, per DAIFO 2/1/1023: ark. 8 verte.

40. Program Święta Huculszczyzny, 3.

41. DAIFO 2/1/1023: 40 verte. Mieczysław Orłowicz of the central tourist office in Warsaw provided the higher estimate: DAIFO 370/1/4: 61–2.

42. DAIFO 370/1/22: 31–3.

43. DAIFO 370/1/22: 15. The same sentiment can be found in another letter by Kasprzycki, DAIFO 370/1/22: 16.

44. The previous contender for interest in the region dated from Habsburg times, when the Prut River Valley and especially the high-altitude resort of Jaremcze were developing at a good
pace until the First World War obliterated their achievements. For more on this, see Dabrowski, "The 'Polish Switzerland'," 165-74. And of course the mere presence of Emperor Franz Joseph at the ethnographic exhibition in Kolomyja/Kolomyia had previously raised the profile of the region. On this, see note 3.

45. On this, see, for example, Skowroński, Tatry międzywojenne. In English, an article by Daniel Stone conveys some of the growing pains of that resort: Stone, "The Cable Car at Kasprov Wierch," 601-24.

46. See, for example, Goetel, "Zagadnienia regionalizmu górskiego w Polsce," 131; "Kasprzycki Tadeusz Zbigniew (1891-1978)", in Stawecki, Słownik biograficzny generałów, 161-3.

47. This is exactly the opposite of what Philipp Ther has posited for the twentieth century: see Ther, "Einleitung: Sprachliche, kulturelle und ethnische 'Zwischenräume'," XI.


49. See, for example, "Święto Gór," 404.


51. Bausinger, Folk Culture.

52. This can be seen from the arts as well: fine arts, including music, took inspiration from the highlands. Think of the wonderful modern graphic art of Władysław Skoczylas or the modern music of Karol Szymanowski.

53. On regions as constructions, see Ther, "Einleitung: Sprachliche, kulturelle und ethnische 'Zwischenräume'," XIV.

54. See, for example, the account of Gustaw Niemiec, head of the Hutsul group from Kosmacz: Niemiec, "Święto Gór" w Zakopanem.

55. Paraphrase of "wzajemne zbliżenie mieszkańców wszystkich regionów górskich, poznanie wspólnych cech folkloru i dorobku kulturalnego, dla osiągnięcia wspólnej platformy współpracy państwowo-twórczej, nad podniesieniem kulturalnym i gospodarczem ziem górskich," in "Organizacja i powstanie Komitetu Gl. 'Święta Gór'," 1.

56. Every other year there was to be a smaller event, known as a Highland Congress, in contrast to the Highland Holiday, the next of which would take place in Wisła in 1937.


58. As evident from Władysław Orkan, Wskazania. On this publication, see Zborowski, "Regionalizm podhalanński," 204-9.


60. Only a dozen pages of this nearly 250-page guidebook concern the western Bieszczady: Gąsiorowski, Przewodnik po Beskidach Wschodnich.

61. Minutes from the ZZG Congress, April 1937, 8.

62. The modernity of this new arrangement lay in the state (that is, centralized) control over the Union of Mountain Lands as well as its emphasis on the rational development of the highland region, in the form of better roads and infrastructure, improved animal husbandry and the fostering of tourism.

63. For more on multiple loyalties, see Karch, Nation and Loyalty, 1-22, esp. 22.

64. Here, contra the "nationalizing state" of Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Still, there was a slippery slope between this kind of "affirmative action" (à la Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire) and perhaps a secret hope that the highlanders would polonize. Or not-so-secret hope: for with time the rule of the "colonels" after the death of Pilsudski tried to marry the focus on the state with an increased focus on the nation. On this, see Wynot, Polish Politics, 77-9.

65. More on peasants in interwar Poland's eastern borderlands can be found in Labbé, "National Indifference, Statistics and the Constructivist Paragon"; Linkiewicz, "Peasant Communities in Interwar Poland's Eastern Borderlands"; and Struve, "Polish Peasants in Eastern Galicia."
66. Celia Applegate (A Nation of Provincials) and Alon Confino (The Nation as Local Metaphor), among others, have written perceptively about the relationship between regionalism (Heimat) and nationalism in the German case. Regionalism was valued from the very beginning of the interwar Polish state. For a reflection of this, see Patkowski, “Regionalizm,” 781–8.


68. Kurek, “Góralu, czy ci nie żał?” 7. Kurek was writing in general about highlanders, or even more about the Górale, not about the Hutsuls in particular.

69. Karch, Nation and Loyalty, esp. 1–22. That identity is a concept worth jettisoning has been argued by Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond Identity,” 1–47.

70. These last observations come from Krakowiecki, “Sygnały alarmowe.”

71. See Krakowiecki, “Huculskim szlakiem Żelaznej Brygady.”


74. See the massive work by Szatkowski, Goralenvolk: Historia zdrady. For a briefer treatment, see idem, “Goralenvolk—krzyzys tożsamości,” 115–21.

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